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Obama administration: ‘We Must Prevent Muslim Refugees From Seeking Asylum in United States’

In an interview with FoxNews,DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson admitted that the Obama administration views refugees  seeking asylum from the Middle East and Africa as more of a threat to the U.S. homeland than other (i.e. non-muslims) refugees seeking asylum:

“In terms of the Southwest border, I just recently asked for them to focus on immigrants coming illegally from other hemispheres, from the Middle East and so forth, to detect them and block them before they even get to the homeland, working with governments in South America, Central America to prevent that from happening,”

He went on:

“You’re correct that we’re seeing illegal migrants coming from Africa, coming from the Middle East,” Johnson told host Chris Wallace. “And we’re doubling down on preventing that happening before they even reach the Southwest border.”

The Obama administration’s actions are a carbon copy of what Donald Trump has stated in the past on refugee from Syria:

“We have no idea who these people are, we are the worst when it comes to paperwork,” Trump said Monday on CNBC. “This could be one of the great Trojan horses.”

“We cannot let them into this country, period,” Trump said Monday. “Our country has tremendous problems. We can’t have another problem.”

 

 

 

 

 

BIA Remands of Immigration Judge Earle Wilson Asylum Denials.

Immigration Judge Earle Wilson is a lesser known Atlanta Immigration Judge to his notorious colleagues, William Cassidy and Dan Pelletier. But he appears to be just as bad.

A sampling of BIA remands of IJ Wilson’s denials of asylum claims from 01/01/2014 to 05/26/2016 shows that Judge Wilson will always find a way to deny an asylum claim, even if it means making false findings of fact(decision 1); making nonexistent adverse credibility determinations (decision 13); setting extraordinarily short deadlines to ensure corroborating evidence cannot be  found (13); depriving represented immigrants their right to counsel (Decision 10); ordering pro se respondents removed by intentionally failing to provide them with an opportunity to apply for asylum (Decision 11 and 12; depriving unaccompanied children their right to apply for asylum with USCIS under the TVPRA (Decision 2-7); or making impossibly torturous interpretations of settled law and common sense, (decision 14.)

An illustrative example is Decision 14, where IJ Wilson denied an asylum claim based on a particular social group of “violently abused women who cannot leave the relationship without leaving their children behind” because, he reasoned, the Respondent’s ability to flee to the United States meant that she had successfully left the relationship and therefore was not a member of the proposed particular social group.

With an subtle tongue in cheek,  the BIA pointed out in that decision that “…by definition, any person  any person applying for asylum in the United States has fled the  harm that they experienced. As such, the ultimate ability to flee from harm cannot be a disqualifying factor.”

Decision date: May 5, 2016

Basis for remand: IJ made false findings of fact, among other things, “The Immigration Judge appears to have found a number of erroneous facts in his analysis when  explaining that events that were described by (redaction) in his letter, were incidents of harm claimed by respondent—which made her account inconsistent. The immigration judge may have mischaracterized the respondent’s testimony and other evidence as never claiming that the gang members harmed them for, or while, they were preaching. As there may be factual errors in the Immigration Judge’s decision…we will remand the proceeding. And,…it is also unclear whether she was given an adequate opportunity to explain the perceived inconsistencies in her evidence as is required.

2 Decision date: June  1, 2015

Basis for remand: deprived unaccompanied child right to apply for asylum before USCIS

‘On the record before us, we conclude that a remand is necessary for a determination  whether this is a case in which the USCIS would take initial jurisdiction over this respondent’s application for asylum. In this regard, further fact-finding is needed 1) whether the respondent was determined to be a UAC prior to the initial filing of her asylum application; 2) if so. Whether that status has been terminated by an “affirmative act’, within the contemplation of the USCIS memo; and 3) whether the announced position of the USCIS as set forth in the USCIS memo has been withdrawn or superseded.􀀖􀀈

3 Decision date, May 28, 2015

Basis for remand: deprived unaccompanied child right to apply for asylum before USCIS:

“In the case before us, the Immigration Judge ruled during the course of the hearing that the respondent was no longer a UAC because lillS had released him to his mother prior to the filing of his application for asylum (Tr. at 15-19). The Immigration Judge indicated that USCIS could not conclude otherwise under the circumstances presented. Accordingly, the Immigration Judge assumed jurisdiction over and adjudicated the respondent’s application for asylum. On the record before us, we conclude that a remand is warranted pending a determination by the USCIS whether it will take initial jurisdiction over this respondent’s application for asylum.”

4 October 2, 2015

Basis for remand: deprived unaccompanied child right to apply for asylum before USCIS.

On the record before us, we conclude that a remand is necessary for a determination whether this is a case in which the USCIS would take initial jurisdiction over this respondent’s application for asylum. In this regard, further fact-finding is needed regarding: (1) whether the respondent was determined to be a UAC prior to the initial filing of his asylum application; and if so (2} whether that  status has been terminated by an “affirmative act” within the contemplation of the USCIS memo; and (3} whether the announced position of the USCIS as  set forth in the USCIS memo has been withdrawn or superseded.”

5 June 19, 2015,

Basis for remand, insufficient fact finding and legal analysis, D.V. based claim,

“We find it appropriate to remand the record to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings regarding the respondents’ eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal. On remand, the Immigration Judge should make clear findings as to whether the lead respondent suffered past persecution and whether the Honduran government is unable or unwilling to protect the lead respondent from persecution on account of a protected ground resulting from domestic violence. See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 l&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014). The Immigration Judge should further consider the evidence in the record regarding the effectiveness of the Honduran government’s law at protecting women from domestic violence (Exh. 4, tab A, pgs. 16-17).”

6 June 23, 2015

Basis for remand: deprived unaccompanied child right to apply for asylum before USCIS.

In the case before us, the Immigration Judge concluded that even if the there was a prior determination that the respondent was unaccompanied, he can no longer be deemed to be unaccompanied due to the fact that the respondent now currently lives with his mother (fr. at 12- 13). The Immigration Judge found that under these circumstances, the respondent’s status bas changed and a determination that the respondent is no longer unaccompanied may be made in removal proceedings (id). Accordingly, the Immigration Judge assumed jurisdiction over and adjudicated the respondent’s application for asylum. However, it is clear from the USCIS memo that the reunification of a child with a parent is not in itself determinative that UAC status is no longer in place. Further, DHS did not argue before the Immigration Judge, and has not argued before the Board in response to the respondent’s appeal, that there has been an “affirmative act” by HHS, ICE. or CBP to terminate the determination that the respondent was a UAC. Nor has the OHS explained what constitutes such an act within the contemplation of the USCIS memo or argued that the memo no longer represents the position of the Government.”

7 July 15, 2015,

Basis for remand, Id

“In the case before us, the Immigration Judge ruled that the respondent was no longer a UAC because HHShad released him to his mother prior to the tiling of his application for asylum (Tr. at 21; I.J. Denial of Motion to Continue, Oct. 29, 2014). Accordingly, the Immigration Judge assumed jurisdiction over, and adjudicated, the respondent’s application or asylum.

However, to the extent the Immigration Judge may have concluded that HHS’s release of the respondent from custody constituted a “termination” of his UAC status, we note that while the USCIS memo specifically references the HHS’s Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) Verification of Release Form. it solely does so as evidence that a UAC determination has been made. And, it is clear tom this memo that the reunification of a child with a parent is not in itself determinative that UAC status is no longer in place.”

8 June 29, 2015,

Basis for remand, Id

9 July 28, 2015,

Basis for remand: ij denied asylum application stating respondent failed to provide sufficient evidence to corroborate claim. IJ remanded by BIA because sister was available as corroborating witness but for security guards barring her entrance to court.

10 March 7, 2014,

Basis for remand:  Deprivation of right to counsel.

In the motion, counsel indicated she needed to obtain a copy of the respondent’s A-file. A continuance was granted for 8 days to November 14, 2013. On November 5, 2013, Ms. Wang requested a telephonic hearing, but that request was denied on November 7, 2013. On November 8, 2013, Ms. Wang asked for another continuance, indicating that she had a criminal matter scheduled for November 14, 2013. That continuance was denied on November 13, 2013, as untimely. According to the Immigration Judge’s decision, the order denying the continuance was not mailed to counsel until November 14, 2013. According to counsel, on November 14, 2013, the Immigration Judge spoke by telephone to a lawyer in Ms. Wang’s firm~ who reiterated the need for a continuance, and said Ms. Wang was appearing in a criminal trial that day, and she had not yet received the respondent’s A-file. According to counsel, she did not receive notice of the November 18, 2013, hearing.

Though the respondent continued to ask to be represented by counsel, the Immigration Judge proceeded to ask her questions concerning her claims for relief, and ultimately denied her asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (I.J. at 4-8; Tr. at 9-23). · On appeal, the respondent asserts that denial of the continuance resulted in a denial of her right to counsel. We agree.”

11 January 31 2014,

Basis for remand: Deprived opportunity to apply for asylum, pro se.

“The respondent, a native and citizen of El Salvador, filed a timely appeal of an Immigration Judge’s decision dated September 30, 2013. The record reflects that the respondent, who was pro se and who articulated a fear of returning to El Salvador, was not advised by the Immigration Judge of all of the forms of relief for which she might be eligible, and was not given appropriate application forms. We therefore conclude a remand is warranted. Upon remand, the Immigration Judge should consider the respondent for all forms of relief for which she appears eligible at the time.”

12x Date of decision, January 30, 2014,

Basis for remand, Id

“The respondent, a female native and citizen of El Salvador, has filed a timely appeal from an Immigration Judge’s decision dated September 24, 2013, ordering her removal from the United States. Considering the totality of the circumstances presented in t his case, we conclude that it is appropriate to remand the record to the Immigration Judge in order to provide the respondent with an explicit opportunity to file an Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal (Form I-589)…When the respondent indicated that she was afraid of being harmed upon her return to El Salvador, the Immigration Judge should have further inquired into the Respondent’s claimed fear, advise her that she could apply for asylum, and make the required forms for applying for such relief available to her…

13x Date of decision: April 29, 2016.

Basis for remand: First, here is why IJ denied case: First, the Immigration Judge denied asylum claim because she did not provide “reasonably corroborating evidence.” Alternatively, he denied her claim because he determined that her physical departure from the husband’s home literally meant that she could not be part of PSG of Married Guatemalan women who cannot leave their relationships, and lastly he denied claim based on, basically, fact that she did not report abuse to police, despite overwhelming country condition evidence and testimony that D.V. victms are not protected in Guatemala. The BIA found IJ clearly erred on all counts.

Additionally, the BIA noted in a footnote “As observed in the respondent’s appeal brief, the Immigration Judge gave the respondent less than 60 days to obtain and submit her evidence, notwithstanding her attorney’s explanation that she had just taken the case and that documents could not be acquired in that time.” As such, Judge Wilson effectively created a situation where it was more likely for Respondent to be unable to provide corroborating evidence.

“We first address the Immigration Judge’s conclusion that the respondent did not meet her burden of proof because she did not submit reasonably available corroborating evidence. The record establishes that the documents found to be lacking were not reasonably available.2 It is unclear how the respondent was expected to obtain a statement from her mother when neither the respondent, nor her mother, can read or write in any language (Tr. at 24, 35). The respondent’s hospital records were also not reasonably available given the inability of the respondent’s mother to easily travel to the hospital or communicate with the hospital staff, the passage of time, and the fact that the hospital did not reply at all to the requests from the respondent’s attorney (Tr. at 35-36,” 67-71). It was also not reasonable to expect a corroborating statement from the uncle of the respondent ‘s abuser (I.J. at 7). See generally, Niftaliev v. US. Atty. General, 504 F.3d 1211, 1217 (11th Cir. 2007) (providing that respondent cannot be expected to obtain corroborating evidence from the persecutor) .

The Immigration Judge’s decision focused on the fact that the respondent’s husband forced the respondent out of the home after 3 years. Because of that, the Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent was able to leave her relationship . However, the respondent’s testimony demonstrates her inability to leave her relationship even after she was forced out of the home. During this time, her husband continued to pursue her, to threaten her, to drive away other men, to physically injure her, and to make her live in fear that her child would be killed or kidnapped. Her husband asserted that the respondent was still his. The controlling and abusive conduct on the part of the respondent’s husband did not end when the respondent left the home but continued until her departure from Guatemala .

Finally, the respondent established that the government was unwilling or unable to protect her.  The respondent testified that she knew of other men who abused or even killed their wives and that police did nothing. She explained that she was advised by her own mother to put up with the mistreatment she suffered since it was believed to be part of life. Moreover, the State Department country report in evidence states that impunity for perpetrators of domestic violence in Guatemala remains very high, that rape survivors frequently did not report their crimes due to lack of confidence in the judicial system and other factors, and that few officers received training to deal with domestic violence or to assist survivors . See United States Dept. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014, Guatemala, 14-16 (Exh. E).

14x March 17, 2016,

Basis for remand: Immigration Judge denied asylum claim based on an adverse credibility finding, which was actually nonexistent, as the BIA explained.

“The Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s application for relief based on an adverse credibility finding, which the respondent has challenged on appeal (I.J. at 4-5). The Immigration Judge noted that after coming to the United States, the respondent was interviewed by an asylum officer and she indicated that (ex-partner) (I beat her because she wanted to leave with their children (Exh. 1, Interview at 6 of 12; Tr. at 33, 34). ln determining that the respondent lacked credibility, the only inconsistency the Immigration Judge relied on is the respondent’s explanation for why (her ex-partner) ID(I beat her (I.J. at 4, 5). As such, we conclude that the adverse credibility finding is clearly erroneous.

In the alternative, the Immigration Judge also determined that The Immigration Judge determined that the respondent did not establish that her proposed particular social group of “violently abused women who cannot leave the relationship without leaving their children behind” was a cognizable group. Specifically, the Immigration Judge determined that, unlike the respondent in Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), the respondent here was able to leave her abuser.We disagree. Although the respondent did ultimately c0me to the United States to escape her abuser, by definition, any person applying for asylum in the United States has fled the   harm that they experienced. As such, the ultimate ability to flee from harm cannot be a disqualifying factor.

Further, in this case, the respondent testified that [her ex-partner] would not let her leave with her children but insist that she leave them behind with him (Tr. at 33-34). We conclude, however, that it is unreasonable to expect a parent to voluntarily leave her minor children behind under these circumstances, and, therefore, we conclude that the respondent established that, while she was in Honduras, she was constructively unable to leave the abusive relationship because of the children.”

 

BIA Remands of Immigration Judge Dan Pelletier’s Denial of Asylum Claims

Below is a summary of several BIA remand decisions Immigration Judge Dan Pelletier’s denial of asylum claims.

Two important notes.

First, In cases 4 through 10, IJ Pelletier denied unaccompanied children the right to apply for asylum before USCIS, which has initial jurisdiction under the Trafficking and Victims Protection Reauthorization Act. (See INA Section 208(b)(3)(C) INITIAL JURISDICTION- An asylum officer (as defined in section 235(b)(1)(E) ) shall have initial jurisdiction over any asylum application filed by an unaccompanied alien child (as defined in section 462(g) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 279(g))), regardless of whether filed in accordance with this section or section 235(b) .)

In the earliest remand from the BIA, dated May 29, 2015, the BIA remanded the case to Judge Pelletier with clear instructions.

as USCIS is the agency vested with initial jurisdiction over the asylum applications of unaccompanied alien children, we would defer to USCIS’s determination of whether it retains jurisdiction over the initial adjudication of a respondent’s application. See section 208(b)(3)(C) of the Act. Therefore, we will remand the record to the Immigration Judge to await USCIS’s determination as to whether it has taken initial jurisdiction over this respondent’s application for asylum we will remand the record to the Immigration Judge to await USCIS’s determination as to whether it has taken initial jurisdiction over this respondent’s application for asylum.

The BIA remanded 4 additional cases to Judge Pelletier in June of 2015 with the same instructions.

Yet on June 19, 2015, nearly one month after Judge Pelletier was clearly instructed to continue matters to “await USCIS’s determination as to whether it has taken initial jurisdiction over the respondent’s application for asylum” he denied another unaccompanied child the right to apply for asylum before USCIS. See decision number 4 below, which was an appeal from a Pelletier denial of an asylum application on June 19, 2015.

Second, in decisions 1 and 2, where Respondent was ordered removed without an attorney, the BIA found the Immigration Judge failed  “provide to provide respondent’s with an opportunity to apply for” asylum and withholding of removal despite knowing both Respondents having previously expressed a fear of return to their native country.

Decision 2 was remanded by the BIA on June 24, 2014. Decision 1 was an appeal from the Judge’s removal order at a hearing on May 19, 2015.

As such, despite  the June, 2014  instructions from the BIA stating that he must provide Pro Se Respondents an opportunity to apply for asylum by providing them with Form I-589 and advising them of their right to an evidentiary hearing, Judge Pelletier was caught again in the same act on May 19, 2015–depriving Respondent of her basic right to apply for asylum.

1 Date of decision: August 25, 2015, Page 160 of FOIA release:

Basis for remand: “In the instant case, the Immigration Judge asked the respondent, who was not represented by an attorney, whether ‘there was any reason why she could not be returned to Honduras’ The Respondent replied, ‘The problem is the delinquency, the situation there is very difficult. The immigration judge did not further address the Respondent’s fear or address the relief of asylum or withholding of removal.’

The BIA thus remanded to “to provide the respondent an opportunity to apply for asylum and withholding of removal.”

2 Date of decision, June 24, 2014, P. 38.

Basis for remand: Respondent  not provided opportunity to present her asylum claim.

“The immigration judge’s decision states that he questioned the respondent and was unable to determine any relief for which she might be eligible. The immigration judge found that the respondent had testified previously that she did not have a fear of return to Guatemala. However, she actually had expressed such a fear at her hearing in Eloy on April 17, 2012 prior to her case being transferred to Atlanta. At the hearing held on February 23, 2013 the respondent’s reply to this assertion by the Immigration

3.    Date of decision May 17, 2016. Page 167 of FOIA release.

Basis for remand: IJ, in effect, 1. did not make a specific credibility finding; 2. Thoroughly evaluate and weigh the respondent’s supporting documentary evidence; 3. Carefully consider the respondent’s claim that she suffered past harm on account of her membership in the Pygmy tribe; 4. Evaluate whether the respondent would suffer future harm under the Makoumou tradition, particularly in light of her testimony regarding forced sexual contact with male tribe members.”

4. Date of decision November 24, 2015, Page 161 of FOIA release

Basis for remand: IJ did not advise or ensure that the asylum application was filed with USCIS, which has initial jurisdiction over unaccompanied alien children,

“We conclude that a remand is necessary for a determination whether this is a case in which USCIS would take initial jurisdiction over respondent’s application for asylum.”

 

5. Date of decision: October 16, 2015, 157.

Basis for remand:

IJ did not advise or ensure that the asylum application was filed with USCIS, which has initial jurisdiction over unaccompanied alien children,

“We conclude that a remand is necessary for a determination whether this is a case in which USCIS would take initial jurisdiction over respondent’s application for asylum.”

6. Date of decision August 27, 2015, Page 146 of FOIA:

Basis for remand: Id

7. Date of decision, June 19, 2015, Page 141 of FOIA.

Basis for remand: Id

8. Date of decision, May 29, 2015, Page 135 of FOIA

Basis for Remand: Id

9. Date of decision June 15, 2015, Page 131 of FOIA,

Basis for remand: Id

1o. Date of decision, June 17, 2015, Page 126 of FOIA,

Basis for remand: I’d

 11. Date of decision: July 24, 2015, Page 122 of FOIA,

Basis for remand: “after multiple remands, the efforts of the immigration judge, through no fault of his own, have not resulted in a transcript that is sufficient to allow appellate review. Under these unique circumstances, we must remand to afford the respondent a new hearing to present evidence in support of his asylum application and for the issuance of a new decision.

12. Date of decision, September 15, 2015, Page 89 of FOIA

Basis for remand: “Unfortunately, the Immigration Judge made few, if any, factual findings about the respondent’s experience in Mexico to support his determinations.

Footnote: For example, at several points in decision  the Immigration Judge refers to the kidnapping of the respondent, but provides no narrative as to what happened, and no other information about any other incidents that may have caused Respondent to fear returning to Mexico.”

13. Date of decision July 30, 2015, P.70

Basis for remand:

“In the case at bar, the Immigration Judge pointed out implausibilities in the respondent’s testimony and her documentary submission but did not make an express credibility determination (I.J. at 8-9). Instead, the Immigration Judge stated that the respondent did not sufficiently corroborate her claim that she suffered a forcible abortion from the Chinese government despite her mother’s corroboratory testimony (IJ. at 9). We will remand the record for explicit credibility determinations for the respondent and for her mother.”

 

 

BIA Remands of Immigration Judge William Cassidy Denial of Asylum Claims

Below is a summary of several BIA decisions remanding Immigration Judge WIlliam Cassidy’s denial of asylum claims.

One must keep in mind that the vast majority of Judge Cassidy’s decisions denying asylum claims are never appealed. As such, the sampling below is a proverbial “tip of the iceberg.” Full decisions of BIA remands of IJ Cassidy from 01/01/2014 to 05/26/2016

IJ Cassidy, asylum remand decisions:

1.Decision date: April 6, 2016

IJ denied D.V. Based asylum claim, respondent was pro se at final asylum hearing.

Basis for remand: “Upon review of the transcript, it is difficult to entire discount the respondent’s claim that the immigration judge commentary suggested he pre-judged certain aspects of the case before hearing and evaluating all the evidence.”

2. Decision date: February 10, 2016.

Basis for remand: “The record reflects that the immigration judge ordered respondent removed after a motion was filed by an attorney on the respondent’s behalf entitled Motion for Order of Removal. However, there is no no Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Representative before the Immigration Court…contained in the file. Furthermore, the immigration judge’s decision does not reflect that the Respondent was represented at the time the motion was filed or when he issued his order.”

3. Decision date: March 17, 2016.

Basis for remand: “We conclude that the Immigration Judge erred in finding that the lack of a formal marriage between respondent and her domestic partner, and the fact that the relationship lasted no longer than 1 year, were distinguishing facts which prevented her from establishing a cognizable social group similar to the group discussed in Matter of A-R-C-G,”

4. Decision date: February 6, 2016.

Basis for remand: “The Immigration Judge Found that the Respondent had not established a prima facie case for asylum without giving respondent an opportunity to provide oral testimony and evidence in support of her claim. We find that the Immigration Judge erred in denying Respondent’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal without first conducting an evidentiary hearing or giving her an opportunity to present evidence or witnesses in her behalf.”

5. Decision date: December 17, 2015

Basis for remand: Insufficient fact finding, specifically, “…the Immigration Judge, in finding that “the respondent was not in a domestic relationship with the individual who raped her”, overlooked the respondent’s claims that she was in fact forced to remain in a relationship with the gang member who raped her.”

“We are also concerned about the thoroughness of questioning of the pro se respondent as to her efforts, if any, to seek protection from the government of El Salvador. The immigration judge enquired whether respondent had made a report to the police, and the respondent testified that she had. However, the Immigration Judge did not make it clear whether he was referring to actions by respondent’s first or second male partner, and he asked no follow up questions.”
6. March 31, 2016

Basis for remand: “the Immigration Judge’s decision does not contain sufficient findings of fact and legal analysis to permit us to conduct a meaningful review of his credibility and nexus determinations.”

7. December 16, 2014:

Basis for remand: “In light of our many concerns regarding the hearing in this case and the misunderstanding of the respondent’s claim, we find it necessary to remand the record for a new hearing and a new decision.”

(Asylum denied based on adverse credibility finding, relying heavily on credible fear interview notes, which BIA strongly disapproved of in its decisions.)

8. August 22, 2014:

Basis for remand: attorney for asylum Applicant withdrew at the merits hearing. IJ went forward with hearing despite applicant being unrepresented. “…as is the case here,…when counsel for the alien withdraws, the immigration judge must grant a reasonable and realistic amount of time and provide a fair opportunity for an applicant to seek, speak with, and retain new counsel.”

9. July 25, 2014:

“Basis for remand: “We conclude that the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility determination does not comport with the REAL ID Act’s requirements to consider the totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors.”

10. January 8, 2015

Basis for remand: IJ denied asylum claim based partly on adverse credibility determination. BIA held, “Considering the respondent’s overall testimony and the corroborating statements provided, we conclude that the respondent credibly testified that she suffered abuse at the hands of her husband (who is now deceased), and was also abused, starting as a young child, by other family members in Guatemala.”

V. Stuart Couch, Remands

 

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Pro se ON BEHALF OF OHS: Melissa K. Metz Assistant Chief Counsel Decision of the Board oflmmigration Appeals Date: MAR 31 2014 APPLICATION: Asylum; withholding of removal; Convention Against Torture The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, has appealed from the January 17, 2012, decision of the Immigration Judge denying his application for asylum under section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158, withholding of removal under section 24l(b)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 123 I(b)(3), protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c), and a period of voluntary departure under section 240B of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c. The appeal will be dismissed in part, and remanded in part. An Immigration Judge’s findings of fact, including those on credibility, are reviewed to determine whether the findings are “clearly erroneous.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003(d)(3)(i). The Board reviews all questions of law, discretion, judgment, and all other issues in appeals from the decisions of Immigration Judges on a de novo basis. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(ii). The respondent submitted his application after May 11, 2005, and it is governed by the provisions of the REAL ID Act of2005. See Matter ofS-8-, 24 I&N Dec. 42 (BIA 2006). The Immigration Judge found· that the respondent is statutorily ineligible for asylum because his application was untimely filed, and he has not shown that the late filing was legally excused. See sections 208(a)(2)(B), (D) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ J 158(a)(2)(B), (D); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.4(a)(2), (4), (5). The respondent testified that he did not file his asylum application within a year of his arrival because he was unaware of his ability to file for asylum until he was placed in immigration court proceedings (Tr. at 41). We agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondent has not shown that extraordinary or changed circumstances existed which would excuse the delay in filing his asylum application (l.J. at 6-7). Accordingly, we affirm the Immigration Judge’s determination that asylum is time-barred. The Immigration Judge found that the respondent was not credible (l.J. at 7). However, even if the respondent were deemed credible, we agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondent did not sustain his burden of demonstrating that he suffered past persecution or that he faces a clear probability of persecution for purposes of withholding of removal. See INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407 (1984). The respondent’s claim is based on his membership in a cognizable particular social group consisting of gay men from Mexico. See Matter of Toboso-A/fonso, 20 (b) (6) (b) (6) I&N Dec. 819 (BIA 2000). The respondent initially testified that he left Mexico because there was no work following a flood in his town (Tr. at 37). He also claimed that he was discriminated against because of his sexual orientation (Tr. at 33, 37). He described an incident in 2007 in which he was verbally assaulted by the police at a lake (Tr. at 38). The respondent did not leave Mexico for 8 months after this incident. We agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondent’s testimony and declaration on his application describe instances of discrimination by police authorities on account of the respondent’s status as a homosexual male. The respondent was never harmed (Tr. at 38-41, 44- 45). In addition, verbal insults, threats and harassment, by themselves are insufficient to rise to the level of persecution (l.J. at 11). See Liv. Gonzales. 405 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005)(mere harassment does not constitute persecution). The Immigration Judge considered the United States Department of State 2011 country report and the 20 I 0 Country Conditions report for Mexico. These documents reflect significant participation in gay pride activities in Mexico and legal recognition of gay marriage and adoption of children by gay individuals in Mexico since 2009 (Exh. 5). Based on the foregoing, we concur with the Immigration Judge that the respondent has not demonstrated that it is more likely than not that his life or freedom would be threatened in Mexico on account of a protected ground (I.J. at 12). See INS V. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987). With regard to protection under the CAT, we agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondent has not established that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence (including willful blindness) of a public official (or person acting in official capacity) on his return to Mexico. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(4). Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. On appeal, the respondent argues that the Immigration Judge erred in denying voluntary departure for the sole reason that the respondent found not credible. A grant of voluntary departure is a matter of discretion, requiring a respondent to establish not only that he is statutorily eligible but also that he is worthy of discretionary relief. See Matter of Thomas, 21 I&N Dec. 20, 22 (BIA 1995). In exercising discretion with respect to a voluntary departure application, an Immigration Judge must carefully weigh both favorable and unfavorable factors. See Matter of Arguelles-Campos, 22 Dec. 811 (BIA 1999); Matter a,{ Gamboa. 14 I&N Dec. 244 (BIA 1972). : . . . ‘ In this case, the Immigration Judge denied the relief of voluntary departure as a matter of discretion for the sole stated reason that the respondent was not credible. The record does not reflect that the Immigration Judge considered or weighed the favorable and unfavorable factors, nor did he determine whether the respondent had the means to voluntarily depart. As such, we find that a remand is warranted to allow the Immigration Judge to reconsider the respondent’s request for voluntary departure. On remand, the Immigration Judge should address the 2 (b) (6) (b) (6) respondent’s statutory eligibility for voluntary departure, and address and weigh the positive and negative factors affecting his application for voluntary departure. Thereafter, the Immigration Judge should issue a new decision on the respondent’s application for voluntary departure. ORDER: The appeal from the decision of the Immigration Judge on the issues of asylum, withholding of removal and CAT is dismissed. FURTHER ORDER: The appeal of the denial of voluntary departure is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision and the issuance of a new decision. 3 (b) (6) • U.S. Dep11rtment of Justice Executive Office for !Irtmigration Review Falls Churc]l, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL Decision of the Board of !nunigration Appeals Date: FEB 2 8 2014 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Robert Zuniga, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Caroline Youngblade Assistant Chief Counsel APPLICATION: Voluntary departure The Immigration Judge did not prepare a separate oral or vvritten decision in this matter setting out the reasons for the decision. An explanation of the reasons in the transcript is not sufficient. Accordingly, the record will be returned to the Immigration Judge for preparation of a full decision. See Matter of A-P-, 22 I&N Dec. 468 (BIA 1999). Upon preparation of the full decision, tbe Immigration Judge shall issue an order administratively returning the record to the Board. The Immigration Judge shall serve the administrative return order on the respondent and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Board will thereafter give the parties an opportunity to submit briefs in accordance with the regulations. ORDER: The record is returned to the Immigration Court for further action as required above. (b) (6) (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Executive Otlice for Immigration Review Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Falls Chutch, Virginia 20530 Files: – Charlotte, NC In re: Date: MAR 2 6 2014 IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS: Vanessa Elias, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Caroline Youngblade Assistant Chief Counsel CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 212(a)(6)(A)(i), l&N Act [8 U.S.C. § l l82(a)(6)(A)(i)] – Present without being admitted or paroled (all respondents) APPLICATION: Asylum; withholding of removal; voluntary departure1 The respondents are natives and citizens of Honduras. The lead respondent is the husband of the first co-respondent, and the lead respondent and first co-respondent are the parents of the second co-respondent. The respondents claim that they have suffered past persecution and have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion due to the lead respondent’s involvement in the 2009 election of a National Party mayoral candidate. On May 29, 2012, the Immigration Judge held that the respondents’ asylum applications are time-barred, made adverse credibility findings against all three respondents, and alternatively denied asylum and withholding of removal on burden of proof grounds. The Immigration Judge further denied the lead respondent’s and the first co-respondent’s applications for voluntary departure, but granted voluntary departure to the second co-respondent. The appeal will be dismissed in part, and the record will be remanded. As an initial matter, the respondents claim that their right to due process was violated because the Immigration Judge acted with passion, and unfairly intervened and controlled their examinations, giving rise to the perception that he was not a neutral arbiter. Immigration Judges possess broad discretion to conduct removal proceedings, to admit and consider relevant and probative evidence, and to create and control the record of proceedings. See section 240(b)(l) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(l); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.36. We disagree 1 While the respondents checked the box on their asylum applications indicating that they would seek protection under the Convention Against Torture, the respondents withdrew this claim at the conclusion of the hearing (Tr. at 110-11; Exhs. 2, 2A, and 2B). (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) et al. that the portion of the transcript identified by the respondents shows that the Jrnrnigration Judge exceeded his discretion to question witnesses (Tr. at 47-48). After beginning each examination, the Immigration Judge permitted counsel to question all three respondents (Tr. at 47, 76, 102-03). Moreover, the respondents have identified only one instance when the Immigration Judge acted with “undue passion” (Tr. at 72-73). While we agree that it may be inappropriate for an Immigration Judge to raise his or her voice, the transcript does not reflect any relevant objection (Tr. at 72-74). Upon reviewing the Jrnrnigration Judge’s decision and the entire transcript, we conclude that the respondents have not demonstrated the prejudice necessary to establish a violation of their right to due process. See Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 256 (4th Cir. 2008). Regarding asylum, the respondents concede that the lead respondent filed his application I year and 39 days after the respondents entered the United States in July of 2010, making it subject to the time bar of section 208(a)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § I 158(a)(2)(B) (l.J. at 18; Respondents’ Brief at 3).2 See also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2)(i)(A). The respondents argue that the exception to the time bar based on “extraordinary circumstances” applies (l.J. at 18-19). See section 208(a)(2)(D) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2)(i)(B). Specifically, the respondents assert that after separate removal proceedings commenced in Harlingen, Texas, a change of venue to Charlotte, North Carolina was granted in the lead respondent’s case, but denied in the co-respondents’ cases. The respondents assert that they mistakenly assumed that they had all received a change of venue, leading to the entry of in absentia removal orders in the corespondents’ cases. The respondents argue that the “extraordinary circumstances” exception applies because the Harlingen Immigration Court issued inconsistent decisions regarding venue. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(5). They also assert that they did not learn of the possibility of seeking asylum until the first Master Calendar hearing in any of their cases, which occurred on August 15, 2011. The fact that a change of venue was initially granted only in the lead respondent’s case is not the type of “extraordinary circumstance” described in 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.4(a)(5)(i)-(vi). The respondents have not explained how the inconsistent venue orders prevented them from filing an asylum application within I year of their July 20 I 0 arrival in the United States. The respondents received notice of the inconsistent venue orders several months before the running of the asylum time bar, as the co-respondents became subject to in absentia orders of removal entered by a Harlingen Immigration Judge on April 12, 2011. Lack of knowledge about the need to file an asylum application within I year of arrival does not qualify the respondents for the “extraordinary circumstances” exception to the time bar, even though they were pro se at the relevant time. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(5); Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384-85 (1947) (stating that “Li]ust as everyone is charged with knowledge of the United States Statutes at Large, Congress has provided that the appearance of rules and regulations in the Federal Register gives legal notice of their contents.”). Therefore. we affirm the holding that the asylum applications are time-barred (l.J. at 18-19). 2 The co-respondents filed individual applications after the lead respondent on May 20, 2012, to preserve their rights to withholding of removal in the event that asylum was denied, since withholding does not provide for derivative beneficiaries (l.J. at 2-3; Exhs. 2A-2B). See Matter of A-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 275, 279 (BIA 2007). 2 (b) (6) et al. Next, the respondents challenge the adverse credibility detenninations. The Board must defer to an Immigration Judge’s factual findings, including findings as to the credibility of testimony, unless they are clearly erroneous. 8 C.F.R. § !003. l(d)(3)(i); see also Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, NC., 470 U.S. 564 (1985) (holding that where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be deemed clearly erroneous); Matter of S-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 462 (BIA 2002). Since the respondents filed their asylum applications after May 11, 2005, the claims are governed by the amendments to the Act brought about by the REAL ID Act of 2005 (Exhs. 2, 2A, and 2B). Matter of S-B-, 24 l&N Dec. 42 (BL’-\. 2006). As relevant here, an Immigration Judge may base a credibility determination on demeanor, as well as the consistency between the applicant’s written and oral statements whenever made without regard to whether an inconsistency goes to the heart of the claim. Section 208(b)(l)(B)(iii) of the Act; section 24l(b)(3)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (cross-referencing section 208(b)(l)(B)(iii) of the Act); see also Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating that an adverse credibility finding must be supported by specific, cogent reasons). Here, the Immigration Judge proffered eleven reasons in support of the adverse credibility finding. For example, the lead respondent demonstrated poor demeanor when he appeared to coach the first co-respondent by nodding his head up and down during her testimony (l.J.at 12, 25; Tr. at 72-74). In addition, the lead respondent testified that after he was threatened in public and his home was vandalized, his family sought safety at the mayor’s house (l.J. at 7, 25; Tr. at 39-40). This conflicts with the first co-respondent’s testimony that the family moved into her father’s house (l.J. at 13, 25; Tr. at 81). The first co-respondent did not sufficiently explain this discrepancy by claiming a business relationship between the mayor and her father (l.J. at 15. 25; Tr. at 92-93). The lead respondent clearly testified that it was the mayor’s home and mentioned no family business relationship. Furthermore, the lead respondent and the first co-respondent testified that: (I) three armed men attempted to take the ballot box from the lead respondent on election day; (2) their house was vandalized; and (3) men threatened them on the roadway after blocking their car with their own vehicles (l.J. at 4, 7-9, 13-14, 24; Tr. at 35-36, 39, 42-44, 75-76, 80-81, 84). These incidents are omitted from the lead respondent’s asylum application (l.J. at 24; Exh. 2). We agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondents have not adequately explained the omission of these events, which are central to the claim (l.J. at 24-25). The lead respondent testified that he did not want to remember these things (I.J. at 11-12; Tr. at 66, 68). However, the asylum application asks for a description of any past harm or mistreatment (Exh. 2). Although it is understandable that the lead respondent would not want to relive traumatic events, asylum applicants are required to do so. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (stating that a respondent bears the burden of demonstrating eligibility for reliet). Wnile we have not discussed all the reasons set forth by the Immigration Judge. based on the foregoing concerns, we find no clear error in the adverse credibility findings. Absent credible testimony, we affirm the denial of asylum and withholding of removal pursuant to our de novo review authority. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.(d)(3)(ii), 1208.13(a) and 1208.16(b); Camara v. Ashcroji, 378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir. 2004); Matter of D-1-M-, 24 l&N Dec. 448 (BIA 2008). Moreover, we need not address the alternate denial of the respondents’ applications on burden of proof grounds (l.J. at 26-30). 3 (b) (6) • et al. Finally, the respondents argue that the Immigration Judge erred in denying voluntary departure to the lead respondent and the first co-respondent. The Immigration Judge found these respondents ineligible for voluntary departure due to their lack of credibility (l.J. at 30). This ruling is inconsistent with the grant of voluntary departure to the second co-respondent, who was also found incredible (l.J. at 25-26). Furthermore, an adverse credibility finding alone is not a proper basis to deny voluntary departure. It is necessary to determine whether the respondents have satisfied each requirement of section 240B(b)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(l). The Immigration Judge may also determine whether the respondents have demonstrated that they merit a grant of voluntary departure in the exercise of discretion. See Marter of Gamboa, 14 I&N Dec. 244, 248 (BIA 1972) (listing relevant factors for a determination of whether an alien merits voluntary departure in the exercise of discretion). We will remand the record solely for additional analysis regarding the respondents’ eligibility for voluntary departure. See 8 C.F.R. § l003.l(d)(3)(iv). Accordingly, the following orders are entered. ORDER: The appeal of the denial of asylum and withholding of removal is dismissed. FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded to determine the respondents’ eligibility for voluntary departure consistent with the foregoing opinion. 4 (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Japheth N. Matemu, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Susan Leeker Assistant Chief Counsel CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 237(a)(l)(C)(i), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l)(C)(i)] – Nonimmigrant – violated conditions of status Sec. 237(a)(3)(D), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D)] – False claim of United States citizenship JAN -6 2014 APPLICATION: Asylum; withholding of removal; Convention Against Torture; Adjustment of status Tue respondent, a native and citizen of Kenya, timely appeals the Immigration Judge’s June 21, 2012, decision. In that decision the Immigration Judge (I) found the respondent removable as charged under both charges, (2) concluded that the respondent failed to meet his burdens of proof for asylum and withholding of removal under sections 208 and 24l(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“Act”), 8 U.S.C.§§ 1158 and 1231(b)(3) and protection under the Convention Against Torture, (3) pretermitted the respondent’s asylum application, and (4) denied voluntary departure. The respondent argues on appeal that the Immigration Judge erred in finding that he failed to meet his burdens of proof and additionally asserts that his claim should be remanded to the Immigration Court because he was denied due process and is eligible for adjustment of status. Although not mentioned in the Immigration Judge’s decision, we further note that the Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s motion for a continuance to seek adjustment of status. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) argues that the Immigration Judge’s decision is correct and should be affirmed. The Immigration Judge found the respondent removable as charged under section 237(a)(3)(D) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D), for falsely claiming United States citizenship. That charge, however, was not adjudicated by the Immigration Judge nor was the issue appealed by the respondent. The respondent conceded that he was removable under section 237(a)(l)(C)(i) of the Act for bis failure to maintain his nonimmigrant status. Thus, we need not determine ifthe respondent is additionally removable under section 237(a)(3)(D). (b) (6) (b) (6) The respondent does not contest the Immigration Judge’s finding that the respondent did not meet his burden of proving that his asylum application was timely filed (I.J. at 3). Thus, we will not disturb the Immigration Judge’s pretermission of asylum. In regard to the respondent’s withholding of removal claim, the respondent contests the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility finding. We review credibility determinations under the clearly erroneous standard. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(l). The Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility finding was based upon evidence in the record indicating that the respondent falsely checked a box on his Employment Eligibility Verification (Form 1-9) stating that he is a citizen or national of the United States (I.J. at 4; Exh. l & 2). The respondent argues that he made no such indication (Respondent’s Brief at 5-7; Tr. at 67-80). We conclude that even if the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility is clearly erroneous, the respondent’s claim does not meet his burden of proof for the following reasons. Despite the respondent’s contention to the contrary, the respondent was presented the opportunity to support his asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture claims with testimony and corroborating documents (Tr. at 46-48; 55-59). The respondent did not present anything other than his asylum application (Form 1-589). Corroboration was necessary to establish that the Mungiki can locate the respondent throughout Kenya and that they are so “dominate and permeate Kenyan society as to prevent him from Jiving in another part of the country” (I.J. at 6). Moreover, the Immigration Judge concluded, based upon the background country reports, that the government of Kenya actively oppose the existence of the Mungiki (I.J. at 6; Exh. 4 at 14, 17). Inasmuch as the respondent did not present any evidence outside of the statements in his asylum application and material issues remain unresolved and uncorroborated, we conclude de novo that the respondent did not meet his burdens of proof for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Furthermore, the arguments raised by the respondent on appeal are insufficient to conclude that the Immigration Judge’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous or that his legal conclusions warrant reversal under de novo review. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3) (standard of review). See Turkson v. Holder, 667 F.3d 523 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that a respondent’s likely future mistreatment is a factual determination). In regard to voluntary departure, the Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s request as a matter of discretion and further found that the respondent did not establish good moral character under section 10 I (f) of the Act (I.J. at 8). The Immigration Judge’s good moral character finding under section JOJ(f) does not contain any analysis. It appears that the Immigration Judge’s denial of voluntary departure is based primarily upon the false citizenship claim. It is unclear from the record whether the respondent made a false statement or claim to United States citizenship (Exh. I & 2; Tr at 67-80; Respondent’s Brief at 5-7). It is also unclear why the Immigration Judge initially granted the respondent voluntary departure and then later denied the same request (Respondent’s Brief at 8; Tr. at 49). Based on the foregoing, we will reverse the Immigration Judge’s voluntary departure denial. The respondent additionally contests the Immigration Judge’s continuance denial for his application for adjustment of status. The Immigration Judge correctly denied the respondent’s continuance request. However, the respondent submitted to this Board an approved visa petition establishing prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status. Inasmuch as the respondent meets 2 (b) (6) – the requirements for a motion to remand for adjustment of status, we will remand the record for a hearing on the merits of the respondent’s adjustment of status application. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). Fitlally, the respondent argues that his due process rights were violated because the Immigration Judge was hostile. The alleged hostile events were not recorded in the transcript. The transcript reveals that the respondent was provided the opportunity to be represented by counsel, file documents on his behalf, provide testimony, and examine all documents submitted by OHS (Tr. at 35, 46-48, 55-59, 62-66, 68-75). Moreover, the respondent has not established prejudice. See Anim v_ Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 256 (4th Cir. 2008). ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Court for further findings consistent with this decision. FORTHE BOARD Board Member Linda S. Wendtland respectfully dissents in part, and would remand all of the respondent’s claims, for adjudication by a different Immigl’.”ation Judge. At the hearing on the merits, the Immigration Judge<‘handed out a written decision finding (inter alia) that “the respondent made a false statement or claim of citizenship when he sigged a Form I-9 Employment Eligibility Verification ••• ” (I.J. at 8), and only subsequently, the Immigl’.”ation Judge provided the respondent:··an opportunity to present testimony and other evidence on that issue for the purpose of endeavoring to persuade the Immigration Judge to “reconsider” his finding (Tr. at 61-64). In rendering his decision on a critical issue before permitting the respondent to testify about it, the Immigration Judge arguably created an appearance of prejudgment that would call into question the overall fairness of the hearing. This warrants a new hearing on all-of .. the respondent’s claims, before a different Immigration Judge. Further, the majority’s- “de novo” holding that the respondent did not meet his burdens of proof for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture appears inconsistent with its recognition that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circait bas held that determinations as to the likelihood of future mistreatment of an applicant constitute factual findings that this Board may not render de novo. See Turkson v. Holder, 667 F.3d 523, 527-30 (4th Cir. 2012); see also 8 C.F.R. section 1003.l(d)(3)(iv). 3 (b) (6) • U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board oflmmigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Pro se ON BEHALF OF OHS: Susan Leeker Assistant Chief Counsel CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 212(a)(6)(A)(i), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § I I 82(a)(6)(A)(i)] – Present without being admitted or paroled APPLICATION: Asylum; withholding of removal FEB -7 2014 The respondent, a native and citizen of Guatemala, has timely appealed the Immigration Judge’s July 10, 2012, decision. The Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture pursuant to sections 208 and 24l(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, respectively, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 and 1231(b)(3), and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). On appeal, the respondent contests the denial of asylum and withholding of removal. The Department of Homeland Security (“OHS”) has filed a brief opposing the respondent’s appeal. The respondent’s request for oral argument before this Board is denied. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(e)(7). The record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings. Initially, we observe that the respondent’s application for relief is governed by the amendments to the Act brought about by the passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005. See section 208(b)(l)(B) of the Act; Matter of S-8-, 24 l&N Dec. 42 (BIA 2006). We review an Immigration Judge’s findings of fact, including credibility findings, to determine whether they are clearly erroneous. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.J(d)(3)(i). We review de novo all questions of law, discretion, and judgment and any other issues in appeals from decisions of Immigration Judges. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(dX3)(ii). The respondent claims that he was persecuted in Guatemala on account of his sexual orientation. The Immigration Judge found the respondent ineligible for asylum because he did not timely file for asylum (I.J at 10). The Immigration Judge credited the respondent’s testimony but found that he did not establish past persecution or a clear probability of persecution on account of his sexual orientation (I.J. at 9, 13, 15). (b) (6) (b) (6) On appeal, the respondent contends that the Immigration Judge failed to consider that extraordinary circumstances excused the untimely filing of his asylum application (Respondent’s Brief at 9-11 ). The respondent claims that his ongoing severe psychological struggle to overcome the trauma of sexual assault and to accept that he is gay constitutes extraordinary circumstances (Respondent’s Brief at 11). The respondent also argues on appeal that the psychological assessment of Dr. indicates that he continues to suffer nightntares, severe bouts of depression, and other symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and has tried to avoid feelings or discussions related to his past treatment in Guatemala (Respondent’s Brief at 10-11; Exh. 3 at 118-120). The DHS argues that the Immigration Judge properly recognized and rejected the respondent’s late-filed asylum application (DHS’s Brief at 12). We conclude that the Immigration Judge did not adequately analyze the respondent’s claim that e:x:traordinary circumstances excuse the untimely filing of his asylum application (l.J. at 10; Tr. at 52). Therefore, we will remand the record to the Immigration Judge to consider whether the respondent has established extraordinary circumstances to excuse the untimely filing of his asylum claim. Upon remand, the Immigration Judge should consider the psychological assessment of Dr. (Exh. 3 at 118-120). Tue respondent claims on appeal that the Immigration Judge erred in finding that his mistreatment in Guatemala did not constitute past persecution on account of his sexual orientation (Respondent’s Brief at 12-13). Citing Matter of 0-Z- & 1-Z-, 22 I&N Dec. 23 (BIA 1998), the respondent claims that when considered cumulatively, the mistreatment he suffere.d rises to the level of persecution (Respondent’s Brief at 13 ). The respondent claims that he was physically attacked and harassed as a result of his sexual orientation (Respondent’s Brief at 12). In particular, he claims that he was followed, hit with backpacks, kicked, and received death threats as a result of being gay (Respondent’s Brief at 12). The respondent also claims that in one incident, four men attacked him and hit him around his right eye causing an open wound which required stitches (Respondent’s Brief at 12-13). We find that the respondent suffered past persecution on account of his perceived sexual orientation. See Matter of 0-Z- & 1-Z-, supra. The respondent testified credibly that, while a child at school, he was attacked numerous times and threatened with death on account of being perceived as gay (Tr. at 23-24, 48). In addition, he was required to have stitches after one of his more serious attacks (Tr. at 42-43). 1 inasmuch as the respondent has established past persecution on account of his perceived sexual orientation, there is a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution for asylum and a presumption that his life or freedom would be threatened for withholding of removal and the burden shifts to the DHS to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there are changed country conditions. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(l), 1208.16(b)(l). Therefore, upon remand, after determining whether the respondent has established an exception to the 1-year filing deadline, the immigration Judge shall give the DHS an opportunity to rebut the presumption that the respondent has a well-founded fear of persecution or that his life or freedom would be 1 The Immigration Judge made no finding that the respondent lacked eligibility due to failure to report all the attacks and threats to the authorities. He testified that he did report the rape but that the police did nothing (l.J. at 5, 12-13). 2 (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) threatened. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(I), 1208.16(b)(I). Upon remand, the parties shall be given an opportunity to submit additional evidence, including the declaration from Mr. . Consequently, we will not address the other arguments raised on appeal at this time. Accordingly, the following order will be entered. ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision. Board Member Patricia A. Cole respectfully dissents. I would affirm the Immigration Judge’s finding that the respondent did not establish the requisite past persecution for asylum relief. I agree that the harm respondent suffered from private individuals does constitute past persecution on account of his sexual orientation. However, establishing that the harm comes from private actors does not end the inquiry. Persecution under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) must be inflicted either by the government or by persons the government is unable or unwilling to control. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(I); Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d I I 7, 128 (4th Cir. 20 ll) (recognizing the government must somehow be implicated either by participation or acquiescence). The respondent must show the government’s acquiescence in the persecutor’s acts or its unwillingness or inability to control the persecution. The respondent has not met this burden of proof and therefore I would affirm the Immigration Judge. 3 (b) (6) (b) (6) r ‘ I U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for, Immigration Review Decision of the Board oflmmigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 20530 Files: – Charlotte, NC Inre: Date: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS: Joseph J. Rose, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Lisa P. Durant Assistant Chief Counsel CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 237(a)(l)(B), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l)(B)] – ‘JUN 1 In the United States in violation oflaw (both respondents) APPLICATION: Asylum; withholding of removal; Convention Against Torture The respondents, 1 natives and citizens of Belarus, have appealed the Immigration Judge’s September 19, 2012, decision denying their application for asylum under section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158, withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and protection under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture (CAn, as implemented by 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16-.18. The record will be remanded. We review an Immigration Judge’s findings of fact for clear error, and review questions of law, discretion, and judgment, and all other issues on appeal de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3); see Turkson v. Holder, 667 F.3d 523 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that the likelihood of an event is a question of fact; determining whether what is likely to happen amounts to torture is a question of law). Because the respondent filed her application after May 11, 2005, it is governed by the provisions of the REAL ID Act. See Matter o/S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 42, 45 (BIA 2006); see also Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 260 (BIA 2007). The Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture because he found certain aspects of the respondent’s testimony and evidence not credible and found that the respondent did not provide sufficient corroborative evidence. 1 The lead respondent is the wife ( ) and the derivative respondent is her husband ( ). They are collectively referred to as the “respondents,” while the lead respondent will be referred to throughout this decision as the “respondent.” (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) et al. On appeal, the respondent challenges the Immigration Judge’s credibility finding. The respondent asserts that the Immigration Judge made a series of speculative, unsupported assumptions and findings which improperly undermined the respondent’s testimony and other evidence (Respondent’s Br. at 21-26). We conclude that at least one of the reasons cited by the Immigration Judge does not support an adverse credibility finding. For instance, the Immigration Judge first finds that the factual details of the respondent’s claim contained within her written declaration, as well as her testimony, bear a striking resemblance to passages found in the 2010 U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report for Belarus (1.J. at 8; Exh. 2 at Tab A; Exh. 3 at Tab A). We find the Immigration Judge’s reliance on similarities in the respondent’s account with incidents reported by the U.S. State Department to be speculative. We also note that some of the other specific reasons described by the Immigration Judge in his decision may lack the required cogency to support the adverse credibility finding (Respondent’s Br. at 5-15). See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i). For instance, we are concerned by the Immigration Judge’s wholesale discrediting of the respondent’s corroboration due to its self-serving nature or because the corroboration is from an interested party. Cf Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361 (4th Cir. 2004); cf H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 2010).2 As such, we reverse the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility finding as clearly erroneous. See Lin-Jian v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 182 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533 (4th Cir. 2006); cf Kporlor v. Holder, 597 F.3d 222, 227 (4th Cir. 2010). In this instance, we find that a remand is warranted so that the Immigration Judge can make a new credibility determination pursuant to section 208(b}(l)(B)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii). See Matter of J-Y-C-, supra. We observe that the Immigration Judge’s credibility determination should be supported by specific and cogent reasoning that complies with the REAL ID Act standards as well as the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s requirements. See Tassi v. Holder, 660 F.3d 710, 720 (4th Cir. 2011); see also Kourouma v. Holder, 588 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir. 2009). If the Immigration Judge requires corroboration after his new analysis, he must apply the REAL ID Act standards and Fourth Circuit requirements with respect to the expected corroboration. See Jian Tao Lin v. Holder, 611 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Matier of J-Y-C-. supra; see also Matter ofS-B-, supra. For instance, the Immigration Judge must identify the specific kinds of documentation he expects the respondent to provide, must give the respondent an opportunity to explain its absence, and must determine whether this documentation or any required authentications were reasonably obtainable from Belarus (l.J. at I 0-13). See Jian Tao Lin v. Holder, supra; see also § l 208. l 3(a); see also section 208(b}(lXB)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § l 158(b)(l)(B)(ii). In light of the foregoing, we conclude that further factual development and legal analysis are needed with regard to the respondent’s claims. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.I(d)(3)(iv) (limiting the Board’s fact-finding authority and stating that the Board may remand the proceeding to the Immigration Judge where further fact-finding is needed); see also Matter of Fedorenko, 19 l&N Dec. 57, 74 (BIA 1984) (“The Board is an appellate body whose function is to review, not create, 2 On the other hand, the respondent’s reported trips out and back to her country, as well as her omission of the alleged fingernails incident (1.J. at 10) are legitimate factors in assessing her credibility. 2 (b) (6) ‘ et al. a record”). However, we express no opinion regarding the ultimate outcome of these removal proceedings. See Matter of L-0-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 413 (BIA 1996). Accordingly, the following order will be entered. ORDER: The respondents’ case is remanded to the Immigration Court for further proceedings and for the entry of a new decision. 3 (b) (6) !’ : U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Date: IJUN 112015 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Omar Baloch, Esquire ON BEHALF OF OHS: Lisa P. Durant Assistant Chief Counsel CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 237(a}(l)(A), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a}(l)(A)] – Inadmissible at time of entry or adjustment of status under Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i), l&N Act [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)] – Fraud or willful misrepresentation of material fact (withdrawn) Sec. 237(a)(l)(B), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l)(B)] – In the United States in violation of law (withdrawn) Lodged: Sec. 212(a)(6)(A)(i), I&N Act [8U.S.C.§l182(a)(6)(A)(i)] – Present without being admitted or paroled (not sustained) Sec. 212(a)(6)(C)(i), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(6)(CXi)] – Fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact (not sustained) APPLICATION: Termination The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) filed an appeal of the Immigration Judge’s October 17, 2012, decision terminating the removal proceedings. The respondent, a native and citizen of Pakistan, filed a brief in response. The record will be remanded. We review for clear error the findings of fact, including the determination of credibility, made by the Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i). We review de novo all other issues including whether the parties have met the relevant burden of proof, and issues of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(ii). Under the particular circumstances presented in this matter, a remand for additional consideration of whether the respondent is removable from the United States is appropriate. In regard to the charge of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of Act, 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(6)(A)(i), the record will be remanded for the Immigration Judge to determine whether evidence in the record establishes the respondent’s notice of the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (formerly “INS” now the DHS) intent to rescind his lawful permanent resident status (b) (6) (b) (6) , (Exh. 5). The Immigration Judge relied on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Estrada v. Holder, 604 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2010), to conclude that the respondent did not have notice of the INS’s intent to rescind his lawful permanent resident status due to the absence of proof that the notice had been sent to his last known address by certified mail (l.J. at 5-6). However, we agree with the DHS on appeal, that the Seventh Circuit’s decision did not limit what evidence can also be considered to determine the sufficiency of the notice that the respondent – received before the INS rescinded his lawful permanent resident status (DHS’s Br. at 8-10). As noted by the Immigration Judge in his decision, the record reflects the respondent’s actual knowledge of the notice as evidenced in his “Record of Sworn Statement” (l.J. at 5; Exh. 2). Thus, on remand, the Immigration Judge should make factual findings in the first instance as to the respondent’s actual knowledge or notice of the INS’s intent to rescind his lawful permanent resident status and further evaluate the charge of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of Act. Although the Immigration Judge found that the respondent obtained his lawful permanent resident status (related to his Special Agricultural Workers application) by fraud or misrepresentation of a material fact, such facts were not specifically alleged in the Additional Charges of Inadmissibility/Deportability (Form 1-261) in order to sustain the charge of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(aX6)(C)(i). Thus, the record will also be remanded for clarification of the facts alleged in the Form 1-261, and for further consideration of additional or substituted charges of removability and/or factual allegations (l.J. at 6; Exh. 1). See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.30, 1240.lO(e). The respondent should be given an opportunity to respond to the additional factual allegations and charges. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.30. Accordingly, the following order will be entered. ORDER: The Immigration Judge’s decision dated October 17, 2012, is vacated, and the record is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision. FOR THE BOARD 2 (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Exeeutive Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Date: SEP 1 9 2014 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: S. Wayne Patterson, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Susan Leeker Assistant Chief Counsel CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 212(a)(6)(A)(i), I&N Act (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)] – Present without being admitted or paroled APPLICATION: Cancellation of removal The respondent appeals the Immigration Judge’s October 10, 2012, decision pretermitting his application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). For reasons that appear to arise from defective recording, the record before the Board does not contain a complete decision by the Immigration Judge (see l.J. at 2). As we consider the Immigration Judge’s decision necessary for our review of this matter, we will return the record to the Immigration Court for further action. Upon receipt of the record, the Immigration Court shall take such steps as are necessary and appropriate to enable preparation of a copy of the Immigration Judge’s decision including a new hearing, if necessary. ORDER: The record is returned to the Immigration Court for further action as appropriate and certification to the Board by the Immigration Judge thereafter. (b) (6) (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Decision of the Board oflmmigration Appeals . Executive Office for Immigration Review l’alls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: JUN 0 92014 In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Matthew S. Quinn, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Melissa K. Metz Assistant Chief Counsel APPLICATION: Cancellation ofremoval under section 240A(b)(l) of the Act; voluntary departure under section 240B(b) of the Act The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, appeals the decision of the Immigration Judge, dated October 19, 2012, pretermitting her request for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(l) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(I), denying her request for voluntary departure under section 240B(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b), and ordering her removal from the United States. 1 The respondent’s appeal, which is opposed by the Department of Homeland Security, will be sustained. The record will be remanded. The Immigration Judge erred in pretermitting the respondent’s request for cancellation of removal. The basis for an Immigration Judge’s pretermission of an alien’s request for cancellation of removal may not be based on an unfavorable exercise of discretion, a finding of no good moral character on a ground not specifically noted in section lOI(f) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 ( f), or a failure to establish exceptional or extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.2I(c)(l). Even though the respondent did not timely present evidence concerning pending criminal charges, the pendency of said charges did not, in itself, warrant a holding that she had failed to establish statutory eligibility for cancellation of removal.2 Cf. section 240A(b )(1 )(C) of the Act (providing that aliens who have been “convicted” of certain offenses are not eligible for cancellation of removal). 1 The respondent is subject to removal from the United States because she is an alien who is present in this country without being admitted or paroled by an immigration officer or who arrived at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General (Tr. at 1 O; Exh. I). See section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act, 8U.S.C.§I182(a)(6)(A)(i). 2 The respondent, through counsel, has conceded that her 2011 North Carolina conviction for misdemeanor larceny constitutes a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (Tr. at 21). However, there is an absence of indicia that said conviction independently renders her statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. Cf. Matter o.f Cortez, 25 I&N Dec. 301 (BIA 20 I 0) (holding that an alien who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude for which a sentence of a year or longer may be imposed is ineligible for cancellation of removal). (b) (6) (b) (6) Concerning the circumstances set forth above, we will sustain the respondent’s appeal and rpinand the record to the Immigration Judge. Upon remand, the Immigration Judge should set a new filing deadline for the presentation of additional evidence and provide the respondent with a hearing to present the merits of her claim to cancellation of removal. At said hearing, the respondent should also be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present the merits of her request for voluntary departure. At the present time, we express no opinion regarding the ultimate merits of the respondent’s requests for relief. The following order is entered. ORDER: The respondent’s appeal is sustained and the record is remanded to the Immigration Court for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision. 2 (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Decision of the Board oflmmigration Appeals Executive Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL AND MOTION ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Kelli Y. Allen, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Colleen E. Taylor Assistant Chief Counsel APPLICATION: Continuance; remand APR – 8 2014 In a decision dated October 24, 2012, an Immigration Judge found the respondent removable as charged and denied her request for a continuance (Tr. at 45, 57). On February 6, 2014, following the entry of her removal order, the 1-130 (Immediate Relative Petition) filed on her behalf was approved. The respondent now seeks a remand of the record so she can pursue an application for adjustment of status based upon her marriage to . The Department of Homeland Security filed a brief on appeal. However, the government has not filed a response to the motion. The motion is. in effect, unopposed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(g)(3) (a motion is deemed unopposed when the opposing party fails to file a timely response 13 days after service of the motion). Accordingly, we find that a remand is appropriate for the limited purpose of allowing the respondent an opportunity to file an application for adjustment of status. Nonvithstanding the government’s present nonopposition to the motion, it may contest the merits of her application on remand. Matter of Casillas, 22 I&N Dec. 154 (BIA 1998) (pursuant to sections 204(g) and 24S(e) of the Act, an alien must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the marriage was entered into in good faith). Given our disposition of the motion, we decline to adjudicate the respondent’s appeal at this time. ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with this order. (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) U.S, Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Stefan R. Latorre, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Melissa K. Metz Assistant Chief Counsel APPLICATION: Cancellation of removal; voluntary departure MAR 1 4 2014 The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, appeals an Immigration Judge’s October 19, 2012, decision denying his application for cancellation of removal for non-lawful permanent residents under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), and granting him the privilege of voluntary departure. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has filed a brief in opposition to the appeal. We review the Immigration Judge’s findings of fact for clear error. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i). All other issues, including whether the parties have met the relevant burden of proof, and issues of discretion, we review de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003. l(d)(3)(ii). Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, we will sustain the appeal and remand this matter to the Inunigration Judge for a new hearing on the respondent’s application for cancellation of removal. Upon remand, the parties shall not be precluded from proffering additional evidence, both testimonial and documentary, with respect to the relevant issues in this case. Accordingly, the following orders will be entered. ORDER: The appeal is sustained. FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing order and for the entry of a new decision. (b) (6) (b) (6) .. U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: OCT -I Z014 In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Pro se ON BEHALF OF DHS: Scott D. Criss Assistant Chief Counsel CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 2I2(a)(6)(A)(i), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)] – Present without being admitted or paroled APPLICATION: Cancellation of Removal The respondent timely appeals the Immigration Judge’s October 22, 2012, decision finding the respondent inadmissible as charged and ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). The Department of Homeland Security argues that the appeal should be dismissed. The appeal will be dismissed. The respondent was convicted of possession of marijuana of up to 0.5 ounces, in violation of North Carolina Gen. Stat. § 90-95, rendering him inadmissible under section 212{a){2)(A)(i){II) of the Act for aliens who have violated any law of a State relating to a controlled substance. Inasmuch as the respondent has been convicted of an offense under section 212(a)(2), he is not eligible for cancellation of removal. Section 240A(b)(IXC). In Matter of Bustamante, 25 I&N Dec. 564 (BIA 201 I), this Board found that an alien who has been convicted of an offense under section 212(a)(2) of the Act is not eligible for cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents and the bar to cancellation of removal may not be overcome with a waiver. The respondent argues on appeal that he is not removable under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act because he possessed less than 30 grams of marijuana. We will not address whether the respondent is removable under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act because the respondent was charged with inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act, not removability under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act. The respondent additionally seeks voluntary departure. Inasmuch as the October 22, 2012, decision does not explicitly adjudicate the respondent’s voluntary departure request, we will remand the record to the Immigration Judge for such assessment under section 240B(b) of the Act. (b) (6) (b) (6) .. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed in part and the record remanded for adjudication of the respondent’s voluntary departure request. 2 (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Date: JUN 2 7 Z01’i ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Carnell Johnson, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Melissa K. Metz Assistant Chief Counsel APPLICATION: Cancellation ofremoval under section 240A(b}(l) of the Act The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, appeals an hnmigration Judge’s decision denying the respondent’s application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(l) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(I). The Department of Homeland Security requests that the appeal be dismissed. The appeal is dismissed as to cancellation of removal, and remanded as to voluntary departure. We review Immigration Judges’ findings of fact for clear error, and we review questions of law, discretion, and judgment, and all other issues in appeals de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l{d)(3)(i). As the respondent’s application was submitted after May 11, 2005, his application for cancellation of removal is governed by the provisions of the REAL ID Act. See section 240(c)(4)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B). The Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s application on several grounds. First, the Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent did not demonstrate that he had been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of I 0 years preceding service of the Notice to Appear, and did not meet his burden of showing good moral character (l.J. at 10- 15). See sections 240A(b)(l)(A) and (B) of the Act; section 101(f)(6) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 110l(f)(6). The Immigration Judge also concluded the respondent had not established that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives (l.J. at 15-18). See section 240A(b)(l)(D) of the Act. In addition, the Immigration Judge determined that the respondent did not warrant a grant of cancellation or voluntary departure as a matter of discretion (I.J. at 18-19). On appeal, we find no clear error in the Immigration Judge’s findings regarding exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, and the respondent has not identified any factual error. The respondent does not contend that his removal would result in hardship to his United States citizen child. Rather, the respondent contends that his wife’s testimony and the medical reports demonstrated that she had medical conditions preventing her from working no more than 20 hours a week or driving a car. The respondent also contends that his wife has memory problems, narcolepsy, and carpal tunnel syndrome, and as a result his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to her and their child (Respondent” s Appeal Brief at 15). (b) (6) (b) (6) • Upon de novo review, and considering the evidence presented individually and in the aggregate, we agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondent did not meet his burden of establishing that his qualifying relatives would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The Immigration Judge considered a number of factors in reaching his conclusion that the respondent’s removal would not result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship (I.J. at 5-8, 15-18), and the record supports the Immigration Judge’s analysis. The respondent would not bring his family to Mexico with him (l.J. at 4; Tr. at 74}. The record does not contain sufficient evidence that the respondent’s child has any health problems. The respondent’s wife has a number of issues, including depression, memory loss, thyroid problem, and numbness in her extremities. The respondent’s wife also testified that she has narcolepsy, but the record supports the Immigration Judge’s finding that the medical records are not clear as to an actual diagnosis by a medical doctor. Rather, the medical records indicate that the respondent’s wife reported to a physician that she was previously diagnosed with narcolepsy by a neurologist (Exh. 4, Tab Mat 82), and an EEG came back negative (Exh. 3, Tab. J at 61; Tr. at 100-106). We agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondent has not shown that his wife’s medical problems will be exacerbated by the respondent’s removal (l.J. at 16}. Moreover, her condition does not put their child at risk (Tr. at 78). The respondent’s wife is able to work at least part-time (Tr. at 107), and her brother resides with her and may provide some financial, as well as emotional, support (l.J. at 6, 17; Tr. at 79, 81-82). While the respondent’s wife and child would likely suffer from diminished economic and financial opportunities if the respondent were removed to Mexico, and would miss him, the respondent did not establish that their needs would be unmet or that they would be deprived of schooling. We conclude the hardship in this case is not substantially beyond that which would ordinarily be faced by qualifying relatives upon removal of an alien. See Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 56 (BIA 2001). The Immigration Judge also denied the respondent voluntary departure (and cancellation of removal) because he was not a person of good moral character. The Immigration Judge found that the respondent provided false testimony under oath for purposes of an immigration benefit. See section IOl(f)(6) of the Act. We do not agree with the Immigration Judge’s determination as to no good moral character because we find that the record does not support the conclusion that the respondent lied under oath. Rather, on review, the record indicates that the respondent forgot when he initially entered the United States so he provided an estimated date. The respondent originally testified, consistent with his cancellation application, that he entered the United States in late 1997. On cross examination, he was asked if, after his entry, he had ever left on an occasion other than 2002 and then attempted to return. The respondent responded no. He was then shown a government document indicating that he attempted to enter the United States on three separate occasions in January 1998. The respondent explained that it was a long time ago and he must have originally attempted to enter the United States in January 1998, as opposed to late 1997. See Tr. at 66-67, 85-92. The record indicates that the respondent had a number of unsuccessful back-to-back attempts to enter before he was able to enter without inspection in January 1998. Given the record, a remand is necessary so that the Immigration Judge may consider whether the respondent qualifies for voluntary departure, both statutorily and in the exercise of discretion. 2 (b) (6) Given our resolution of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, as well as good moral character, we need not reach the other issues raised on appeal. Accordingly, the following orders shall be issued. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed as to the respondent’s cancellation application. FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded solely for further proceedings in accordance with this decision regarding voluntary departure. 0 ycL..· c.——–.. FOR THE BOARD 3 (b) (6) • U.S. Department of Justice “Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Executive Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: APR – 3 2015 In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Jeremy L. McKinney, Esquire CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 212(a)(6)(C)(ii), I&N Act [8U.S.C.§l182(a)(6)(C)(ii)] – False claim to citizenship Sec. 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)] – Immigrant – no valid immigrant visa or entry document APPLICA T-ION: Asylum; withholding of removal; Convention Against Torture The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, has timely filed an appeal of an Immigration Judge’s decision dated October 31, 2012. The Immigration Judge found the respondent removable as charged, denied her applications for asylum and withholding of removal pursuant to sections 208 and 24l(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “Act”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 and 123 I(b)(3), respectively, and protection under the Convention Against Torture pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2), and ordered the respondent removed. On appeal, the respondent contests the denial of all three forms of relief. The record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings and for the entry of a new decision. The respondent bases her claims on abuse she alleges to have experienced at the hands of her step-father. The Immigration Judge found that the respondent was not credible (l.J. at 6-9). This Board must defer to the Immigration Judge’s factual findings, including findings as to the credibility of testimony, unless they are clearly erroneous. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i); see also Matter ofS-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 462, 464-65 (BIA 2002) (stating that the Board must defer to the factual determinations of an Immigration Judge in the absence of clear error); Matter of A-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 1106, 1109-12 (BIA 1998) (noting that because an Immigration Judge has the ability to see and hear witnesses, he or she is in the best position to determine the credibility of such witnesses). In this case, we find dear error in the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility finding, and will reverse it. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i); see also .Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 260 (BIA 2007). The Immigration Judge based his adverse credibility finding on three factors. First, he found that the respondent’s attempt to illegally enter the United States by presenting fraudulent documents to immigration authorities did not “reflect favorably on Respondent’s credibility” (l.J. at 7). In Matter of 0-D-, 21 l&N Dec. 1079, 1083 (BIA 1998), this Board found that the (b) (6) (b) (6) presentation of questionable documents in an asylum adjudication for the purpose of establishing the elements of an asylum claim tarnished the respondent’s veracity and diminished the reliability of other evidence. However, we distinguished such cases from situations in which an alien has presented a fraudulent docwnent to immigration authorities for the purpose of escaping immediate danger from an alien’s country of origin or resettlement, or for the purpose of gaining entry into the United States. Matter of 0-D-, supra, at I 081. Here, where the respondent used fraudulent identity documents to gain entry into the United States, we do not find this rationale supports an adverse credibility finding. Second, the Immigration Judge observed that the respondent repeatedly did not state any fear of returning to Mexico during prior encounters with immigration authorities, but only did so after she had served her criminal sentence in the United States for misuse of a passport (I.J. at 7). We are not persuaded that this inconsistency supports a finding that the respondent was not credible, however, particularly given the nature of the respondent’s claim, her explanation that she did not think immigration officials could help her, and the consistency of the 1-589, her testimony during the credible fear interview, and her testimony during the hearing. Third, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent was not credible because she “failed to corroborate that her cousins were responsible for her brotherO’s murder” (l.J. at 8). However, even if this is the case, the lack of corroboration is relevant to whether the respondent has met her burden of proof, not whether she was credible. See. e.g., Lin-Jian v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 182, 191-92 (4th Cir. 2007) (discussing differences between credibility and corroboration); Toure v. Att)1 Gen. of the US., 443 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2006) (“As we recently made clear in Chen v. Gonzales, corroboration and credibility, although intuitively related, are distinct concepts that should be analyzed independently. 434 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2005).”); Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 288 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that it is inappropriate to base an adverse credibility finding solely on the failure to provide corroboration). Therefore, the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility finding is clearly erroneous. Having found the respondent to be credible, we tum to the merits of the respondent’s asylum claim. In his decision, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent had not established that she was a member of a particular social group, or that any past persecution was on account of particular social group membership. In so finding, the Immigration Judge observed that the “Respondent was threatened and victimized by private actors who were perpetrating private violence,” such that a nexus had not been shown. Subsequent to the Immigration Judge’s decision in this case, the Board issued Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), in which we held that, depending on the facts and evidence in an individual case, “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” can constitute a cognizable particular social group that forms the basis of a claim for asylum or withholding of removal. See also Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 2014). Given this development, and the respondent’s claim that the Mexican government refused to intervene when she reported domestic violence committed against her by her stepfather, we find it appropriate to remand this matter to the Immigration Judge to allow the parties to present arguments and evidence as to the applicability, if any, of this precedent decision to the respondent’s claims for relief from removal. 2 (b) (6) Accordingly, the following orders will be entered. ORDER: The Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility finding is reversed. FURTHER ORpER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision. l FOR THE BOARD 3 (b) (6) U.S. Department of Jnstice Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Chris Greene, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Lisa P. Durant Assistant Chief Counsel APPLICATION: Cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) ‘JUN 3 3 2014 The respondent has appealed from the Immigration Judge’s decision dated November 7, 2012. The Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), for failure to demonstrate that he did not have a disqualifying conviction under section 240A(b)(l)(C) of the Act. The respondent’s appeal will be sustained. The Board reviews an Immigration Judge’s findings of fact, including findings as to the c.redibility of testimony, under the “clearly erroneous” standard. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(J)(i). The Board reviews questions of law, discretion, and judgment and all other issues in appeals from decisions oflmmigration Judges de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(ii). Because the respondent’s application was filed after May 11, 2005, it is subject to the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231. The Immigration Judge found the respondent ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(l)(C) of the Act, due to his conviction for the offense of Assault Bodily Injury – Family Member, a misdemeanor, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 22.0l(a) (1.J. at 6-7). The Immigration Judge concluded that under the modified categorical approach the respondent was convicted of a crime of domestic violence, which rendered the respondent ineligible for cancellation of removal for commission of an offense described in section 237(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2). However, during the pendency of these removal proceedings, the Supreme Court decided Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), which held that a criminal statute is divisible, so as to warrant a modified categorical inquiry, only if: (I) it lists multiple discrete offenses as enumerated alternatives or defines a single offense by reference to disjunctive sets of “elements,” more than one combination of which could support a conviction; and (2) at least one (but not all) of those listed offenses or combinations of disjunctive elements is a categorical match to the relevant generic standard. Id. at 2281, 2283. In other words, the modified categorical approach does not apply merely because the elements of a crime can sometimes be proved by reference to (b) (6) (b) (6) conduct that fits the generic federal standard; under Descamps, such crimes are merely “overbroad,” they are not “divisible.” Id. at 2285-86, 2290-92. The assault statute under which the respondent was convicted provides in pertinent part: “A person commits an offense if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including the person’s spouse.” The essential elements of the offense of assault family violence are that (I) defendant, (2) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, (3) caused bodily harm to a family member, including defendant’s spouse. See Davila v. State, 346 S.W.3d 587 (Tx. App. 2009). Inasmuch as the elements of the assault offense involve acts that do and do not involve the use of physical force, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), the statute under which the respondent was convicted is not a categorical match for a crime of domestic violence. See e.g., United States v. Villegas-Hernandez, 468 F.3d 874, 878-83 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that the misdemeanor offense defined by Tex. Penal Code § 22.0l(a) does not categorically qualify as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § I 6(a)). Thus, under the Descamps framework, the statute is overbroad and not subject to an inquiry under the modified categorical approach. Under these circumstances, we find it appropriate to remand the record to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings regarding the respondent’s eligibility for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Act and any other issues raised by the parties on remand. Accordingly, the following order will be entered. ORDER: The respondent’s appeal is sustained and the record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing decision. ORTHEBOARD 2 (b) (6) — ——- – ··- U.S. Department of Justice .Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Ross E. Miller, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: CHARGE: Melissa K. Metz Assistant Chief Counsel Date: Notice: Sec. 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)] – Jmmigrant – no valid immigrant visa or entry document APPLICATION: Asylum; withholding of removal AUG 15 2014 The respondent appeals from the Immigration Judge’s October 31, 2012, decision denying her applications for asylum under section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158, and withholding of removal under section 24l(b)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). 1 The reeord will be remanded. We. review findings of fact, including credibility findings and (under the law of the Circuit with jurisdiction over this case) determinations as to the likelihood of future events, under the “clearly erroneous” standard. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(J)(i); see also Turkson v. Holder, 667 F.3d 523, 529 (4th Cir. 2012); Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 260 (BIA 2007); Matter of S-H-, 23 J&N Dec. 462 (BIA 2002). We review questions of law, discretion, or judgment, and all other issues de novo. See 8 C.F.R. § I003.l(d)(3)(ii). Because the respondent’s Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal (Form I-589) was filed on or after May 11, 2005, it is subject to the provisions implemented by the REAL ID Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231 (l.J. at 2; Exh. 2). The respondent fears returning to Honduras because of threats she received from a neighbor named (l.J. at 2; Tr. at 25-28, 31 ). The respondent testified that, although Mr. has never physically harmed her, he has verbally threatened her and her family (l.J. at 2; Tr. at 28, 40-41). She first encountered a problem with Mr. a year before 1 The record reflects that the respondent, through counsel, specifically declined to pursue her application for protection under the Convention Against Torture, and the Immigration Judge deemed that application withdrawn (Tr. at 20, 22-23; Exh. 2). (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) leaving Honduras, when he told her that “if [she’s) not his [she)’Jl not be with anyone else” (l.J. at 2; Tr. at 27). Mr. also told the respondent that he would “take her by force” (I.J. at 2; Tr. at 27-28, 35). The respondent informed her family of Mr. ‘s threats, but she did not report the threats to the police because he had threatened to hann or kill her family if she did so, and she does not believe that the police could protect her if she returns to Honduras (l.J. at 2; Tr. at 30, 35, 37). The respondent believes that Mr. is a dangerous man because she has heard from others in her home village that Mr. murdered and mutilated a friend of her family (I.J. at 2; Tr. at 28-30). She fears that Mr. will harm her and her family if she does not submit to his demands (l.J. at 2; Tr. at 40-41). The Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s application for asylum upon determining that it was not timely filed (I.J. at 2-3). See section 208(a)(2)(B) of the Act. The respondent, through counsel, conceded before the Immigration Judge that her asylum application was untimely, and, on appeal, she has not specifically disputed the Immigration Judge’s denial of asylum on the ground that her application is time barred (l.J. at 2-3; Tr. at 22; Respondent’s Brief at 7). Accordingly, we do not address the respondent’s eligibility for asylum. See, e.g., Matter of Cervantes, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 561 n.1 (BIA 1999) (expressly declining to address an issue not raised by a party on appeal); Matter of Gutierrez, 19 I&N Dec. 562, 565 n.3 (BIA 1988) (same). Upon de novo review, we conclude that a remand is necessary for further fact-finding and evaluation with regard to the respondent’s application for withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Act. The respondent seeks withholding of removal based on her membership in the asserted particular social group of “Honduran women unable to leave an imputed domestic relationship” (I.J. at 4; Tr. at 19-20; Respondent’s Brief at 8). The Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent’s proposed particular social group was not cognizable under the Act (l.J. at 4-5). The Board recently clarified the elements required to establish a cognizable particular social group. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 2014). An applicant must establish that his or her asserted group is 1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, 2) defined with particularity, and 3) socially distinct within the society in question. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, supra, at 237; Matter of W-G-R-, supra, at 212-18. Social distinction (formerly known as social visibility) means that the group must be perceived as a group by society, regardless of whether society can identify the members of the group by sight. See Matter of W-G-R-, supra, at 216-17. To demonstrate social distinction, an applicant must provide evidence showing that society in general perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular characteristic to be a group. Id at 217 (“Although the society in question need not be able to easily identify who is a member of the group, it must be commonly recognized that the shared characteristic is one that defines the group.”). In assessing the respondent’s proposed particular social group, the Immigration Judge determined that, while the respondent’s gender was an immutable characteristic, her relationship with Mr. was not an immutable characteristic because she was not actually in a relationship with him (l.J. at 4). However, this assessment does not account for the defining characteristic of the proposed group insofar as it includes imputed domestic relationships. The 2 (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) question remains as to whether being “unable to leave an imputed domestic relationship” is “something that either cannot be changed or that the group members should not be required to change in order to avoid persecution.” Matter of W-G-R-, supra, at 213. Inasmuch as this is at least in part a factual question, it is for the Immigration Judge to resolve in the first instance. See Matter of S-H-, supra, at 464-65 (stating that the Board has limited fact-finding authority); se1? also Matter of W-G-R-, supra, at 209 (observing that “analysis of a particular social group claim is based on the evidence presented and is often a fact-specific inquiry”). The Immigration Judge also determined that the respondent’s proposed social group was not defined with sufficient particularity (J.J. at 5). Although the Immigration Judge found that the articulated social group was overbroad, in assessing the group’s defmition, the Immigration Judge noted only that the group’s members “have not been in any type of relationship at all” (I.J. at 5). Despite this observation, the decision before us contains no specific evaluation as to “whether the group can be described in sufficiently distinct terms that it ‘would be recognized, in the society in question, as a discrete class of persons.”‘ Matter of W-G-R-, supra, at 214 (quoting Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579, 584 (BIA 2008)). A factual inquiry in this regard is necessary to determine whether the proposed group’s parameters, taken as a whole, meet the particularity requirement for establishing a cognizable particular social group under the Act. See Matter of W-G-R-, supra, at 214; see also Temu v. Holder, 740 F.3d 887, 894 (4th Cir. 2014) (stating that the Board erred, where “it broke down [the applicant’s] proposed group into pieces and rejected each piece, rather than analyzing his group as a whole.”). Insofar as the Immigration Judge determined that the respondent’s proposed particular social group lacked social visibility, that determination also was supported only by the observation that the group’s members “have not been in any type of relationship at all” (l.J. at 5). As discussed above, in order to meet the “social distinction” requirement, the respondent must demonstrate that society in general perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the asserted characteristics to be a group. See Matter of W-G-R-, supra, at 217. A determination as to whether the respondent’s proposed group is socially distinct requires additional fact-finding and assessment of the evidence of record with regard to Honduran society’s perceptions vis-a-vis the characteristics of the proposed particular social group. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that further fact-finding is needed to decide whether the respondent’s proposed particular social group is cognizable under the Act. Although we do not reach the issue whether the proposed group is legally cognizable, we do conclude that the Immigration Judge should reconsider his determination that the proposed group is impermissibly circular (I.J. at 5). The proposed group does not appear to be defined solely by the fact that its members are targeted for persecution, as its definition does not include, as its sole element, that group members must be subjected to, or likely to face, mistreatment. See Temu v. Holder, supra, at 894 (“A [particular social] group cannot be defined solely by the fact of its persecution,” but can still qualify as such if it “has a cornrnon thread outside of its victirnhood”). Moreover, we acknowledge the Immigration Judge’s finding that the respondent’s claim involves ”threats of private violence” (l.J. at 5). However, in deciding that evidence of these threats did not constitute persecution on account of a protected ground, the Immigration Judge made no finding as to whether the Honduran government was unable or unwilling to control the 3 (b) (6) private actor that the respondent fears; nor did he consider the background evidence that the respondent has presented in regard to that issue and others (I.J. at 5). See Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 12% (4th Cir. 2011) (observing that whether the government is unable or unwilling to control a private actor is a factual question). Additionally, while the Immigration Judge determined that the respondent did not establish a nexus between the harm she experienced and her membership in the proposed particular social group, the Immigration Judge made no specific finding regarding the alleged persecutor’s motives. See id at 127-28 (observing that the motivations of the persecutor(s) involve a factual question); Matter of N-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 526, 532 (BIA 2011) (“A persecutor’s actual motive is a matter of fact to be determined by the Immigration Judge[.]”). Thus, absent additional fact-finding, we are unable to meaningfully review the Immigration Judge’s determinations regarding nexus and whether the actions of the feared individual constitute cognizable persecution under the Act (I.J. at 5). See Afatter of S-H-, supra, at 464-65. In view of the above, we will remand the record to the Immigration Judge for further consideration of the respondent’s eligibility for withholding of removal. 2 Because the Immigration Judge must further evaluate whether the respondent established past persecution or a clear probability of future persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground, we do not reach the issue whether the respondent could avoid a future threat to her life or freedom by relocating to another part of Honduras (l.J. at 6).3 See generally 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(l)(ii) (explaining the Department of Homeland Security’s burden of proof regarding internal relocation in cases where an applicant establishes past persecution); Matter of S-H-, supra, at 465. Accordingly, the following order will be entered. ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision. 2 The respondent has requested that this Board “exercise discretion and grant withholding of removal” (Respondent’s Brief at 13). However, we have no jurisdiction to grant an application for withholding of removal absent a showing of statutory eligibility, as withholding of removal is not a discretionary form ofrelief. See section 24J(b)(3) of the Act. 3 We acknowledge the respondent’s appellate argument (with regard to the issue of internal relocation) that it must be reasonable to expect her to relocate under all the circumstances (Respondent’s Brief at 12-13). See generally 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(b)(!Xi)(B), (3). To the extent appropriate, the issue may be addressed on remand. 4 (b) (6) V.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Revi.ew Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: -Charlotte, NC Date: In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: George N. Miller, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Melissa K. Metz Assistant Chief Counsel APPLICATION: Cancellation ofremoval; voluntary departure OCT l7 2014 The respondent, a 34-year-old citizen of Guatemala, has appealed from the Immigration Judge’s November 19, 2012, decision denying his applications for non-permanent resident cancellation of removal and voluntary departure under sections 240A(b)(l) and 240B(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(l) and 1229c(b). See Notice of Appeal, attached statement; Respondent’s Brief on Appeal (Brief). The record will be remanded. The Board reviews an Immigration Judge’s findings of fact, including findings as to the credibility of testimony, under the “clearly erroneous” standard. 8 C.F.R. § l003.l(d)(3)(i). The Board reviews questions of law, discretion, and judgment and all other issues in appeals from decisions of Immigration Judges de novo. 8 C.F.R. § l003.l(d)(3)(ii). Directing our attention first to cancellation of removal under section 240A(b )(I) of the Act, the Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s application for such relief after concluding that the respondent (l) is barred from demonstrating his good moral character pursuant to section 101(f)(6) of the Act (false testimony); (2) did not satisfy his burden of demonstrating 10 years of continuous physical presence during the requisite period; and (3) did not merit such relief as a matter of discretion. The respondent has challenged each of these determinations on appeal. The Immigration Judge found that the respondent gave false testimony for purposes of obtaining cancellation of removal. l.J. at 5. As support for this finding, the Immigration noted that the respondent admittedly lied while testifying regarding how and when he met his wife, and whether he knew her when they were in Guatemala. I.J. at 2-3; Tr. at 43-47 (reflecting that the respondent initially testified that he met his wife after he entered the United. States, and that he did not know her in Guatemala; also reflecting that the respondent subsequently admitted that he lied as to these particular issues, and that he corrected his testimony to explain that he did know the woman who is now his wife in Guatemala, that they had dated and broken up the month 1 No determination was made regarding the hardship resulting to the respondent’s five United States citizen (USC) children (one of whom suffers from severe learning disorders and has an I.Q. of 62) if he is removed to Guatemala. l.J. at 3, 5. (b) (6) (b) (6) — —— before he came to the United States, that unbeknownst to him she later entered the United States2 and settled with her family members in North Carolina). Section I Ol(t)(6) of the Act precludes a finding of good moral character where an alien “has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefit under [the Immigration and Nationality] Act” during the period for which good moral character is required to be established. However, as is correctly noted by the respondent on appeal, we have held that an alien is not barred by section 101(t)(6) of the Act from establishing his good moral where he has made a voluntary and timely retraction of a false statement before an immigration officer. Brief at 5-6; Matter of M-, 9 I&N Dec. 118 (BIA 1960); Matter of Namio, 14 I&N Dec. 412 (BIA 1973). In this case, the Immigration Judge rendered his good moral character finding pursuant section 10l(t)(6) of the Act without analyzing, in accordance with controlling case law, whether the respondent properly !llld timely recanted his initial untruthful testimony. Moreover, when the circumstances presented in this case, including how the respondent’s hearing testimony unfolded, are properly taken into consideration, the record establishes that the respondent voluntarily retracted3 his initial false statements, and that he did so in a timely manner, without delay, and prior to exposure of his misrepresentations by the government (Tr. at 43-45).4 In addition, there is insufficient support in the record to conclude that the respondent gave his initial false statements regarding whether he knew his wife in Guatemala for the purpose of obtaining a benefit under the Act. On this record, we fuld that the respondent is not barred from demonstrating his good moral character under section !Ol(f)(6) of the Act for purposes of cancellation of removal eligibility. Therefore, a remand is warranted for a new determination regarding the respondent’s good moral character. Regarding the continuous physical presence requirement, the Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent did not satisfy his burden of proof as to this issue. I.J. at 4-5. In so concluding, the Immigration Judge duly noted the respondent’s testimony that he entered the United States on 1998, and that thereafter he never departed. l.J. at 5. The respondent’s claims as to his continuous physical presence do not rest solely on his hearing testimony. To corroborate his testimony as to this issue, he submitted a great deal of documentation covering the period from 1998 thrOugh 2011. See Exh. 3, Tabs A-V (including, e.g., federal tax returns for 2004-2011; Wage and Tax Forms (W-2 Forms) for taxable years 1998, 1999-2007, 2010- 2011; two MoneyGram receipts from 1999; hospital and car tax bills; apartment leases; a bank statement; marriage certificate; birth certificates for his five use children; and, school records 2 The respondent testified that he entered the United States on 1998, and that his wife (whom he married in 2010) entered in 2000 or 2001, though he was not sure (Tr. at 31, 49). 3 We do not find the fact that the respondent and his own attorney conferred prior to the respondent’s change in testimony to be determinative of whether the respondent voluntarily retracted his initial testimony. 4 The DRS has not pointed to anything in the record that establishes that it knew that the respondent’s testimony as to the aforementioned matters was false. 2 (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) for his eldest USC daughter); Exh. 6 (original carbon copies of three MoneyGram receipts from 1999, and the respondent’s various W-2 forms for 2001). The Immigration Judge found that the respondent had provided “various documents which corroborate his testimony to some extent,” but that he had submitted only “two documents” tending to corroborate his residence “before October 25, 2000.” For purposes of relief under section 240A(b)(l) of the Act, an alien must demonstrate 10 years of continuous physical presence for the 10-year period prior to service of his Notice to Appear (NTA). Sections 240A(b)(l) and (d) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(1) and (d); Matter of Nolasco, 22 I&N Dec. 632 (BIA 1999); Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2004) (continuous physical presence ends on the date the NTA is served). Thus, to satisfy the continuous physical presence requirement in this case, the respondent needs to demonstrate his continuous physical presence in the United States from October 25, 2000, through October 25, 2010 (when the Notice to Appeal was issued), and not before. Given the evidence presented, we find that the respondent did meet the continuous physical presence requirement, and reverse the Immigration Judge on this issue. Regarding discretion, the Immigration Judge’s discretionary denial of the respondent’s application for cancellation of removal is conclusory in nature, and is not supported by an explanation of the reasons underpinning this determination. In the absence of such an explanation, it is unclear whether the Immigration Judge engaged in the requisite weighing of the positive and negative factors presented by the record relevant to the issue of discretion. Thus, a remand is appropriate for a proper analysis as to this issue. As the Immigration Judge made no findings or ruling on the issue of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, that issue should also be decided on remand. On appeal, the respondent also challenges the denial of voluntary departure. Brief at 7-8. The Immigration Judge denied such relief solely based on his earlier determination that the respondent was barred from establishing his good moral character under section 10l(t)(6) of the Act for cancellation of removal because he gave false testimony under oath for purposes of obtainiug an immigration benefit. We have already concluded that on this record the respondent is not precluded from demonstrating his good moral character by section 101(t)(6) of the Act. On remtlild, the issue of voluntary departure should also be further considered, if necessary. Based on the foregoing, the record will be remanded for further consideration of the respondent’s application for cancellation of removal and voluntary departure. On remand, the parties may present additional testimony and evidence. Accordingly, the following order will be entered. ORDER: The record is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the foregoing opinion, and for entry of a new decision . .__.._ _:.\FOR THE BOARD 3 (b) (6) ‘ U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: 1 LUi4 In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL AND MOTION ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Brad W. Butler, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Susan Leeker Assistant Chief Counsel· CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 212(a)(6)(A)(i), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(6)(A)(i)] – Present without being admitted or paroled APPLICATION: Cancellation of removal; withholding of removal; voluntary departure The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, appeals from the Immigration Judge’s November 6, 2012, decision denying cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), and voluntary departure under section 240B(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b). On appeal, the respondent has also submitted evidence he asserts shows the driving while intoxicated charge pending against him at the time of the proceedings has been dismissed, and that his son will experience hardship upon the respondent’s removal to Mexico. We construe- the filing of additional evidence as a motion to remand. See Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. 127, 138 (BIA 2009); Matter of Coelho, 20 I&N Dec. 464, 471 (BIA 1992). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) opposes the appeal and the motion. We will grant the motion and remand the record. The Immigration Judge denied cancellation of removal as a matter of law and discretion, finding that the respondent had the requisite continuous physical presence (I.J. at 3), but that his 2001 and 2002 alcohol-related convictions, when the respondent was and years old, coupled with a pending state charge for driving while intoxicated, rendered him unable to show 10 years of good moral character to qualify for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(l)(B) of the Act and unworthy of a favorable exercise of discretion (I.J. at 3-5). The Immigration Judge found that the pending charge also rendered the respondent unable to show 5 years of good moral character to qualify for voluntary departure under section 240B(b) of the Act (I.J. at 5). Because the Immigration Judge so concluded, he did not make findings of fact or conclusions of law respecting any hardship the respondent’s removal would cause his United States citizen children (l.J. at 4). It is well established that an application for relief from removal is a “continuing” application. See, e.g., Matter of Valentin Isidro-Zamorano, 25 l&N Dec. 829 (BIA 2012); Matter of Garcia, 24 I&N Dec. 179, 181 (BIA 2007); Matter of Ortega-Cabrera, 23 I&N Dec. 793 (BIA 2005) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b ) (6 ) (holding that because an application for cancellation of removal is a continuing one for purposes of good moral character, the period during which good moral character must be established ends with the entry of a final administrative order). The Immigration Judge issued his decision on November 6, 2012, meaning that the period during which good moral character must be demonstrated began in November 2002 for cancellation of removal, and in November 2007 for voluntary departure. While we have no intention to minimize the respondent’s 2001 and 2002 convictions, which the respondent sustained when he was and years old, inasmuch as those convictions occurred outside of the 10- and 5-year statutory periods for which good moral character must be demonstrated, those convictions are not relevant to the instant statutory determinations of good moral character. In addition, as it appears that the only event the Immigration Judge considered that falls within the relevant period, i.e., the then-pending charge for driving while intoxicated, may have been voluntarily dismissed during the pendency of this appeal, and as it is unclear how much weight the Immigration Judge accorded the 2001 and 2002 convictions and whether the Inunigration Judge considered the respondent’s positive equities in rendering his discretionary determination, we find it necessary to vacate the Immigration Judge’s decision and remand the record for the Immigration Judge to conduct additional fact-finding respecting the respondent’s eligibility for the relief he seeks. See Matter of S-H-, 23 l&N Dec. 462, 465 (BIA 2002); Matter of Fedorenko, 19 l&N Dec. 57, 74 (BIA 1984). On remand, the Immigration Judge shall determine anew whether the respondent has demonstrated good moral character during the requisite period and whether the respondent merits a favorable exercise of discretion, 1 and shall determine in the first instance whether the respondent’s removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his United States citizen children. If necessary, the Immigration Judge shall also determine anew whether 1 We have long-recognized that the term “good moral character” is “elusive and difficult of definition.” See Matter ofU-, 2 I&N Dec. 830, 831 (BIA, A.G. 1947). Section IOl(f) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 11 Ol(f), provides that no person can establish “good moral character” if he or she is \vithin any of certain classes enumerated in the statute. In addition, a “catch-all” provision at the end of the section states that “[t]he fact that any person is not within any of the foregoing classes shall not preclude a finding that for other reasons such person is or was not of good moral character.” Section lOl(f) of the Act; Matter of Guadarrama, 24 I&N Dec. 625, 625-26 (BIA 2008). While the statute does not define “good moral character,” our interpretation of this concept is guided by the principle of ejusdem generis, as well as our long-held understanding that good moral character “should not be construed to mean moral excellence, nor is it destroyed by a single lapse. It is a concept of a person’s natural worth derived from the sum-total of all his actions in the community,” Matter of U-, supra, at 831; see also Matter of Guadarrama, supra, at 627 (citing Matter of K-, 3 I&N Dec. 180, 182 (BIA 1949), and Matter of U-, supra, at 831 ); Matter of S-, 3 I&N Dec. 393, 395 (BIA 1948) (‘”Good moral character’ has been defined by the courts to be that which measures up to the standard of average citizens of the community in which the alien lives.”). 2 (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b ) (6 ) the respondent has shown eligibility for voluntary departure. The following orders shall be entered. ORDER: The respondent’s motion to remand is granted. FURTHER ORDER: The Immigration Judge’s decision is vacated and the record is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing discussion and the entry of a new decision. FOR THE BOARD 3 (b) (6) . U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: JUN 162015 In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Andres Lopez, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Susan Leeker Assistant Chief Counsel CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 212(a)(6)(A)(i), l&N Act [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)] – Present without being admitted or paroled APPLICA TJON: Cancellation of removal The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, appeals the Immigration Judge’s decision dated November 26, 2012. The Immigration Judge determined that the respondent was not eligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). The record will be remanded. We review an Immigration Judge’s findings of fact for clear error, and review questions of law, discretion, and judgment, and all other issues on appeal de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3); see Turkson v. Holder, 667 F.3d 523 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that the likelihood of an event is a question of fact; determining whether what is likely to happen amounts to torture is a question of law). The Immigration Judge determined that the copies of the judicial orders issued on 2012, by a Judge of the Orange County, California, Superior Court, vacating the respondent’s conviction for carrying a concealed weapon after finding the conviction constitutionally defective for failure to be properly advised of the adverse immigration consequences of his plea (Exh. C) and expunging his conviction based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), and for violations of the 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution (Exh. B), were insufficient to demonstrate his conviction was no longer valid for immigration purposes (l.J. at 3). We disagree with the Immigration Judge’s conclusions to the extent legal, and find clear error to the extent factual, that the respondent’s evidence was insufficient to demonstrate his conviction is no longer valid for immigration purposes. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(ii); see also Turkson v. Holder, supra. (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) .. ——- — – In the instant case, the respondent has made a showing that his original conviction was vacated for constitutional and procedural reasons – a procedural defect in his underlying plea (Exhs. B, C). See Dung Phan v. Holder, 667 F.3d 448 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding a conviction vacated for rehabilitative or immigration reasons remains valid for immigration purposes, while one vacated because of procedural or substantive infirmities does not); Matter of Adamiak, 23 I&N Dec. 878 (BIA 2006) (holding that a conviction vacated due to the trial court’s failure to advise the alien defendant of the possible immigration consequences of a guilty plea is a procedural defect that renders the conviction no longer a valid conviction for immigration purposes). Therefore, we reverse the Immigration Judge’s decision that the respondent’s vacated firearms conviction precludes him from cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents under section 240A(b)(l)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(C) (I.J. at 3). We express no opinion regarding the merits of the respondent’s case, but will remand the record to the Immigration Judge for further consideration of the respondent’s application for cancellation of removal. Accordingly, the following order shall be entered. ORDER: The record is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion, and for the entry of a new decision. FOREBOARD 2 (b) (6) • U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL Decision of the Board oflmmigratioo Appeals Date: JUL 3 0 2014 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Mark Citrin, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Scott D. Criss Assistant Chief Counsel CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 237(a)(l)(C)(i), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l){C)(i)] – Nonimmigrant – violated conditions of status APPLICATION: Asylum; withholding of removal; Convention Against Torture The respondent, a native and citizen of Russia, appeals the November 28, 2012, denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The respondent claims that he suffered past persecution and he has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his Chechen ethnicity and Christian religion (1.J. at 2-3). The Immigration Judge made an adverse credibility finding and alternatively denied the application on burden of proof grounds (I.J. at 5-10). The appeal will be sustained and the record will be remanded. The Board must defer to an Immigration Judge’s factual findings, including findings as to the credibility of testimony, unless they are clearly erroneous. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i); see also Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564 (1985) (holding that where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be deemed clearly erroneous); Matter of S-H-, 23 l&N Dec. 462 (BIA 2002). Since the respondent filed his asylum application after May 11, 2005, his claim is governed by the amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act brought about by the REAL ID Act of 2005 (l.J. at 4). Matter of S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 42 (BIA 2006). The relevant standards are codified at sections 208(b)(l)(B)(iii), 240(c)(4)(C), and 24l(b)(3)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii), 1229a(c)(4)(C), and 123i(b)(3)(C). See also Singh v. Holder, 699 F.3d 321, 328-29 (4th Cir. 2012); Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 260 (BIA 2007). Furthermore, certain pre-REAL ID principles still apply in assessing credibility. In particular, an adverse credibility finding must be supported by specific, cogent reasons. Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir. 2006); see also Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1989); Matter of A-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 1106, 1109 (BIA 1998). “Examples of specific and cogent reasons include ‘inconsistent statements, contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable testimony; [in particular,] where these circumstances exist in view of the background evidence on country (b) (6) (b) (6) conditions, it is appropriate for an Immigration Judge to make an adverse credibility determination on such a basis.”‘ Tewabe· v. Gonzales, supra, at 538 (quoting Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 722, 729 (BIA 1997)). On appeal, the respondent has challenged each reason provided by the Immigration Judge in support of the adverse credibility finding. We address these arguments in tum. The Immigration Judge noted that the respondent testified before an asylum officer on June 23, 2011, that he ”might want to go to the Seventh Day Adventist Church” to practice Christianity (l.J. at 5; Exh. 6 at 2). At his hearing in these proceedings on October 25, 2012, the respondent submitted a letter from the church’s pastor describing him as a “recent” and “new” attendee (I.J. at 5; Exh. 4 at 1). Moreover, the respondent submitted a similar letter from a bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints dated June 12, 2011, 11 days before his asylum interview (1.J. at 5; Exh. !). The Immigration Judge determined that given the 16 months between the respondent’s asylum interview and his removal hearing, his recent attendance at the Seventh Day Adventist Church was “a subterfuge to generate evidence in order to corroborate his asylum claim, and does not reflect favorably on his credibility” (I.J. at 5). We agree with the respondent that this rationale does not support an adverse credibility finding, as it assumes that a certain level of religious knowledge or practice is necessary for the respondent to be eligible for asylum on grounds of religious persecution (Respondent’s Brief at 8-9). See Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2006); Mezvrishvili v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 467 F.3d 1292, 1296 (11th Cir. 2006). This issue is also minor, considering that ethnicity is the primary basis of the claim (Respondent’s Brief at 8; Tr. at 51-52). See Tewabe v. Gonzales, supra, at 538. Next, the respondent testified that he was hospitalized for 2 weeks after individuals assaulted him on account of his ethnicity on , 2009 (I.J. at 2-3, 5; Tr. at 42-47). The Immigration Judge found that when asked to describe the treatment he received, the respondent was vague and nonresponsive, merely repeating the injuries reported in unauthenticated medical documents that he submitted (l.J. at 5; Exh. 2). The respondent correctly asserts that he described his injuries in accordance with the medical record provided (Respondent’s Brief at 9; Tr. at 47; Exh. I). Some lack of detail is understandable, considering that the respondent was knocked unconscious. Furthermore, the Immigration Judge did not ask additional questions designed to elicit details about the nature of the respondent’s injuries (Respondent’s Brief at 9; Tr. at 47-48). We thus find no basis that may support an adverse credibility finding. See id. In addition, the Immigration Judge observed that the respondent applied for a visa on April 1, 2009, and he was assaulted on November 29, 2009 (I.J. at 5). He found the timing of these events to be suspicious and not coincidental, reflecting poorly on the respondent’s credibility (I.J. at 5). As the respondent notes on appeal, the most recent United States Department of State Country Report provides that xenophobia and hate crimes are increasing in Russia (Respondent’s Brief at 9-10). See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(iv) (the Board may take administrative notice of commonly known facts such as current events or the contents of official documents). Moreover, the attack occurred almost 6 months after the respondent applied for a visa. We thus agree with the respondent that this reason is based on speculation (Respondent’s Brief at 10). See id. 2 (b) (6) (b) (6) Finally, the Immigration Judge determined that the respondent testified with a flat affect and unemotional demeanor when testifying regarding graphic and disturbing events (l.J. at 5). The respondent explains that he appeared stoic because by the time he testified, he had already suffered discrimination on account of his Chechen ethnicity throughout his life (Respondent’s Brief at 10; l.J. at 2; Tr. at 41-42). Therefore, while demeanor findings are entitled to deference, we consider this reason alone insufficient to uphold the adverse credibility finding. See Tu Lin v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 395, 400 (2d Cir. 2006); Singh-Kaur v. INS, 183 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 1999). Consequently, we reverse the finding as clearly erroneous. The respondent credibly testified that a group of individuals beat him unconscious after harassing him about his Chechen ethnicity on , 2009, causing him to be hospitalized until , 2009 (l.J. at 2; Tr. at 42-47). We conclude that the respondent suffered harm on account of a protected ground that is sufficiently severe to constitute past persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(ii) (the Board exercises de novo review over issues of law, discretion, or judgment); Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005) (defining “persecution”). At the same time, persecution “encompasses harm inflicted by either a government or an entity that the government cannot or will not control.” Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 128 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). We will remand for additional analysis concerning this factual question. See id. at 128-29; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(iv) (the Board may remand where additional fact-finding is required). While the respondent did not report his beating to the authorities, analysis of country conditions evidence is required to determine whether this would have been futile, as the respondent testified (l.J. at 8; Tr. at 71-72). See Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006). If the respondent succeeds in demonstrating that the Russian government was unable or unwilling to protect him, the showing of past persecution would trigger a presumption of a wellfounded fear of persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(l). The burden of proof would then shift to the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to show by a preponderance of the evidence that there are fundamentally changed circumstances such that the respondent no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution, or that the respondent could avoid persecution by relocating and it would be reasonable to expect him to do so under all of the circumstances. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(I); Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir. 2004); Matter of D-1-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 2008). On remand, the parties should have the opportunity to update the record and to provide any additional evidence, both testimonial and documentary, regarding the respondent’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection, or any other fonn of relief for which the respondent may be eligible. We express no opinion regarding the outcome of the proceedings on remand. Accordingly, the following order is entered. ORDER: The appeal is sustained, the Immigration Judge’s decision is vacated, and the record is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 3 (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Executive Otlice for Immigration Review Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ‘ Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: W. Rob Heroy, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Caroline Y oungblade Assistant Chief Counsel Date: APPLICATION: Asylum; withholding of removal: Convention Against Torture JAN 15 2015 The respondent, a native and citizen of El Salvador, appeals from the Immigration Judge’s decision of January 14, 2013, which pretermitted her application for asylum, and denied withholding ofremoval and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“‘CAT”). Sections 208(a)(2)(B), 208(a)(2)(D) and 24l(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ ll58(a)(2)(B), 1158(a)(2)(D), 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.4(a), 1208.16-1208.18. The appeal will be dismissed in part and the record will be remanded. We review for clear error the findings of fact. including the determination of credibility, made by the Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1003. l(d)(3)(i). We review de novo all other issues, including whether the parties have met the relevant burden of proof, and issues of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003. I (d)(3)(ii). Since the respondent submitted her asylum a,pplication after May 11, 2005, it is governed by the provisions of the REAL ID Act (Exh. 2; l.J. at 3-4). Singh v. Holder, 699 F.3d 321, 328 (4th Cir. 2012). Ordinarily, an alien must file an asylum application within I year of arriving in the United States. See section 208(a)(2)(B) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2)(i)(A); see also Mulyani v. Holder, 771 F.3d 190, 195 (4th Cir. 2014). Here. the respondent entered the United States on May 28, 2010, and filed her asylum application on January 12. 2012 (Exh. l; Tr. at. 21; I.J. at 3 ). She testified that the first time she was advised about the need to file for asylum was when she consulted with a private attorney in November 2011 (Tr. at 42-43; l.J. at 3). However, the record reflects that she was interviewed by a credible fear officer on May 28, 20 I 0. A Form I-870 associated with that interview indicates that the asylum officer read to the respondent, through an interpreter, a paragraph advising in part that she could seek asylum (Exh. I at 7, paragraph 3.2; I.J. at 3). Given the circumstances of this case, we concur with the Immigration Judge’s pretermission of the respondent’s asylum application (l.J. at 3). See section 208(a)(2)(D) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a). The respondent claims that she was the victim of acts of violence in El Salvador committed by her former domestic partner, Mr. and that she fears returning to EI Salvador because she believes he will harm her again (l.J. at 2). She testified that after she learned of (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) Mr. ‘s involvement with the Mara Salvatrucha gang, he grabbed her hair and threw her on a bed, and would hit her repeatedly (Tr. at 24-28, 34; l.J. at 4 ). The respondent stated that she did not report Mr. ‘s abuse to the police in El Salvador because the authorities ignored such claims and feared the gangs themselves (Tr. at 27-28; l.J. at 4-5). Before coming to the United States in 2010, she left her minor children to live with a cousin in a village 3 hours away from where she had lived with Mr. (Tr. at 28-29; l.J. at 5). Before the Immigration Judge, the respondent claimed persecution on the basis of her membership in a particular social group defined as “El Salvadoran women in abusive relationships who are treated as property by their domestic partners” (l.J. at 5). 1 See section IOl(a)(42)(A) of the Act (defining “refugee,” in relevant part, as an alien who will be persecuted on the basis of one or more particular characteristics, including membership in a particular social group). The Immigration Judge also considered the question of whether the respondent established her membership in a particular social group related to a fear of reprisal by the Mara Salvatrucha criminal gang (I.J. at 6). However, the Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent had not advanced cognizable particular social groups. We conclude that a remand is appropriate in this case, in view of the evolving law on the issue of particular social groups. See, e.g., Maller of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 2014), and Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014) (clarifying what is required to establish a particular social group); see also Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014) (discussing domestic violence in particular social group determinations). On remand, the parties should have the opportunity to update the record, and to make any additional legal and factual arguments regarding particular social groups and nexus as they may apply to this case. The Board expresses no opinion regarding the ultimate outcome of these proceedings. Accordingly, the following orders will be entered. ORDER: The respondent’s appeal of the denial of asylum is dismissed. FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded for further proceedings concerning the respondent’s request for withholding of removal and protection under the CAT, consistent with the foregoing decision, and for the entry of a new decision by the Immigration Judge. 1 On appeal, the respondent has articulated two more proposed social groups: “domestic partner[ s] of El Salvadorian men who view women as property” and “El Salvadorian worn[ e Jn unable to leave a domestic violence relationship” (Respondent’s Br. at 4 ). 2 (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board oflmmigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Jordan G. Forsythe, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Melissa K. Metz Assistant Chief Counsel APPLICATION: Continuance; adjustment of status G 3 2Q14 The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, has appealed from the Immigration Judge’s decision dated January 29, 2013. During the pendency of his appeal, the respondent filed a motion to remand based on new evidence. The motion will be granted and the record returned to the Immigration Court for further proceedings. The record reflects that the Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s motion for a continuance to seek post-conviction relief with respect to one of two controlled substance offenses that rendered him ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility that would have allowed.him to apply for adjustment of status. The respondent has now presented evidence to show that the conviction was vacated on constitutional grounds. See Matter of Pickering, 23 l&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2003) (holding that a conviction vacated based upon a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying proceedings no longer exists for immigration purposes), rev’d on other grounds, Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2006). The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) does not oppose the motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(g)(3). Accordingly, the motion is granted. Accordingly, the following order is ent ed. ORDER: The respondent’s motion to rem is granted, and the record is remanded to the Immigration Court for further proceedings consist t with the foregoing opinion. (b) (6) (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for lrnmigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL Decision of the Board oflmmigration Appeals Date: JUN 2 6 2014 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Jordan G. Forsythe, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Scott Criss Assistant Chief Counsel APPLICATION: Cancellation of removal The respondent, a native and citizen of El Salvador, has appealed the Immigration Judge’s March 25, 2013, decision denying him cancellation of removal for non-permanent residents under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). The record will be remanded for further proceedings. We review for clear error the findings of fact, including the determination of credibility, made by the Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i). We review de novo all other issues, including whether the parties have met the relevant burden of proof, and issues of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003. l(d)(3)(ii). Since the application for relief was filed after May 11, 2005, it is governed by the provisions of the REAL ID Act. Matter of Almanza-Arenas, 24 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2009). The Immigration Judge determined that the respondent had not demonstrated the requisite good moral character for cancellation of removal based on his testimony that he paid someone in May 2003 to smuggle his son into the United States (l.J. at 5-6; Tr. at 43-44). See section 240A(b)(l)(B) of the Act. In Matter of Ortega-Cabrera, 23 I&N Dec. 793, 798 (BIA 2005), this Board held that the 10-year period for good moral character under section 240A(b)(l)(B) of the Act is calculated backward from the date on which the application is finally resolved by the Immigration Judge or the Board. As the incident in question now falls outside of the IO-year window, it no longer bars the respondent from cancellation of removal. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) asserts that the date of the smuggling incident is unclear, because the respondent’s wife testified it was sometime in 2004 (Tr. at 67). However, the Immigration Judge relied on the respondent’s testimony that the incident occurred in May 2003, and we have no basis to conclude this is clearly erroneous. The DHS also argues that because section 212(a)(6)(E) of the Act refers to an alien who “at any time” encouraged or assisted another’s illegal entry, and because section 10l(f)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(f)(3), references individuals described in that provision, there is no temporal limit on the respondent’s good moral character determination if he smuggled at any time (DHS Brief at 6-7). The introductory section to section lOl(f) of the Act, however, specifically (b) (6) (b) (6) mandates that good moral character needs to be established during the “period for which good moral character is required to be established.” Section 240A(b)(l)(B) of the Act sets that period at 10 years. We also note that the OHS does not cite to any authority to support its interpretation of the statutes at issue. Accordingly, we will remand this matter to the Immigration Judge for further consideration of the respondent’s application for cancellation of removal. The following order is entered. ORDER: The record is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing decision. 2 (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review · Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL Decision of the Board oflnnnigration Appeals Date: DEC 2 9 2014 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Mariana Toledo-Hermina, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Scott D. Criss Assistant Chief Counsel ORDER: The respondent, a native and citizen of Haiti, appeals from the Immigration Judge’s decision dated March 27, 2013, which denied his motion for a continuance and ordered him removed from the United States. The parties have provided arguments on appeal. The record will be remanded. The Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s request for a continuance pending the adjudication of the Form 1-130, Petition for Alien Relative, filed on his behalf by his lawful permanent resident spouse. While the appeal of that decision was pending, the Board learned that the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services approved the visa petition on August 6, 2013. Under the circumstances, we find that a remand is appropriate so that the parties may evaluate the case in light of the approved visa petition and so that the respondent may pursue any relief for which he may be eligible. Accordingly, the record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new dedsion. (b) (6) (b) (6) • U.S. Department of Justice ExCC\\tive Office for Immigration Review Falls’ Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC Inre: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL AND MOTION Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Date: JUN t 820!5 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: P. Mercer Cauley, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Susan Leeker Assistant Chief Counsel CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)] – Convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude APPLICATION: Termination; cancellation of removal; section 212(c) waiver; section 212(h) waiver; voluntary departure The respondent, a native and citizen of Laos and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, appeals from the Immigration Judge’s March 13, 2013, decision1 finding him removable as charged and denying his applications for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), and waivers of inadmissibility under sections 212(c) and (h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ I 182(c), (h). The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) appeals the Immigration Judge’s grant of the respondent’s application for voluntary departure. Section 240B(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b). During the pendency of this appeal, the respondent filed a motion to remand for the purpose of applying for adjustment of status, which the DHS opposes. The record will be remanded. We review for clear error the findings of fact, including the determination of credibility, made by the Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i). We review de novo all other issues, including whether the parties have met the relevant burden of proof, and issues of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(ii). We will remand the record for the Immigration Judge to further consider whether the DHS has established by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is removable as charged. Section 240(c)(3)(A} of the Act; 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.S(a). The respondent is charged with being removable as an alien convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude. The Notice to Appear alleges two 1996 convictions for “disorderly 1 The Immigration Judge’s March 13, 2013, decision incorporates his November 29, 201 I, decision on removability. (b) (6) (b) (6) conduct prostitution” to support this charge (Exh. I). In sustaining the charge, the lmmigration Judge relied on a 2-page document entitled “Index Search System” printed from a website and a record of sworn statement from the respondent (Exhs. 2-A, 2-B). The respondent asserts on appeal that the Immigration Judge erred by admitting the “Index Search System” document into evidence and in concluding that the DHS met its burden of proving that the respondent is removable as charged (Respondent’s Brief at 5-10). On remand, the lmmigration Judge should make explicit determinations, consistent with Matter of J.R. Velasquez, 25 I&N Dec. 680 (BIA 2012), regarding the reliability of the conviction documents. In Matter of J.R. Velasquez, which was decided after the lmmigration Judge’s removability decision in this case, we noted that some form of authentication is required before documents may be admitted as evidence of criminal convictions. Matter of J.R. Velasquez, supra, at 683-84; see also section 240(c)(3)(B) of the Act (regarding proof of criminal convictions); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41 (same). We further noted that in deciding whether to admit a document, the lmmigration Judge should determine whether it bears sufficient indicia of probativeness and reliability to satisfy due process. Id. at 685. We express no opinion at this time on whether the DHS has met its burden of establishing that the respondent is removable as charged. Given our conclusion that further consideration of this issue is warranted, we do not reach the respondent’s motion or the parties’ contentions on appeal relating to applications for relief from removal, including DHS’ appeal of the Immigration Judge’s grant of voluntary departure. ORDER: The record is remanded to the lmmigration Court for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision. 2 (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL AND MOTION Decision of the Board oflmmigration Appeals Date: otT 312014 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Mariana Toledo-Hennina, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Susan Leeker Assistant Chief Counsel APPLICATION: Remand The respondent, a native and citizen of Togo, appeals from the Immigration Judge’s decision dated April 1, 2013, denying his motion for a continuance to await the Board’s adjμdication of his wife’s appeal of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services decision to revoke approval of a visa petition (Form 1-130) that was filed on his behalf, as the spouse of a citizen. Jn addition, the respondent has filed a motion to remand which states that the Board on December 13, 2013, sustained his wife’s appeal, reinstated his approved visa petition, and he requests a hearing on his application for adjustment of status pursuant to section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The motion will be granted. Accordingly, the following order will be entered. ORDER: The motion to remand is granted, and these proceedings are remanded for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinio (b) (6) (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL Decision of the Board of lnnnigration Appeals Date: OCT 20 2014 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Vanessa Elias, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: CHARGE: Melissa K. Metz Assistant Chief Counsel Notice: Sec. 212(a)(6)(A)(i), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(6)(A)(i)] – Present without being admitted or paroled APPLICATION: Asylum; withholding ofrernoval; Convention Against Torture The respondent, a native and citizen of Honduras, appeals the Immigration Judge’s April 17, 2013, decision denying her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. See sections 208 and 241(b)(3) of the lmmigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 123J(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13, 1208.16- 1208.J 8. The record will be remanded. The Board reviews an Immigration Judge’s findings of fact, including credibility determinations and (under the law of the Circuit with jurisdiction over this case) the likelihood of future events, under a “clearly erroneous” standard. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i); see Turk.son v. Holder, 667 F.3d 523, 530 (4th Cir. 2012). We review all other issues, including questions of law, judgment, or discretion, under a de novo standard. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(ii). The respondent’s applications were filed after May I I, 2005, and therefore are governed by the provisions of the REAL ID Act. Matter of S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 42 (BIA 2006). The Immigration Judge clearly erred in finding that the respondent did not testify credibly (I.J. at 7). First, the Immigration Judge found that it “strains credulity” that the respondent would tell immigration officials that she was from Mexico during her first two entries into the United States (I.J. at 7). The respondent reasonably explained that others told her to claim to be from Mexico, that she preferred to be in Mexico rather than in Honduras, and that claiming to be from Mexico would get her released from detention in the United States (I.J. at 8; Tr. at 85-86). Second, the Immigration Judge engaged in impermissible speculation not grounded in record facts, when he found it to be implausible that the respondent did not quit working for her abuser, did not seek medical treatment, and did not tell her grandparents about a series of rapes committed by her employer (I.J. at 9). The respondent, who was years old when the rapes (b) (6) (b) (6) (b ) (6 ) ——— committed by her employer (I.J. at 9). The respondent, who was years old when the rapes began, reasonably eJlplained that she felt trapped and could not bring herself to challenge her powerful abuser because to do so would invite scandal and additional harm (Tr. at 47-48, 51, 81- 82). Third, the Immigration Judge clearly found that the respondent’s testimony was internally inconsistent concerning whether she was “interviewed” at the border by immigration officials (l.J. at 8). However, the respondent reasonably explained that she answered officials’ questions about herself, but that she did not do so in what she considered to be an “interview” setting (Tr. at 74-75, 84-86). Fourth, we find clear error in the Immigration Judge’s finding that the respondent’s testimony contained “glaring inconsistencies” concerning whether other individuals knew of her abuse (l.J. at 9). The respondent testified that she did not think that her abuser told anyone of his sexual relationship with her, but that the relationship was obvious to the abuser’s associates who enabled the abuse (Tr. at 56, 64, 69). These two statements are not inconsistent with one another. Although we acknowledge that the respondent did not testify consistently concerning the date she graduated from high school, the Immigration Judge correctly found that this inconsistency is not central to her claim, and we find that it does not significantly undermine her credibility (l.J. at 8; Tr. at 78-81). Similarly, although the respondent’s testimony was inconsistent with her written statement concerning whether, during one particular incident, she picked up her abuser’s gun or merely touched it, we do not find this inconsistency to significantly undermine her credibility (I.J. at 8; Tr. at 56-57, 82-84). Finally, although the respondent omitted her employment with her abuser from her employment history on page 4 of her Form I-589 (Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal), we find the significance of this omission to be mitigated by the fact that the respondent’s written statement, submitted as an attachment to her Fonn 1-589, discusses her employment with her abuser at length (I.J. at 8-9; Tr. at 80-81; Exh. 2). Therefore, we find that the Immigration Judge clearly erred in finding that the respondent did not testify credibly, and we deem her testimony to be credible. Given the respondent’s credible testimony concerning her past harm, we find that the Immigration Judge’s concerns regarding the respondent’s corroborative evidence are not sufficient to undermine her claim. First, although we acknowledge that letters from overseas that are notarized and accompanied by a copy of an identification card may be considered more reliable than those that are not, we find that the letter from Mr. (Exh. 3, Tab I) adequately corroborates the respondent’s credible testimony about her relationship with her abuser (see l.J. at 10). Further, although the Immigration Judge identified a potential inconsistency in the letter from Mr. the Immigration Judge did not give the respondent an opportunity to explain the discrepancy between the letter’s claim that Mr. did not return to his hometown, and the return address on the envelope in which the letter was sent (l.J. at 10-11 ). In addition, the Immigration Judge did not adequately explain why the fact that the letter does not mention that the respondent’s abuser knows that the respondent is in removal proceedings in the United States constitutes a significant omission that undermines the weight to be given to the letter (l.J. at 11 ). 2 (b) (6) (b ) (6 ) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) Second, according to the respondent’s credible testimony, her grandparents do not know about the abuse she suffered in Honduras, and therefore it should not be held against the respondent that the letter from her grandparents does not mention the abuse (I.J. at 11; Exh. 3, Tab N). Third, although the Immigration Judge found that the respondent did not corroborate her testimony that her abuser had influence over the local police, the Immigration Judge did not identify any specific document that he would expect the respondent to produce as corroboration of this fact (I.J. at 11). Fourth, although we acknowledge that the respondent’s therapy and medical records were not created contemporaneously with her alleged harm, we find that they do corroborate her claim of past harm to some extent (I.J. at 11; Tr. at 26; Exh. 3, Tabs J-K). Although we acknowledge that the respondent’s case may have been stronger if she bad corroborated it with testimony from her mother, who is present in the United States, we do not find that the absence of this testimony fatally undermines the respondent’s claim (l.J. at 11). Therefore, we find that the respondent testified credibly and adequately corroborated her claim of past harm in Honduras at the hands of a local businessman and govenunent official. However, we will remand the record to the Immigration Judge to permit the parties to update their arguments concerning the respondent’s claimed particular social group or groups in light of recent developments in the Board’s case law. See Ji,fatter of A-R-C-G-, 26 l&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014); Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 l&N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 2014). Accordingly, the following order will be entered. ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings c.onsistent with this order and for the entry of a new decision. 3 (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board oflmmigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Jeremy L McKinney, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Melissa K. Metz Assistant Chief Counsel CHARGE: Notice: 237(a)(\)(B), l&N Act (8 U.S.C. § \227(a)(\)(B)] • In the United States in violation oflaw APPLICATION: Continuance JUL 2 4 2014 The respondent appeals the decision of the Immigration Judge, dated June 5, 2013, denying his request for a further continuance and ordering him removed to Ghana. The Department of Homeland Security (“OHS”) opposes the appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, the respondent filed a motion to remand. There is no OHS response to this motion in the record. The record will be remanded. We review an Immigration Judge’s findings of fact for clear error. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i). We review questions of law, discretion, and judgment, and all other issues raised in an Immigration Judge’s decision, under a de novo standard. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(ii). The respondent’s motion to remand indicates that the respondent seeks another opportunity to seek a continuance, inasmuch as since the date of the Immigration Judge’s decision, this Board issued a decision finding in his favor with respect to a contested issue in a separate matter (namely, visa petition proceedings in which he is the beneficiary). On December 31, 2013, the Board remanded the record in those proceedings to the Field Office Director. This material change may have an impact on whether the respondent can, in these proceedings, show good cause for a continuance. See generally Marter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785 (BIA 2009). For the foregoing reasons, the following order will be entered. ORDER: The record is remanded for furthe oceedings and the entry of a new order. (b) (6) (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Execu\ive Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Date: FEB 21 2014 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Stefan R. Latorre, Esquire APPLICATION: Remand TI1e respondent, a native and cltlzen of El Salvador, has timely appealed from the Immigration Judge’s decision served on June 14, 20I 3. The record will be remanded. The respondent contends on appeal that the Immigration Judge erred in finding that he waived his opportunity to file an application for cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent residents. The Immigration Judge set a master calendar hearing for December 17, 2012, which was also the deadline date for filing any applications for relief from removal (Tr. at 3 ). On December 11, 2012, the Jnunigration Judge granted a continuance to allow the respondent to attempt to obtain certification from a law enforcement agency so he could apply for U nonimmigrant status [the Immigration Judge’s order did not state whether a cancellation application was still due on December 17, 2012, or the deadline had been exterided to the next master calendar hearing]. On February 5, 2013, the Immigration Judge granted an additional continuance on the U nonimmigrant status issue, and set a new master calendar hearing date. At the June 12, 2013, hearing counsel attempted to file a cancellation application [since no law enforcement agency certification had been issued], and the Immigration Judge found the opportunity to file a cancellation application was waived (Tr. at 4-5, 8). The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31 (c) provides, in pertinent part, that the Immigration Judge may sel and extend time limits for the filing of applications; if an application is not filed within the time set by the Immigration Judge; the opportunity to file that application shall be deemed waived. Under the specific circumstances presented by this case, it was unclear whether a cancellation application was due on December 17, 2012, We will therefore, remand the record to the Immigration Judge to give the respondent one last opportunity to timely file a cancellation application. Accordingly, the following order will be entered. ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings not inconsistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision. FORHEBOARD (b) (6) (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Executive’ Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL AND MOTION Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Date: JUL 1 5 2014 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Jeffrey E. Baron, Esquire APPLICATION: Remand During the pendency of the respondent’s appeal of the Immigration Judge’s decision dated August 14, 2013, counsel for the respondent filed a motion attaching new evidence. Counsel asks that we remand the case based on the recent naturalization of the respondent’s wife as a United States citizen and filing of a visa petition (Form I-130) on his behalf with supporting evidence. The respondent argues that he is now eligible for new forms of relief from removal, including a provisional unlawful presence waiver. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has not filed an opposition to the motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(g)(3). Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the motion to remand will be granted. Accordingly, the following order will be entered. ORDER: The motion to remand is granted. (b) (6) (b) (6) • U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 20530 Files: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL AND MOTION Date: ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS: Jeremy L. McKinney, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Scott D. Criss Assistant Chief Counsel APPLICATION: Reopening ORDER: ‘i-IAR 2 4 2014 The respondents have an appeal pending before the Board. The respondents and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) have now filed a joint motion to remand these proceedings to the Immigration Judge to address the issue of whether the respondent was required to conduct affirmative actions for the material support to terrorism bar. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003. l(d)(3)(iv). The motion is gr!II)ted, and the record is remanded for further proceedings and entry of a new decision. FOR THE BOARD (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) .U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Date: MAY ll20I ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Eric Y. Zheng, Esquire The respondent appeals the Immigration Judge’s decision of November 14, 2013, which denied her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture, and cancellation of removal. See sections 208(b )(1 )(B). 24 l(b )(3), and 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“Act”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(l)(B), 1231(b)(3), 1229b(B); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13, 1208.16-1208.18. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has not filed a response to the appeal. The appeal Vlill be sustained in part, and the record will be remanded to the Immigration Court. The respondent argues in part that her hearing was fundamentally unfair from the outset because the Immigration Judge “was predisposed to deny her applications for relief due to his personal animus towards [her] counsel on the basis of his Chinese ethnicity and geographical location.” Upon review of the transcript, this is a claim that it is difficult to entirely discount because of the Immigration Judge’s inappropriate questioning of the respondent and her husband regarding their decision to consult with Chinese-speaking counsel and his comments regarding her “Chinese attorney in New York” that permeated the hearing from its outset (Tr. at 1) through to its conclusion (Tr. at 170-71). See generally Matter of Exame, 18 I&N Dec. 303 (BIA 1982). We agree that the manner in which the hearing was conducted cast some doubt on the Immigration Judge’s impartiality and did not meet the high standards of fairness (including the appearance of fairness) that respondents can expect and in fact receive on a daily basis in our Immigration Courts. Given this unfortunate circumstance, we will vacate the Immigration Judge’s decision and remand the record to the Immigration Court for a new hearing with a different Immigration Judge. ORDER: The Immigration Judge’s November 14, 2013, decision is vacated. (b) (6) (b) (6) .. · · FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Court for further proceedings before a new Immigration Judge. FOR THE BOARD 2 (b) (6) . ‘ Q”.S. Department of Jmtice Executive Office fur Immigmtion Review Falls ClmR:b, Vnginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL Decision of the Boord of Immigration Appeals Date: APR l 6 2015 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Louis F. Massard, Esqujre ON BEHALF OF DHS: Scott D. Criss Assistant Chief Counsel APPLICATION: Contim1ance The respondent, a native and citiz.en of Honduras, bas filed a timely appeal of the Immigration Judge’s decision issued November 5, 2013, denying her request fur a continuance. 1 The respondent has filed a brief on appeal. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has filed a motion for summary aftirmance. The record will be remanded. The Immigration Judge found the respondent not to be a credible witness (l.J. at 3). For purposes of this appeal, we will assume that the respondent is credible. The Immigration Judge determined that the respondent failed to establish good cause for a continuance. See 8 C.F.R § 1003.29; Matter of Sibnm, 18 I&N Dec. 354, 355 (BIA 1983) (regarding good cause for a continuance). The respondent sought a continuance so that the DHS could adjudicate her application for a U visa (Form 1-918). See generally Matter of Sanchez Sosa, 25 I&N Dec. 807 (BIA 2012) (regarding factors to consider in requests for continuances when a respondent has filed a U nonimmigrant visa petition). We agree with the respondent’s arguments on appeal, that her motion included documentary evidence showing that the respondent would likely be able to show that she suffered “substantial physical or mental abuse” and prima facie approvability, especially where she included a signed certification by law enforcement officials (Respondent’s Appeal Brief; l.J. at 3). Furthermore, DHS did not provide any reason fur opposing the motion on the record below (l.J. at 2; Tr. at 77). 1 On her Notice of Appeal (Form EOIR-26), the respondent contested the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). However, she has not addressed these forms of relief in her appeal brief; and did not include any detailed arguments on her Notice of Appeal or any attachments. These forms of relief will not be addressed further at this time. (b) (6) (b) (6) , Accordingly, the following order will be entered. ORDER: The record is remanded for further proceedings. 2 (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 22041 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Date: NOV 2 5 2015 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Stefan R. Latorre, Esquire APPLICATION: Cancellation of removal under section 240A(b )(I) of the Act; voluntary departure The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, appeals from the Immigration Judge’s decision dated November 22, 2013, which denied his application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), as well as voluntary departure under section 240B of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c. The Department of Homeland Security has not replied to the respondent’s brief on appeal. The appeal will be sustained in part and the record remanded. We review Immigration Judges’ findings of fact for clear error, but we review questions of law, discretion, and judgment (including the question of whether the respondent has established that his removal will result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to any of his qualifying relatives), and all other issues in appeals de novo. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003. l(d)(3)(i), (ii). See section 240A(b )(I )(D) of the Act. Because the application was filed after May 11, 2005, it is subject to the provisions of the REAL ID Act of 2005. See Mauer of S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 42 (BIA2006). For the reasons provided in the decision, we agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondent has not met his burden to prove that his removal to Mexico would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, as intended by Congress, for any qualifying relative (I.J. at 5-8). Section 240A(b)(l)(D) of the Act; Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 56, 62 (BIA 2001). The respondent argues on appeal that the Immigration Judge did not adequately consider the alleged hardships, which principally consist of anticipated difficulties concerning his employment and his United States citizen child’s education and medical needs. Respondent’s Brief at 15-20. However, he does not address the findings in the Immigration Judge’s decision concerning the lack of supporting evidence, in particular, evidence to show that the child has some compelling medical or educational need that will go unmet in Mexico. General economic detriment and diminished educational opportunity in general, which are likely to occur in cases involving removal to a comparatively poor country, such as Mexico, are not exceptional and extremely unusual hardships. Matter of Andazola, 23 I&N Dec. 319, 323 (BIA 2002). Thus, we agree that the respondent has not established that his United States citizen child would experience the requisite level of hardship if he is removed to Mexico. (b) (6) (b) (6) Although we agree with the hardship determination, we do not agree with the Immigration Judge’s determinations as to continuous physical presence and good moral character. Sections 240A(b)(l)(A), (B) of the Act. Despite finding documentary gaps with respect to the presence issue, the Immigration Judge did not conclude that the respondent’s testimony in this regard was not credible (l.J. at 3-4). Under the ID Act, if there is no explicit adverse credibility finding, there is a rebuttable presumption of credibility on appeal. Section 240(c)(4)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § l229a(c)(4)(C). With respect to good moral character, we do not agree that the two convictions for driving under the influence, one in 2001 and one in 2011, are sufficient to support a finding that the respondent is a habitual drunkard under section IOl(t)(l) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § l lOl(t)(l) (l.J. at 4-5). Finally, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion, for purposes of either cancellation of removal or voluntary departure (l.J. at 8-9). See Matter o/Sotelo, 23 I&N Dec. 201, 203 (BlA 2001); Matter of Arguelles, 22 I&N Dec. 811, 816-17 (BIA 1999). However, in neither instance did the Immigration Judge engage in a meaningful assessment of the respondent’s positive equities as they weigh against the adverse factors cited, such that we cannot affirm the discretionary denial of relief. Thus, we will remand the record to the Immigration Judge to afford the parties an opportunity to present evidence bearing on the respondent’s eligibility for voluntary departure, and to evaluate again whether the respondent merits such relief in the exercise of discretion. 1 Accordingly, the following order will be entered. ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision. p;¢;c:;;,;; ?- I FORTHEBOARD 1 We acknowledge, as the Immigration Judge noted in the decision, that the respondent’s partner was pregnant at the time of the hearing (l.J. at 2; Tr. at I 03 ). In the brief on appeal, the respondent states that this child was born on 2013. Respondent’s Brief at 2. However, he has not submitted a birth certificate or any other evidence related to this child or potential associated hardship. In light of our decision to remand the record, the respondent would not be precluded from seeking to introduce any new evidence relevant to his eligibility for cancellation of removal. 2 (b) (6) (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte. NC Date: JUN 062015 In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL AND MOTION ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: William R. Heroy, Esquire ON BEHALF OF OHS: Scott D. Criss Assistant Chief Counsel CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 237(a)(l)(D)(i), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l)(D)(i)] – Conditional resident status terminated (conceded) APPLICATION: Special rule cancellation ofremoval; remand The respondent, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, appeals from the Immigration Judge’s December 4, 2013, decision finding her removable as charged and denying her application for special rule cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2), reserved for certain victims of domestic violence in accordance with the provisions of the Violence Against Women Act (VA WA). The respondent also filed a motion to remand to pursue adjustment of status pursuant to section 245(a) of the Ac.t, 8 U .S.C. § I 255(a), based on an approved Alien Relative Petition (Form I-130) filed on her behalf by her United States citizen daughter. The Department of Homeland Security (OHS) opposes the respondent’s appeal but has not filed any response to the motion to remand. The motion will be granted and the record will be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. We review findings of fact, including credibility findings, for clear error. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(i); see also Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 260 (BIA 2007); Matter ofS-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 462 (BIA 2002). We review questions of law, discretion, or judgment, and all other issues de novo. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(ii). At the outset, the respondent generally maintains the Inunigration Judge erred in finding that removability was conceded. as the transcript from the record of proceedings does not contain the respondent’s pleadings on the record (Notice of Appeal; Resp. Briefat 2-5; I.J. at I). While this statement is accurate, we are unpersuaded by the respondent’s assertion that removability is at issue. In this regard, the respondent notes that she was represented at one point by an attorney who expressed confusion as to whether pleadings had been taken (Resp. Brief at 4-5; Tr. at 5). Notwithstanding this apparent confusion by prior counsel and contrary to the respondent’s assertions on appeal, the record contains written pleadings, filed by another attorney who (b) (6) (b) (6) previously represented the respondent in the course of these proceedings, wherein prior counsel conceded the charge of inadmissibiliry (Resp. Brief at 5; November 28, 2007, Motion to Waive Master Calendar Hearing). In addition, during several subsequent hearings, in which the respondent was represented by the same attorney who now represents her on appeal, the respondent, with the assistance of current counsel, acknowledged that she previously plead to the factual allegations as contains on the Notice to Appear and conceded her removabiliry (Tr. at 17, 24, 32). Moreover, as the DHS accurately notes, there is independent evidence establishing that the respondent’s conditional permanent resident status was terminated in accordance with section 237(a)(l)(D)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l)(D)(i), in that the notice from United States Citizenship and Immigration Services terminating the respondent’s conditional permanent resident status has been entered into evidence (DHS Brief at 2; Exh. 4). Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by the respondent’s assertion that further proceedings are required to assess whether the respondent is removable as charged. In addition, the respondent otherwise generally maintains that additional, untranscribed hearings were conducted, and that deficiencies in the transcript may have rendered these proceedings potentially unfair (Resp. Brief at 3-4). However, in the absence of any specific proffer, we conclude that the respondent has not demonstrated resulting prejudice, constituting a due process violation, related to these additional possible hearings. See Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 256 (4th Cir. 2008). Turning to the respondent’s application for cancellation of removal pursuant to section 240A(b )(2) of the Act, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent did not credibly testify in establishing that she had been the victim of battery or extreme cruelty in her prior marriage to a United States citizen (l.J. at 2-3, 5-7). See section 240A(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Act. In addition, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent had not established that she or her qualifying relatives would experience extreme hardship should her cancellation application be denied (l.J. at 8-9). Finally, the Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion because, among other things, the respondent had left her allegedly abusive relationship and was in a relationship with another man with whom she was co-parenting a child at the time of her final hearing (l.J. at 9). See Matter ofA-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2009). On appeal, the respondent challenges the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility determination and findings with respect abuse and/or extreme cruelry (Resp. Brief at 5-9). However, she does not meaningfully challenge the Immigration Judge’s findings with respect to extreme hardship (Resp. Brief at 8-9). Accordingly, we decline to disturb the Immigration Judge’s decision denying the respondent’s application for special rule cancellation of removal, and instead, we will dismiss the respondent’s appeal. Turning to the respondent’s motion to remand, we note that it is supported by new evidence, and specifically, a visa petition, approved on the respondent’s behalf on January 21, 2015, and affording her status as the immediate relative of a United States citizen (Resp. Motion to Remand). See Matter of Coelho, 20 l&N Dec. 464, 471(BIA1992); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(l). In addition, the respondent’s motion is supported by a completed Application for Adjustment of Status (Fonn I-485) (Resp. Motion to Remand). See id. Based on our review of the respondent’s 2 (b) (6) , adjustment application, the record of proceedings, and the Immigration Judge’s written decision, and in the absence of OHS opposition to the motion, we conclude that the respondent has established her prima facie eligibility to pursue an adjustment application.1 Moreover, although we recognize that the Immigration Judge previously denied the respondent’s application for special rule cancellation of removal in the exercise of discretion, we do not conclude that the determination is controlling in assessing the respondent’s eligibility for remand and ability to pursue adjustment of status as (1) the discretionary determination was based in part on factors unique to special rule cancellation of removal in the domestic violence context and (2) the Immigration Judge’s decision does not identify or counterbalance any relevant positive discretionary considerations (I.J. at 9). Accordingly, the following orders will be entered. ORDER: The respondent’s appeal is dismissed. FURTHER ORDER: The respondent’s motion to remand is granted. FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with this order and for the entry of a new decision. 1 Because we conclude that the respondent is removable as charged and that her previously accorded conditional permanent resident status has been terminated, she remains potentially eligible to pursue adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Act, notwithstanding section 245(d) of the Act. See Matter o/Stockwell, 20 l&N Dec. 309 (BIA 1991). 3 (b) (6) p ‘ ‘ ‘ I · U.S. Department of Justice Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Executive Office for Review Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: JUL 242015 In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL AND MOTION ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Matthew D. Pierce, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: CHARGE: Colleen E. Taylor Assistant Chief Counsel Notice: Sec. 237(a)(l)(B), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l)(B)] – In the United States in violation oflaw APPLICATION: Continuance; remand The respondent appeals from the Immigration Judge’s January 15, 2014, decision denying his motion to continue the proceedings. 1 The respondent sought the continuance to await the adjudication of a pending visa petition filed on his behalf in order then to apply for adjustment of status. The Department of Homeland Security opposes the appeal. While the appeal remained pending, the respondent offered evidence that the visa petition has now been approved. With the following comments, we will remand the record to the Immigration Judge to enable the respondent to apply for adjustment of status as the spouse of a United States citizen. In his January 15, 2014, decision, the Immigration Judge granted the respondent’s motion to amend his pleadings and to vacate his removability under 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (alien convicted of a controlled substance violation) based on a conviction for possession of cocaine. The respondent offered evidence that the criminal court had amended the underlying drug-related offense and found him guilty of accepting money in order to conceal an offense involving a felony, which is a tnisdemeanor offense punishable by not more than I year. See Immigration Judge’s Decision at 1-2; Exhibit 7. 1 The Board reviews the Immigration Judge’s findings of fact under a “clearly erroneous” standard. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i). If the Board detertnines that an Immigration Judge’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, it may review de novo whether the facts are sufficient to meet an applicable legal standard. See Matter of A-S-B·. 24 I&N Dec. 493, 497 (BIA 2008); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(ii). (b) (6) (b) (6) .. , ” While the Immigration Judge determined that the amended conviction no longer supported the charge of removability under section 237(A)(2)(B)(i) of the Act, he nevertheless concluded that the respondent is statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status because he did not show that he is not inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Although the drug-related conviction was amended, the Immigration Judge found that the criminal court order was ambiguous and “inconclusive regarding the rationale for the vacatur.” See Immigration Judge’s Decision at 4. We note that the criminal court’s decision specifically states that the respondent’s conviction was amended “in the interests of justice and a cure for any possible violations of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution that may have occurred in (the respondent’s) prior adjudication.” On review, we find that the language of the amended order supports the respondent’s assertion that the conviction was amended due to a defect in the underlying criminal proceedings. See Matter of Pickering, 23 l&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2003). See also Matter of R-S-H-, 23 l&N Dec. 629, 637 (BIA 2003) (“It has been held that a finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i). Accordingly, the following order will be entered. 2 ORDER: The record is remanded to Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with this decision. FOR THE BOARD 2 The respondent’s request to terminate the proceedings is denied. 2 (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: JUL lf 2015 In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Karen Spink, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Susan Leeker Assistant Chief Counsel APPLICATION: Cancellation of removal The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, has appealed from the Immigration Judge’s decision date January 8, 2014, denying the relief of cancellation of removal pursuant to section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). The record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge. The Board reviews an Immigration Judge’s findings of fact, including findings as to the credibility of testimony, under the “clearly erroneous” standard. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i); Matter of S-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 462, 464-65 (BIA 2002). The Board reviews questions of law, discretion, and judgment – and all other issues in appeals from decisions of Immigration Judges – de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(ii). To determine whether the respondent’s removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative, we examine the hardship factors in their totality. See Matter <?f Recinas, 23 I&N Dec. 467, 472 (BIA 2002). The Immigration Judge noted that the respondent’s United States citizen son had undergone evaluations and therapy (I.J. at 5). The Immigration Judge stated that the “evidence reflects that [the respondent’s son’s] speech difficulties are more likely related to his English comprehension growing up in a Spanish-speaking household, as opposed to some intrinsic learning disability.” (I.J. at 5). The Immigration Judge also said that ‘the respondent provided much of the objective evidence considered by the evaluators, which is subject to his own self-serving bias.” (I.J. at 5). The respondent, on appeal, disagrees with the Immigration Judge’s characterizations. We conclude that the evidence does not link the respondent’s son’s speech difficulties to growing up in a Spanish-speaking household. Moreover, the fact that the respondent may have provided some information during the evaluation process does not make it self-serving. We also note that the severity of the respondent’s son’s language difficulties was assessed as “severe” with a percentile rank of I (Exh. 3, Tab F, p. 125). (b) (6) (b) (6) We find it appropriate to remand the record for the Immigration Judge to reevaluate the respondent’s son’s learning disability. On remand, the respondent may provide current evidence relevant to this matter and any other issues of hardship. On remand, the respondent may also submit evidence to demonstrate that he has any stepsons who may be considered qualifying relatives. Accordingly, the following order will be entered. ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision. FOR THE BOARD 2 (b) (6) ··’ U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Date: MAY 11Z015 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Ross E. Miller, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Scott D. Criss Assistant Chief Counsel CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 212(a)(6)(A)(i), l&N Act [8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(6)(A)(i)] – Present without being admitted or paroled (Withdrawn) Lodged: Sec. 237(a)(l)(B), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l)(B)] – In the United States in violation of law APPLICATION: Cancellation of removal The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, appeals from the Immigration Judge’s decision denying his application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(l) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l). The Department of Homeland Security argues the Immigration Judge’s decision should be summarily affirmed. The appeal will be sustained and the record remanded for further proceedings. We defer to an Immigration Judge’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and all other issues, including the application of law and the exercise of discretion, we review under a de novo standard. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.l(d)(3)(i), (ii). In concluding that the respondent had not met his burden of establishing his qualifying relatives would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, the Immigration Judge stated that the respondent “provided no evidence which demonstrates any of his children suffer from any significant medical condition, learning disability, or education deficit which would be exacerbated if they return with him to Mexico” (I.J. at 7). The Immigration Judge did not address the educational records indicating an Individual Education Plan for one of the children, or the testimony that one child has a deformity which may require future operations (Exh. 5, Tab E; Tr. at 44). Therefore, we conclude that additional factual :findings are necessary for us to meaningfully adjudicate this appeal. On remand, the respondent should be provided with the opportunity to submit additional or updated evidence regarding the hardship in this case. ORDER: The appeal is sustained. (b) (6) (b) (6) ” FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision. FOR THE BOARD 2 (b) (6) U.S. Department of’Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Falls Cbmch, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: JUN 302015 In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Hamdan Qudah, Esquire APPLICATION: Remand The respondent has appealed from the decision of the Immigration Judge, dated January 15, 2014. On December 23, 2014, the respondent submitted a Motion to Remand, including evidence that he is the beneficiary of an approved immigrant visa petition (Form 1-130) filed on his behalf by his United States citizen daughter. The Department of Homeland Security has not filed a brief in opposition to the respondent’s request for remand. See 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(g)(3). Accordingly, the record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge to provide the respondent with an opportunity to apply for adjustment of status. ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. (b) (6) (b) (6) 􀀓􀀉􀀑􀀧􀀨􀀂􀀎􀀚􀀉􀀛􀀟􀀖􀀍􀀗􀀞􀀪􀀨􀀓􀀱􀀅􀀢􀀜􀀟􀀒􀀊􀀍􀀪 􀀄􀀧􀀏􀀋􀀣􀀠􀀕􀀤􀀐􀀪􀀆􀀑􀀋􀀐􀀪􀀕􀀫􀀱􀀋􀀌􀀚􀀖􀀫􀀏􀀮􀀛􀀩􀀥􀀱􀀇􀀐􀀥􀀓􀀐􀀦􀀪 􀀃􀀐􀀌􀀓􀀝􀀔􀀙􀀘􀀪􀀩􀀔􀀱􀀡􀀐􀀪􀀇􀀩􀀏􀀬􀀑􀀱􀀩􀀔􀀞􀀤􀀜􀀗􀀏􀀮􀀜􀀩􀀧􀀱􀀆􀀪􀀪􀀒􀀏􀀡􀀭􀀱 􀀉􀀏􀀟􀀠􀀭􀀱􀀈􀀘􀀯􀀐􀀘􀀁􀀱􀀍􀀚􀀫􀀖􀀝􀀦􀀝􀀏􀀱􀀄􀀄􀀂􀀅􀀃􀀱 􀁃􀂍􀂗􀁶􀀳􀃖 􀀛 􀀾􀂈􀁭􀂖􀂩􀂻􀃂􀁶􀀏􀃖􀁖􀀾􀃖 􀁋􀂦􀃖􀂯􀁶􀀳􀃖 􀀱 􀃖 􀁎􀁗􀃖􀁛􀁂􀁔􀁘􀁣􀀹􀁒􀃖􀁙􀁚􀁘􀀾􀁂􀁂􀁀􀁋􀁖􀁆􀁝􀃖 􀀻􀁙􀁂􀀹􀁓􀃖 􀁀􀁩􀂻􀁶􀀲􀃖 􀁘􀁖􀃖􀀽􀁂􀁈􀀹􀁓􀁄􀃖􀁘􀁄􀃖􀁛􀁂􀁝􀁙􀁘􀁖􀁀􀁂􀁖􀁟􀀳􀃖 􀀹􀂣􀂌􀂼􀃖 􀁀􀁶􀂋􀂰􀁩􀀖􀃖􀁂􀂹􀂭􀃈􀂌􀂯􀁶􀃖 􀀾􀁉􀀹􀁚􀁇􀁂􀀴􀃖 􀁖􀂩􀂼􀂌􀁱􀁶􀀳􀃖 􀁝􀁶􀁱􀀞􀃖 􀀩􀀪􀀯􀀈􀁩􀀌􀀉􀂜􀀌􀀈􀀹􀀌􀀐􀃖􀁋􀀂􀁖􀃖􀀹􀁱􀂼􀃖􀁥􀀰􀃖􀁢􀀞􀁝􀀟􀀾􀀞􀃖􀀨􀀪􀀦􀀩􀀩􀀯􀀉􀁩􀀌􀀈 􀂖 􀀍􀀉􀀹􀀍􀁧􀃖􀀜 􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀄􀀂􀀄 􀀋􀀊􀀌􀀨 􀁋􀂦􀁩􀁴􀂣􀂍􀂹􀂹􀂌􀁯􀂖􀁶􀃖􀁩􀂼􀃖􀂼􀂍􀂥􀁶􀃖􀂩􀁸􀃖􀁶􀂦􀂻􀂷􀃒􀃖􀂩􀂯􀃖 􀁩􀁴􀂕􀃈􀂹􀂻􀂣􀁶􀂦􀂼􀃖􀂩􀁸􀃖􀂹􀂻􀁩􀃄􀃉􀂹􀃖􀃈􀂨􀁴􀁶􀂯􀃖􀂹􀁶􀁱􀂼􀂌􀂩􀂦􀃖 􀀩􀀦􀀩􀀈􀁩􀀌􀀉􀀮􀀌􀀉􀀾􀀌􀀉􀂌􀀍􀀑􀃖􀁋􀀂􀁖􀃖􀀹􀁱􀂻􀃖 􀁦􀀰􀃖􀁢􀀣􀁝􀀠􀀾􀀣􀃖 􀀩􀀪 􀀁􀀪􀀦􀀰􀀩􀀉􀁩􀀌􀀉􀀮􀀌􀀈􀀾􀀌􀀉􀂍􀀌􀁨􀃖 􀀝 􀁄􀂲􀁩􀃈􀁴􀃖􀂩􀂯􀃖􀃍􀂔􀂙􀂖􀂂􀂙􀃖􀂣􀂌􀂹􀂰􀁶􀂬􀂯􀁶􀂹􀁶􀂦􀂻􀁩􀂼􀂎􀂩􀂦􀃖􀂩􀁸􀃖􀂣􀁩􀃄􀁶􀂷􀂌􀁩􀂖􀃖􀁻􀁱􀂻􀃖 􀀼􀁙􀁒􀁍􀀿􀀹􀁞􀁎􀁘􀁖􀀵􀃖 􀁤􀁩􀂍􀃋􀁶􀂯􀃖􀃈􀂦􀁴􀁶􀂯􀃖􀂹􀁶􀁱􀂻􀂍􀂩􀂦􀃖􀀩􀀪􀀯􀀉􀁩􀀍􀀋􀂘􀀌􀀈􀁈􀀌􀃖 􀁞􀂈􀁶􀃖 􀂯􀁶􀂹􀂬􀂩􀂦􀁴􀁶􀂦􀂻􀀒􀃖 􀁩􀃖 􀂦􀁩􀂽􀂍􀃋􀁶􀃖 􀁪􀂨􀁴􀃖 􀁱􀂌􀂼􀂍􀃕􀁶􀂦􀃖 􀂩􀁸􀃖􀁋􀂦􀁴􀂌􀁪􀀔􀃖 􀂈􀁮􀃖 􀁩􀂬􀂬􀁶􀁪􀂗􀁶􀁴􀃖 􀁿􀂩􀂣􀃖 􀁩􀂧􀃖 􀁎􀂣􀂥􀂌􀂄􀂯􀁩􀃇􀂩􀂦􀃖 􀁏􀃈􀁴􀂄􀁶􀀃􀂹􀃖 􀁐􀁩􀂧􀃈􀁪􀂰􀃓􀃖 􀀩􀀯􀀓􀃖 􀀩􀀤􀀦􀀫􀀔􀃖 􀁴􀁶􀁱􀂌􀂹􀂍􀂩􀂦􀃖 􀁴􀁶􀂦􀃑􀂍􀂦􀂄􀃖 􀂈􀂍􀂹􀃖 􀁩􀂬􀂬􀂖􀂍􀁱􀁩􀂻􀂌􀂩􀂦􀃖 􀁾􀂰􀃖 􀁩􀃖 􀃍􀁩􀂍􀃋􀁶􀂯􀃖 􀂩􀁸􀃖 􀂰􀁶􀂣􀂩􀃋􀁩􀂙􀃖 􀃊􀂦􀁴􀁶􀂯􀃖 􀂹􀁶􀁱􀂼􀂍􀂩􀂦􀃖 􀀩􀀪􀀯􀀉􀁩􀀍􀀉􀂝􀀍􀀉􀁈􀀍􀃖 􀂩􀁸􀃖􀂼􀂈􀁶􀃖􀁋􀂣􀂣􀂌􀂇􀁩􀂼􀂌􀂩􀂦􀃖􀁪􀂦􀁴􀃖􀁗􀁩􀂼􀂍􀂩􀂦􀁩􀂖􀂌􀃄􀃑􀃖􀀹􀁱􀂼􀀕􀃖􀀰􀃖􀁢􀀡􀁝􀀢􀀾􀀣􀃖 􀀨􀀪 􀀧􀀩􀀩􀀯􀀊􀁩􀀌􀀉􀂖􀀎􀀈􀁉􀀌􀀢􀃖 􀁟􀂈􀁶􀃖􀁀􀁶􀂬􀁩􀂯􀃃􀂣􀁶􀂦􀂼􀃖 􀂩􀁸􀃖􀁈􀂩􀂤􀁶􀂗􀁪􀂧􀁴􀃖 􀁝􀁶􀁱􀃈􀂯􀂍􀃅􀃔􀃖 􀂈􀁩􀂺􀃖 􀂦􀂩􀂼􀃖 􀁽􀂗􀁷􀁴􀃖 􀁩􀃖 􀂯􀁶􀂹􀂬􀂩􀂦􀂹􀁶􀃖 􀂻􀂩􀃖 􀂼􀂉􀁶􀃖 􀂯􀁷􀂺􀂬􀂩􀂦􀁴􀁶􀂦􀂼􀀆􀂹􀃖 􀁩􀂬􀂬􀁶􀁩􀂞􀀣􀃖 􀁠􀂉􀁷􀃖 􀂱􀁶􀁱􀂪􀂯􀁴􀃖 􀃍􀂎􀂟􀂞􀃖 􀁰􀁶􀃖 􀂯􀁶􀂣􀁬􀁴􀁶􀁴􀀢􀃖 􀁞􀂈􀁶􀃖 􀂯􀁶􀁱􀂩􀂯􀁴􀃖 􀁱􀂩􀂦􀂼􀁩􀂍􀂦􀂹􀃖 􀁩􀃖 􀂹􀀁􀁪􀂲􀃒􀃖 􀂩􀁸􀃖 􀂻􀂈􀁶􀃖 􀁌􀂣􀂣􀂍􀂄􀂯􀁩􀂻􀂍􀂩􀂦􀃖 􀁏􀃈􀁴􀂄􀁶􀀄􀂹􀃖 􀁴􀁶􀁱􀂌􀂹􀂍􀂩􀂦􀃖 􀁴􀁶􀂦􀃒􀂌􀂦􀂄􀃖 􀃄􀂈􀁶􀃖 􀂰􀁶􀂹􀂬􀂩􀂦􀁵􀁶􀂦􀂼􀀅􀂹􀃖 􀁩􀂬􀂬􀂙􀂔􀁱􀁩􀂻􀂍􀂩􀂦􀃖 􀁾􀂰􀃖 􀁩􀃖 􀃍􀁩􀂍􀃋􀁶􀂯􀃖 􀃈􀂧􀁴􀁶􀂯􀃖 􀂹􀁶􀁱􀂻􀂌􀂩􀂦􀃖 􀀩􀀪􀀯􀀉􀁩􀀍􀀋􀂘􀀌􀀈􀁈􀀌􀃖 􀂩􀁸􀃖􀂼􀂈􀁶􀃖 􀀹􀁱􀂼􀃖 􀁩􀂧􀁴􀃖 􀂩􀂰􀁴􀁶􀂯􀂌􀂦􀂄􀃖 􀀙􀀱 􀂰􀁶􀂣􀂩􀃋􀁶􀁴􀃖􀂼􀂩􀃖􀁎􀂦􀁴􀂍􀁩􀀞􀃖 􀁡􀂈􀁶􀃖􀂼􀂯􀁩􀂧􀂹􀁱􀂰􀂒􀂬􀂻􀃖􀂒􀂨􀁴􀂌􀁱􀁩􀃄􀁶􀂹􀃖􀃄􀂈􀁩􀂾􀀖􀃖􀂩􀂦􀃖􀂻􀂈􀁩􀂻􀃖􀁴􀁩􀂼􀁶􀀗􀃖􀂻􀂈􀁶􀃖􀁋􀂣􀂥􀂌􀂄􀂸􀁩􀂻􀂍􀂩􀂦􀃖􀁏􀃈􀁴􀂄􀁶􀃖􀂬􀂯􀂩􀃋􀂌􀁴􀁶􀁴􀃖􀂼􀂈􀁶􀃖 􀂬􀁪􀂶􀃂􀂍􀁶􀂹􀃖 􀃎􀂌􀂻􀂈􀃖􀁱􀂩􀂬􀂌􀁶􀂹􀃖􀂩􀁸􀃖􀂉􀂌􀂹􀃖 􀃍􀂱􀂌􀃂􀃃􀁶􀂦􀃖 􀁴􀁶􀁱􀂍􀂹􀂍􀂩􀂦􀃖 􀁴􀁶􀂦􀃑􀂌􀂧􀂄􀃖􀂼􀂈􀁶􀃖 􀃍􀁩􀂏􀃋􀁶􀂯􀀣􀃖 􀁊􀂩􀃍􀁶􀃋􀁶􀂯􀀘􀃖 􀂻􀂈􀁶􀃖􀃏􀂰􀂌􀃅􀂽􀁶􀂦􀃖􀁴􀁶􀁱􀂍􀂹􀂍􀂩􀂦􀃖 􀂍􀂹􀃖 􀂣􀂌􀂹􀂹􀂒􀂨􀂄􀃖 􀁿􀂩􀂣􀃖 􀂻􀂈􀁶􀃖 􀂰􀁶􀁱􀂩􀂰􀁴􀃖 􀂩􀁸􀃖􀂬􀂰􀂩􀁱􀁶􀁶􀁴􀂐􀂦􀂄􀂹􀀣􀃖 􀁞􀂈􀃈􀂹􀀙􀃖 􀂼􀂉􀁶􀃖 􀂯􀁶􀁱􀂩􀂯􀁴􀃖 􀁴􀂩􀁶􀂹􀃖 􀂦􀂩􀂼􀃖 􀁱􀂩􀂦􀂼􀁩􀂍􀂦􀃖 􀁩􀃖 􀂹􀁶􀂬􀁪􀂲􀁩􀂼􀁶􀃖 􀂩􀂯􀁩􀂙􀃖 􀂩􀂯􀃖 􀃍􀂯􀂔􀂼􀂻􀁶􀂦􀃖 􀁴􀁶􀁱􀂍􀂹􀂌􀂩􀂦􀃖 􀁶􀃐􀂬􀂖􀁩􀂌􀂧􀂌􀂦􀂄􀃖 􀂼􀂈􀁶􀃖 􀁋􀂣􀂣􀂌􀂄􀂯􀁩􀂿􀂏􀂩􀂦􀃖 􀁏􀃈􀁴􀂄􀁶􀀆􀂹􀃖 􀁹􀂓􀂦􀁴􀂒􀂦􀂄􀂹􀃖 􀂩􀁸􀃖􀁼􀁱􀂼􀃖 􀁩􀂦􀁴􀃖 􀂰􀁩􀃂􀂌􀂩􀂦􀁩􀂗􀁶􀀣􀃖 􀁤􀂍􀃆􀂩􀃈􀂻􀃖 􀁩􀁴􀁶􀂮􀃈􀁩􀂼􀁶􀃖􀁶􀃐􀂬􀂙􀁪􀂨􀁩􀂻􀂍􀂩􀂦􀃖􀂩􀁸􀃖􀂻􀂈􀁶􀃖􀂲􀁶􀁩􀂹􀂩􀂦􀂹􀃖􀁹􀂫􀂯􀃖􀃄􀂈􀁶􀃖􀁎􀂣􀂣􀂑􀂄􀂸􀁩􀂻􀂍􀂩􀂦􀃖􀁏􀃈􀁴􀂄􀁶􀀇􀂹􀃖􀁴􀁶􀁱􀂍􀂹􀂍􀂩􀂦􀃖􀂼􀂈􀁶􀃖􀀽􀂩􀁩􀂯􀁴􀃖􀂌􀂹􀃖􀂦􀂩􀂼􀃖􀁩􀁯􀂖􀁶􀃖􀂻􀂩􀃖 􀂣􀁶􀁩􀂨􀂍􀂦􀂅􀂂􀂠􀂗􀃑􀃖 􀂰􀁶􀃋􀂍􀁶􀃍􀃖 􀂼􀂈􀁶􀃖 􀁩􀂬􀂬􀁶􀁩􀂗􀀣􀃖 􀀒􀀖􀀗􀀨􀀎􀀔􀀣􀀗􀀞􀀨􀀛􀀙􀀨􀀎􀀈􀀐􀀄􀀃􀀨􀀩􀀥􀃖 􀁋􀀂􀁖􀃖 􀁀􀁶􀁱􀀢􀃖 􀀯􀀰􀀮􀃖 􀀋􀀽􀁌􀀹􀃖 􀀨􀀱􀀱􀀫􀀌􀀷􀃖 􀀡􀀖􀀗􀀨 􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀛􀀨 􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀘􀀟􀀨􀀜􀀙􀀨􀀍􀀅􀀏􀀄􀀁􀀨􀀩􀀩􀃖􀁋􀀂􀁖􀃖 􀁀􀁶􀁱􀀞􀃖 􀀬􀀮􀀰􀃖 􀀉􀀽􀁍􀀹􀃖 􀀦􀀱􀀱􀀱􀀌􀀢􀃖 􀁡􀂈􀁶􀂯􀁶􀁹􀂫􀂯􀁶􀀚􀃖 􀃍􀁶􀃖 􀀎􀀰􀀢􀀣􀀱 􀂵􀁶􀂣􀁪􀂧􀁴􀃖 􀃀􀂊􀁶􀂹􀁶􀃖 􀂬􀂯􀂩􀁱􀁶􀁶􀁴􀂍􀂦􀂄􀂹􀃖 􀁺􀂫􀂰􀃖 􀂻􀂈􀁶􀃖 􀂬􀁩􀂯􀃁􀂍􀁶􀂹􀃖 􀂻􀂩􀃖 􀁯􀁶􀃖 􀂄􀂌􀃋􀁶􀂦􀃖 􀁪􀂧􀃖 􀂩􀂬􀂬􀂩􀂰􀂻􀃈􀂧􀂌􀂻􀃑􀃖 􀂻􀂩􀃖 􀂬􀂯􀁶􀂹􀁶􀂦􀂼􀃖 􀂃􀁶􀂰􀃖 􀁶􀃌􀂌􀁴􀁶􀂦􀁱􀁶􀃖 􀂯􀁶􀂄􀁩􀂰􀁴􀂌􀂧􀂄􀃖 􀂼􀂈􀁶􀃖 􀂯􀁶􀂹􀂬􀂩􀂦􀁴􀁶􀂦􀂻􀀆􀂹􀃖 􀁶􀂖􀂍􀂄􀂍􀁰􀂍􀂗􀂌􀂿􀃑􀃖 􀁾􀂰􀃖 􀂰􀁶􀂚􀂌􀁶􀁸􀃖 􀂀􀂩􀂣􀃖 􀂰􀁶􀂣􀂩􀃋􀁩􀂖􀀒􀃖 􀁩􀂦􀁴􀃖 􀁾􀂰􀃖 􀂼􀂈􀁶􀃖 􀁌􀂣􀂣􀂌􀂄􀂯􀁩􀂼􀂍􀂩􀂦􀃖 􀁏􀃈􀁴􀂄􀁶􀃖 􀂻􀂩􀃖 􀂍􀂹􀂹􀃈􀁶􀃖 􀁩􀃖 􀁴􀁶􀁱􀂍􀂹􀂍􀂩􀂦􀃖 􀂍􀂨􀃖 􀁱􀂩􀂣􀂬􀂙􀂍􀁫􀂦􀁱􀁶􀃖􀃍􀂌􀂻􀂈􀃖􀀎􀀔􀀥􀀖􀀞􀀨􀀛􀀙􀀨􀀍􀀆􀀐􀀇􀀂􀀨􀀢􀀦􀀝􀀠􀀔􀀁􀀨􀂻􀂉􀁶􀂷􀁶􀁩􀂁􀁶􀂰􀀡􀃖 􀀺􀁲􀁳􀂩􀂳􀁴􀂒􀂦􀂄􀂛􀃑􀀖􀃖􀂻􀂈􀁶􀃖􀁺􀂫􀂛􀂡􀂩􀃍􀂒􀂦􀂄􀃖􀂩􀂯􀁴􀁶􀂯􀃖􀃍􀂒􀂢􀂡􀃖􀁯􀁶􀃖􀁶􀂦􀂻􀁶􀂴􀁶􀁴􀀞􀃖 􀁘􀁛􀁁􀁂􀁚􀀶􀃖 􀁞􀂈􀁶􀃖 􀂯􀁶􀁱􀂩􀂴􀁴􀃖 􀂍􀂹􀃖 􀂰􀁶􀂣􀁩􀂦􀁴􀁶􀁴􀃖 􀁾􀂰􀃖 􀂂􀂰􀂽􀂈􀁶􀂰􀃖 􀂬􀂰􀂩􀁱􀁶􀁶􀁴􀂍􀂦􀂆􀂹􀃖 􀁱􀂩􀂦􀂹􀂐􀂹􀂻􀁶􀂦􀂼􀃖 􀃍􀂍􀂼􀂈􀃖 􀂽􀂈􀁶􀃖 􀁾􀂵􀁶􀂄􀂩􀂍􀂦􀂄􀃖 􀂩􀂬􀂍􀂦􀂌􀂩􀂦􀃖􀁩􀂦􀁴􀃖􀁹􀂫􀂵􀃖􀂻􀂈􀁶􀃖􀂌􀂹􀂹􀃈􀁩􀂦􀁱􀁶􀃖􀂩􀁸􀃖􀁩􀃖􀂦􀁶􀃍􀃖􀁴􀁶􀁱􀂍􀂹􀂌􀂩􀂦􀀣􀃖 􀀁􀀁􀀂 􀁅􀁘􀁚􀃖􀁞􀁉􀁂􀃖 􀀽􀁘􀀹􀁛􀁁􀃖 􀀁􀃖 (b) (6) (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Date: JUL 2 92015 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Matthew D. Pierce, Esquire CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 237(a)(2)(B)(i), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)] – Convicted of controlled substance violation APPLICATION: Termination The respondent appeals the Immigration Judge’s January 15, 2014, decision finding him removable and ordering him removed to Jamaica. The record will be remanded. We review for clear error the findings of fact, including the determination of credibility, made by the Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i). We review de novo all other issues, including whether the parties have met the relevant burden of proof, and issues of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(ii). The respondent, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted on , 2012, of possession of greater than one ounce of marijuana in violation of section 44-53-370(d)(2) of the Code of Laws of South Carolina (Exh. 1).1 The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued him a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), charging him with removability under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), as an alien convicted of a controlled substance violation (Exh. I). The respondent denied that he was removabie.2 The Immigration Judge applied our decision in Matter of Davey, 26 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2012), which held that the circumstance-specific approach applies to the section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) exception for a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 1 Although the respondent admits that he pied guilty to possession of greater than one ounce of marijuana, the statute under which he pied guilty is silent as to the quantity of marijuana that an individual must possess in order to sustain a conviction. See section 44-53-370(d)(2) of the Code of Laws of South Carolina. 2 The respondent, through counsel, filed a motion to reopen pleadings in order to contest removability, which was granted by the Immigration Judge. (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) J ‘ grams or less of marijuana, and concluded that the OHS met its burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent was removable, as the OHS presented an arrest warrant that stated that the respondent possessed approximately 60 grams of marijuana at the time of his arrest (l.J. at 2-3). Relying solely on the information in the arrest warrant, the Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s motion to terminate proceedings and ordered the respondent removed. The respondent now appeals. The respondent argues, inter alia, that he was not given an opportunity to dispute the information contained in the arrest report that the Immigration Judge relied on in ordering him removed (Respondent’s Br. at 11-12). In Nijhawon v. Holder, the Supreme Court upheld the application of the “circumstance-specific” approach in analyzing whether an offense involved “fraud or deceit when the loss to the victim exceeds $10,000” under section 10l(a)(43)(M)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(43)(M)(i). 557 U.S. 29, 37 (2009). A circumstance-specific approach requires an inquiry into the nature of the alien’s conduct giving rise to the offense. Id. at 34. In Nijhawan, the Court recognized that a circumstance-specific inquiry required the use of fundamentally fair procedures that “give an alien a fair opportunity to dispute a Government claim that a prior conviction involved a fraud with the relevant loss to victims.” Id. at 41. Subsequent to the Immigration Judge’s decision in the instant case, this Board issued Matter of Dominguez-Rodriguez, 26 l&N Dec. 408 (BIA 2014), in which we reaffirmed our decision in Matter of Davey, supra, and held that for purposes of section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act, the phrase “a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of thirty grams or less of marijuana” Clllls for a circumstance-specific inquiry into the character of the alien’s unlawful conduct on a single occasion, not a categorical inquiry into the elements of a single statutory crime. Matter of Dominguez-Rodriguez, supra, at 411. We further explained that a circumstance-specific approach allows an Immigration Judge to “inquire into some of the factual circumstances surrounding the crime[],” Id. at 413. Moreover, we again emphasized, consistent with the Court in Nijhawan, that the circumstance-specific approach “contemplates the use of fundamentally fair procedures that give respondents a reasonable opportunity to dispute any OHS claim that the exception is inapplicable.” Id. at 413. Finally, we noted that the DHS has the burden to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent possessed more than 30 grams of marijuana. Id. Even if we were to conclude that it is appropriate to consider the arrest warrant under the circumstance-specific approach, remand is required in the instant case, as the Immigration Judge did not inquire into the factual circumstances surrounding the crime, but instead relied solely on the information contained in the arrest warrant: a document that the respondent was not given an opportunity to dispute. In light of our disposition of this case, we need not reach the remaining arguments raised by the respondent on appeal. Accordingly, the following order will be entered. ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and entry of a new decision. v FOR THE BOARD 2 (b) (6) • ., U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 22041 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Date: ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: J. Gabe Talton, Esquire CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), I&N Act [8U.S.C.§J182(a)(2)(A)(i)(Il)] – Controlled substance violation APPLICATION: Cancellation of removal; waiver of inadmissibility under 212(h) The respondent appeals from the Immigration Judge’s January 22, 2014, decision finding him inadmissible as charged, pretermitting his application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), and denying his application for voluntary departure under section 240B(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b). The appeal will be sustained, and the record will be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. The respondent is a native and citizen of Mexico and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. The Immigration Judge found the respondent inadmissible as charged based on his 1997 conviction for the offense of possession of marijuana with intent to sell and deliver in violation of § 90-95(a)(l) of the North Carolina General Statutes (NCGS), for which he was sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 6 to 8 months, and ordered to serve 36 months of probation (Exhs. 1 and 2; Tr. at 12). The Immigration Judge also found that the respondent was convicted in 1997 of the offense of the sale or delivery of marijuana in violation of NCGS § 90-95(a)(l) (Tr. at 16-17). The Immigration Judge also found the respondent statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal and voluntary departure based on his detennination that the respondent’s conviction for the sale or delivery of marijuana constitutes an aggravated felony as defined in section 10l(a)(43)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(a)(43)(B) (l.J. at 2-3). See sections 240A(b)(l)(C) and 240B(b)(l)(C) of the Act. The Immigration Judge additionally pretennitted the respondent’s cancellation of removal application because he did not file the application with the Immigration Court on or before August 12, 2013, as directed (I.J. at 2). On appeal the respondent does not challenge the Immigration Judge’s inadmissibility finding. Instead, he argues that the Immigration Judge erred in finding that his drug conviction constitutes an aggravated felony. See Notice of Appeal, Attachment. He also argues that the Immigration (b) (6) (b) (6) Judge erred in denying his waiver of inadmissibility under section 2 l 2(h) of the Act, 8 U .S.C. § 1l82(h), without holding an evidentiary hearing. It is undisputed that in 1997 the respondent was convicted under NCGS § 90-95(a)(l) for two offenses: (1) sale and delivery of marijuana and (2) possession of marijuana with intent to sell and deliver (Exh. 2; Tr. at 16-17). The central issue before us is whether either of the respondent’s drug convictions constitutes an aggravated felony under section 10l(a)(43)(B) of the Act. At the time of the respondent’s convictions NCGS § 90-95(a)(l) provided that (a) Except as authorized by this Article, it is unlawful for any person: ( 1) To manufacture, sell or deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture, sell or deliver, a controlled substance The North Carolina Supreme Court has determined that NCGS “§ 90-95(a)(l) creates three offenses: ( 1) manufacture of a controlled substance, (2) transfer of a controlled substance by sale or delivery, and (3) possession with intent to manufacture, sell or deliver a controlled substance.” Stale v. Moore, 395 S.E.2d 124, 126 (N.C. 1990). A sale involves remuneration while a delivery does not. Id. at 127. Under NCGS § 90-95(b)(2), the transfer of less than 5 grams of marijuana for no remuneration does not constitute a delivery under NCGS § 90-95(a)(l). The Immigration Judge did not determine whether the respondent’s conviction for the crime of sale or delivery of marijuana under § 90-95(a)(l) is categorically an aggravated felony under section 10l(a)(43)(B) of the Act. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013). On de novo review, we find that the respondent’s crime is not categorically an aggravated felony. To make that determination, we ask whether the minimum conduct that has a realistic probability of being successfully prosecuted under the statute corresponds to the illicit trafficking or drug trafficking crime definitions. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, supra, at 1684-85 (explaining that “our focus on the minimum conduct criminalized by the state statute is not an invitation to apply legal imagination to the state offense; there must be a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.”) (citing Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). As the Moncrieffe Court determined, and as the Immigration Judge acknowledged, delivery of a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration is punishable as a federal misdemeanor under 21 U.S.C. § 84l(b)(4) (I.J. at 2). In State v. Blackburn, 239 S.E.2d 626, 629- 30 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977), the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld a NCGS § 90-95(a)(l) conviction in which the jury found that the defendant possessed 14 grams of marijuana with intent to deliver. As the minimum conduct that has a realistic probability of being successfully prosecuted under NCGS § 90-95(a)(l) is possession of less than 30 grams of marijuana with the intent to deliver without remuneration, that offense is not a categorical aggravated felony. Matter of Castro Rodriguez, 25 I&N Dec. 698, 703 (BIA 2012) (stating that the phrase “small amount” was not statutorily defined but concluded that 30 grams was a “useful guidepost” for immigration cases). Next, we review the Immigration Judge’s ruling that the crime of sale or delivery of a controlled substance in violation of NCGS § 90-95(a)( I) is a divisible offense so that the 2 (b) (6) —- ‘ modified categorical approach applies (I.J. at 2-3). According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this case arises, ”the use of the word “or” in the definition of a crime does not automatically render the crime divisible. A crime is divisible under Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), only if it is defined to include multiple alternative elements, not multiple alternative means. See Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 2014 ). The Court explained that elements are “factual circumstances of the offense the jury must find “unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2288). To determine divisibility we consider how North Carolina juries are instructed with respect to NCGS § 90-95(a)(l) offenses. See Omargharib v. Holder, supra at 198-99. To prove sale and/or delivery of a controlled substance the State must prove a transfer of a controlled substance by sale, by delivery, or by both. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that “[t]he transfer by sale or delivery of a controlled substance is one statutory offense, the gravamen of the offense being the transfer of the drug. So long as each juror finds that the defendant transferred the substance, whether by sale, by delivery, or by both, the defendant committed the statutory offense, and no unanimity concerns are implicated.” State v. Moore, supra at 127. “Whether the defendant is tried for transfer by sale, by delivery, or by both, the jury in such cases should determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of transferring a controlled substance to another person.” Id. To prove possession with intent to sell or deliver a controlled substance the State must prove “two elements: (I) defendant’s possession of the drug, and (2) defendant’s intention to “sell or deliver” the drug.” State v. Creason, 326 S.E.2d 24, 28 (N.C. 1985). “Whether the transfer was to be by sale or delivery, or both is immaterial. As long as the jury finds that the possession was with the intent to “sell or deliver,” the crime is proved.” Id. According to these cases, the North Carolina Supreme Court has determined it is immaterial whether the transfer was by sale or by delivery or by both. A jury can convict a defendant of sale or delivery of a controlled substance and possession with intent to sell or deliver a controlled substance without finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the transfer was by sale. We conclude that the crimes for which the respondent was convicted under NCGS § 90-95(a)(l) are not divisible because the crimes define alternative means of making a transfer, that is, by sale or by delivery. The Immigration Judge should not have applied the modified categorical approach because the statute of conviction is indivisible. See Omargharib v. Holder, supra at 198. We conclude that the respondent’s drug convictions are not aggravated felonies under section I 01 (a)(43)(B) of the Act. Accordingly, we will remand the record to the Immigration Judge to afford the respondent the opportunity to apply for relief from removal. We recognize that the Immigration Judge also denied the respondent’s application for cancellation of removal because he did not timely submit his application as directed by the Immigration Judge (l.J. at 1). 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3l(c). However, the respondent submitted evidence that the application was filed (misfiled) with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Also, it is unclear whether the Immigration Judge would have permitted the 3 (b) (6) — – ‘ respondent to present his cancellation application had he found him eligible for such relief. On remand, the respondent will have the opportunity to apply for any relief for which he is eligible. The appeal will be sustained and the record will be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. ORDER: The appeal is sustained. FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision. Board Member Patricia A. Cole respectfully dissents. I would affirm the Immigration Judge’s finding that the respondent did not meet his burden of proof pursuant to section 240(c)(4)(A) of the Act. The majority’s analysis is accurate for determining whether the respondent is removable for an aggravated felony offense. However, it was proper for the Immigration Judge to review the charging documents in the respondent’s case to determine whether the evidence “indicates that one or more of the grounds for mandatory denial” for relief applied. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.S(d). The appeal should be dismissed. 4 (b) (6) • U.S.’Department of Justice Executive Office.for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 22041 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL Decision of the Board oflmmigration Appeals Date: NOV 2 3 2015 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Katherine Smelas, Esquire ON BEHALF OF OHS: Scott D. Criss Assistant Chief Counsel APPLICATION: Asylum; withholding ofremoval; Convention Against Torture The respondent appeals from the Immigration Judge’s February 10, 2014, decision denying his application for asylum and withholding of removal under sections 208(b)(l)(A) and 24l(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“Act”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(l)(A) and 123 l(b)(3)(A), and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)-1208.18. The respondent’s request for a fee waiver is granted. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.3(a)(i), 1003.8. The Department of Homeland Security (“OHS”) has responded to the appeal. The record will be remanded for further proceedings. We review for clear error the findings of fact, including the determination of credibility, made by the Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i). We review de novo all other issues, including whether the parties have met the relevant burden of proof, and issues of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(ii). The respondent filed his application after May 11, 2005, and it is governed by the provisions of the REAL ID Act. The respondent’s case was previously before the Board on March 26, 2013. Accepting the Immigration Judge’s credibility finding, we concluded that the respondent suffered harm that rose to the level of past persecution in China. As such, we remanded the record for the DHS to have an opportunity to rebut the presumption that the respondent has a well-founded fear of future persecution upon return to China. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13{b)(I). Matter ofD-1-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 2008). On remand the OHS waived the opportunity to conduct an individual hearing to supplement the record. The respondent claims past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his political or imputed political opinion. The respondent testified that he is not a Falun Gong practitioner. He claimed that he distributed Falun Gong material in China to earn money, and was arrested by the police. During his period of detention the respondent testified he was interrogated about his relationship with Falun Gong and suffered harm rising to the level of past persecution (l.J. at 2-3). Since the respondent established past persecution on account of a protected ground, he is presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution based on the same claim (l.J. at 3). See (b) (6) (b) (6) 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(I). On remand, the Immigration Judge held that the presumption of future persecution was rebutted by the fact that the respondent does not practice Falun Gong and will not practice Falun Gong if he is removed to China. This, however, is not alone sufficient to show a change in circumstances. The respondent previously asserted that he was not a Falun Gong practitioner, but was detained and harmed nonetheless. The Immigration Judge also cited the respondent’s ability to obtain a passport. It is not clear, however, that the Immigration Judge determined that this factor amounts to a change in circumstances adequate to rebut the presumption of future persecution (for example, that it is an indication that the Chinese government is no longer interested in the respondent or in imputing that he is a Falun Gong practitioner). We note that the respondent’s appellate arguments on this point do not recognize that the presumption may be rebutted by evidence of a fundamental change in the respondent’s personal circumstances, not only a change in country conditions. See 65 Fed. Reg. 76121, 76127 (Dec. 6, 2000) (fundamental change in personal circumstances is contemplated in the regulatory change) (codified at 8 C.F.R. 208). On remand, the Immigration Judge must determine whether the respondent would be harmed based on imputed political opinion regarding Falun Gong or whether he would not be targeted any longer given that he does not intend to engage in Falun Gong activities upon his return. Accordingly, we will again remand the record to the Immigration Court. On remand, the Immigration Judge should further consider whether there are changed circumstances and, if so, explain why there are changed circumstances. Additionally, the Immigration Judge may address the possibility that harm to the respondent could be avoided by his relocating within China The respondent’s brief reflects that the authorities of one province do not communicate with authorities of other provinces (Respondent’s Brief at 3-7). Finally, on remand, the Immigration Judge may address whether the respondent’s ability to obtain a passport affects the assessment of his credibility. Our remand is not limited solely to the issue of changed circumstances, but includes any issues the Immigration Judge deems appropriate. Accordingly, the following order will be entered. ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Court for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision. FOR THE BOARD 2 (b) (6) tJ.S. Department of Justice Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals . Executive Office for lmmi,gration Review Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: JUN S92Dl5 In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Hassan M. Ahmad, Esquire CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 212(a)(6)(A)(i), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)] – Present without being admitted or paroled APPLICATION: Continuance The respondent, a 21-year-old native and citizen of Mexico, was ordered removed on February 10, 2014, and filed a timely appeal. The respondent submitted a brief concerning the Immigration Judge’s decision, while the Department of Homeland Security (the “DHS”) did not make a filing with the Board on appeal. The record will be remanded to the hnmigration Judge for further proceedings. We review an Immigration Judge’s findings of fact for clear error, but questions of law, discretion, and judgment, and all other issues in appeals, are reviewed de novo. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.l(d)(3)(i),(ii); Matter of A-S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 2008). On June 26, 2013, the respondent, and counsel, appeared before the Immigration Judge, after the venue in this case was changed to Charlotte, North Carolina (Tr. at 22). Counsel conceded that the respondent is subject to removal as charged. Id Counsel indicated that the respondent was pursuing an application for deferred action under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program with the DHS, and the application was pending (Tr. at 23-24). The Immigration Judge stated that the removal hearing would be continued until September 30, 2013, which would be the deadline for all applications for relief (Tr. at 29). The Irnrnigration Judge stated that any applications for relief not filed by that date would be deemed waived or abandoned. Id The Immigration Court on June 26, 2013, mailed a Notice of Hearing to the respondent’s counsel, noting that a hearing would take place on September 30, 2013. On August 27, 2013, the Immigration Court mailed a Notice of Hearing to the respondent’s counsel, which indicated that a hearing would take place on September 23, 2013. (b) (6) (b) (6) On September 23, 2013, the parties appeared before the Immigration Judge, who stated that “today was the deadline for any and all applications for relief’ (Tr. at 31). The respondent’s counsel indicated that, on August 30, 2013, the DHS had denied his DACA application (Tr. at 32-33). Counsel asked for additional time to prepare an asylum application (Tr. at 33). The Immigration Judge stated that the respondent had abandoned the opportunity to file any applications for relief (Tr. at 34, 37). The Immigration Judge continued the case for the respondent to file a motion for administrative closure (Tr. at 36). At a February 10, 2014, hearing, the Immigration Judge reiterated that the respondent had abandoned any applications for relief, and did not file a motion for administrative closure (Tr. at 40). The Immigration Judge granted a period of voluntary departure (Tr. at 41). In his February 10, 2014, written order, the Immigration Judge stated that the respondent had waived his opportunity to file applications for relief”by the deadline of September 23, 2013” (l.J. at 2). In his brief to the Board, the respondent contends that he was not given a fair opportunity to present an asylum claim. He claims to fear returning to Mexico after being identified as a gang member, and as a result of helping the police. Respondent’s Br. at 7. In this case, the Immigration Judge had set a deadline of September 30, 2013, for the filing of applications for relief. Respondent’s Br. at 5; Tr. at 29. A removal hearing was later rescheduled to September 23, 2013, but the Immigration Judge had explicitly allowed the respondent until September 30, 2013, to file his relief applications. The respondent contends that an asylum application was being prepared for completion by the September 30, 2013, deadline (Respondent’s Br. at 6). Under the circumstances, the case will be remanded to the Immigration Court, for the respondent to pursue applications for asylum and withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, sections 208 and 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16-18, and any other relief to which he may be entitled. ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion. FOR THE BOARD 2 (b) (6) • U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 22041 File: – Charlotte, NC Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Date: DEC – 9 2015 In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: William Junior Vasquez, Esquire APPLICATION: Asylum; withholding of removal; Convention Against Torture The respondent, a native and citizen of El Salvador, appeals from an Immigration Judge’s February 26, 2014, decision, denying her application for asylum and withholding of removal under sections 208(b)(l)(A) and 241(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“Act”), 8 U.S.C. §§ I 158(b)(l)(A) and 1231(b)(3)(A), and her request for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). The record will be remanded. We review for clear error the findings of fact, including the determination of credibility, made by the Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. § I003.l(d)(3)(i). We review de novo all other issues, including whether the parties have met the relevant burden of proof, and issues of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(ii). Since the respondent’s asylum application was filed after May 11, 2005, it is governed by the provisions of the REAL ID Act. The Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s applications based, m part, upon an adverse credibility finding. Under the REAL ID Act, an adverse credibility finding must be based on consideration of the totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors, including the responsiveness of the applicant, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s written and oral statements, and the internal consistency of each such statement, without regard to whether an inconsistency goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim. Section 208(b)(l)(B)(iii) of the Act. A review of the record indicates that the adverse credibility finding was largely based upon inconsistencies between the testimony and the documentary evidence, statements made to the Customs and Border Patrol agent, lack of reporting the husband’s actions to the police, discrepancy in the dates of the hospital stay and a “flat effect” in the respondent’s testimony. The respondent has addressed some of these issues extensively on appeal (Respondent’s Brief at 8-14). We conclude that a remand is warranted so that the Immigration Judge can reassess the respondent’s credibility considering her explanations as part of the totality of the circumstances. On remand, the respondent should be given an opportunity to address the concerns the Immigration Judge articulated. The OHS should also be afforded the opportunity to address whether the respondent’s explanations are adequate. The Immigration Judge’s assessment of credibility should include consideration of the totality of the testimony, the respondent’s declaration, and other corroborating evidence. Furthermore, the record reflects that the Immigration Judge also found that the respondent’s proposed social group of “Salvadoran women who are unable to leave a domestic relationship” was not a cognizable social group (l.J. at 11-15). He further found that even if the respondent (b) (6) (b) (6) were a member of recognized particular social group, that she had not demonstrated the requisite nexus to establish a well-founded fear of persecution on account of the particular social group (l.J. at 15-16). Due to our limited fact-finding authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(i), and in light of our recent decision in Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), which was issued after the Immigration Judge’s decision, we find it appropriate to remand the record to the Immigration Judge to address the respondent’s eligibility for asylum in light of this decision. Consequently, it is necessary to remand the record further proceedings and preparation of a new decision by the Immigration Judge. On remand the Immigration Judge should reassess the respondent’s credibility, clarifying and supporting his credibility findings with specific and cogent reasons. Specifically, the respondent should address the concerns mentioned by the Immigration Judge and the credibility determination should consider the totality of the record, including the respondent’s detailed testimony, declaration and corroborating evidence. Moreover, the Immigration Judge should make clear findings of fact and issue a new decision. In the remanded proceedings, the Immigration Judge shall provide the parties with the opportunity to present and develop evidence regarding current country conditions in El Salvador and how those conditions might affect the respondent’s applications for relief and protection. We express no opinion regarding the merits of the claim for relief. In light of the foregoing, the record shall be remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, and for the entry of a new decision. ORDER: The record is remanded for further proceedings and the entry of a new decision. FOR THE BOARD 2 (b) (6) . ‘ U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board oflmmigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 22041 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: JAN 1 3 2016 In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Wade Johnson, Esquire APPLICATION: Cancellation ofremoval The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, appeals the decision of the Immigration Judge dated March 12, 2014, granting a motion filed by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to pretermit the respondent’s application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(l) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l). The respondent’s appeal will be sustained, the Immigration Judge’s decision will be vacated, and the record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings. We review Immigration Judges’ findings of fact for clear error, but questions of law, discretion, and judgment, and all other issues in appeals, de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3). Because the respondent’s Form EOIR-42B was filed on or after May 11, 2005, it is subject to the provisions of the REAL ID Act of2005. It is the respondent’s burden to establish eligibility for relief from removal. See section 240(c)(4)(A) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d). For purposes of cancellation of removal, a departure from the United States under threat of removal proceedings interrupts an alien’s continuous physical presence. See Matter of Romalez, 23 I&N Dec. 423 (BIA 2002). However, ifthe evidence indicates that the alien’s encounter with immigration authorities involved nothing more than being returned to the border following refusal of admission for failure to have proper documents, the encounter does not break continuous physical presence. See Matter of Avilez-Nava, 23 l&N Dec. 799 (BIA 2005). During the pendency of this appeal, we issued two precedent decisions in which we clarified our holding in Matter of Avilez-Nava, supra. See Matter of Garcia-Ramirez, 26 I&N Dec. 674 (BIA 2015); Matter ofCastrejon-Colino, 26 I&N Dec. 667 (BIA 2015). Specifically, we concluded in these two recent decisions that, where an alien had the right to appear before an Immigration Judge, evidence that photographs and fingerprints were taken in conjunction with a voluntary departure or return is insufficient to break the alien’s continuous physical presence in the absence of evidence that he or she was informed of and waived the right to a hearing. We noted in Castrejon-Colino that the salient point to be taken from Matter of Avilez-Nava is that a voluntary departure will not break the alien’s continuous physical presence unless there is evidence that the alien knowingly accepted its terms. Matter of Castrejon-Colino, supra, at 670. We also stated that the evidence required to show a process of sufficient formality to break an alien’s continuous physical presence will depend on the circumstances of each case. Id. at 671. (b) (6) (b) (6) We further noted in Castrejon-Colino that although the alien ultimately bears the burden of proving the required continuous physical presence, the DHS is in a better position to fill gaps in the evidence and resolve any disputes by presenting documentation in its own records to show the formality of the process. Id. at 672 n.5; see also Matter of Garcia-Ramirez at 677 n.4. In the instant case, the Immigration Judge pretermitted and denied the respondent’s application after finding that the respondent did not meet his burden to establish that he had been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of at least 10 years when he was served with the Notice to Appear. See sections 240A(b)(l)(A) and 240A(d)(l) of the Act Specifically, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent’s Form 1-213, which included the respondent’s photograph and fingerprints and indicated that the respondent was granted a request for voluntary return on January 30, 2008, established a formal, documented return of the respondent to Mexico on that date. The Immigration Judge also found that, as the respondent was served with the Notice to Appear on July 9, 2013, he had not established at least JO years of continuous physical presence in the United States. In reaching this determination, the Immigration Judge noted that, given the respondent’s denial in his Form EOIR-42B of having ever departed the United States since his arrival in March 2002, his testimony that he was not given the option to appear before an Immigration Judge during his January 30, 2008, encounter with immigration authorities suffered from diminished credibility (JJ. at 1-5; Group Exh. 2, Tab A at 2, item no. 23; Group Exh. 3, Form 1-213). We acknowledge and share the Immigration Judge’s concerns about the respondent’s credibility. Nonetheless, we agree with the respondent’s appellate argument that the evidence in this case is insufficient to show that a formal, documented process took place at the border on January 30, 2008 (Respondent’s Brief at 1-8). As argued by the respondent on appeal, while the record shows that he was allowed to return to Mexico and that his picture and fingerprints were taken at the border on January 30, 2008, the record lacks evidence that be was compelled to depart the United States under threat of removal or that such a threat was ever made, communicated, or conveyed to him. Id. Nor do we find that the documents presented by the DHS show that the terms and conditions of the respondent’s January 30, 2008, departure were clearly specified, More specifically, the evidence in this case is insufficient to establish that the respondent was made aware, when immigration officials allowed him to voluntarily return to Mexico on January 30, 2008, of the possibility of appearing at a hearing before an Immigration Judge and that, having been given that option, the respondent affirmatively agreed to depart in lieu of being subjected to removal proceedings. Matter o/Castrejon-Colino, supra, at 670. We also agree with the respondent that the facts in his case differ from those in Garcia v. Holder, 732 FJd 308 (4th Cir. 2013), in that, unlike in his particular case, the alien in Garcia testified that be was explicitly offered an opportunity to appear before an Immigration Judge, which the alien declined, instead opting to return to Mexico (Respondent’s Brief at 5-8). The Immigration Judge’s finding that the respondent did not meet his burden to establish that . be met the continuous physical presence requirement was the only basis for the Immigration Judge’s decision to pretermit and deny the respondent’s application for cancellation of removal. Therefore, we find it appropriate to remand this case to give the Immigration Judge an 2 (b) (6) opportunity to address the remaining criteria for cancellation of removal, including the criterion of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative. In the remanded proceedings, both parties should be given another opportunity to submit evidence, including testimony, regarding the respondent’s application for relief. We emphasize that our decision to remand the record does not indicate any opinion as to the proper outcome of this matter. Accordingly, the following orders shall be entered. ORDER: Tue respondent’s appeal is sustained. FURTHER ORDER: Tue Immigration Judge’s March 12, 2014, decision is vacated. FURTHER ORDER: Tue record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision. – 3 (b) (6) • ·, U.S. Department of Justice Execu1ive Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 22041 File: -Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL AND MOTION Decision of the Board of Immigranon Appeals Date: SEP 2 9 2015 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Robert Zuniga, Esquire APPLICATION: Cancellation of removal; reopening The respondent appeals from the Immigration Judge’s May 13, 2014, decision pretermitting his application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). On August 8, 2014, the respondent filed a motion to reopen. The appeal will be sustained, the motion will be granted, and the record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings. The Board reviews an Immigration Judge’s findings of fact, including credibility determinations and the likelihood of future events, under a “clearly erroneous” standard. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i); Matter ofZ-Z-0-, 26 I&N Dec. 586 (BIA 2015). We review all other issues, including questions of law, judgment, or discretion, under a de novo standard. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(ii). The respondent submitted his application after May 11, 2005, and it is governed by the provisions of the REAL ID Act of 2005. See Matter of S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 42 (BIA 2006). The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, does not dispute that he is removable pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § l l 82(a)(6)(A)(i). Thus, the only question before us is whether the Immigration Judge properly preterrnitted his application for cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent residents. See Section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Although the respondent is statutorily eligible for this relief, the Immigration Judge pretermitted the cancellation of removal application on grounds of abandonment because the respondent did not timely provide biometrics as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47. The Immigration Judge noted that during the individual hearing on May 13, 2014, the respondent’s counsel advised the court that the respondent had submitted the required fingerprints and biographical information for a work authorization application, but he inadvertently failed to submit them in support of his application for cancellation of removal (I.J. at 1-2; Tr. at 25-26). In his motion to reopen, the respondent states that he has now completed the biometrics for his application for cancellation of removal, and he seeks a remand to the Immigration Court to continue with his application. The Board recently determined that the Immigration Judge must provide proper notice of the biometrics requirements to a respondent. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(d); Matter of D-M-C-P-, 26 I&N Dec. 644, 647-49 (BIA 2015). Specifically, the Immigration Judge should, on the record, (!) ensure that the Department of Homeland Security has advised the applicant of the need to provide biometrics and other biographical information and has furnished the appropriate (b) (6) (b) (6) instructions; (2) inform the applicant of the deadline for complying with the requirements of which he has been notified; and (3) inform the applicant of the consequences of noncompliance, including the possibility that the application will be deemed abandoned and dismissed, unless the failure to comply resulted from good cause. Id. at 649. While the respondent acknowledges that he received notification from the Department of Homeland Security of the need to provide biometrics and biographical information, the record does not reflect that the respondent was either given a deadline for submitting the biometrics or advised of the consequences of failure to comply, including the possibility that his application for cancellation of removal would be deemed abandoned. Id. at 649-50. Consequently, we conclude that the Immigration Judge improperly determined that the respondent abandoned his application for cancellation of removal. The respondent states that the biometrics for his cancellation of removal application has been successfully completed. See Resp!.’ s Motion to Reopen, Exh. 0. Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be sustained, the motion to reopen will be granted, and the record will be remanded for further consideration of his applications for relief from removal. ORDER: The respondent’s appeal is sustained. FURTHER ORDER: The respondent’s motion to reopen is granted. FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision. 2 (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Bradley W. Butler, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Susan Leeker Assistant Chief Counsel CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 212(a)(6)(A)(i), I&N Act (8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(6)(A)(i)] – Present without being admitted or paroled (conceded) APPLICATION: Cancellation of removal; Temporary Protected Status MAY 112015 The respondent, a native and citizen of El Salvador, appeals from the Immigration Judge’s April 30, 2014, decision denying his applications for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(l) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l), and Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) under section 244(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a). The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) opposes the appeal. The record will be remanded to the Immigration Court for further proceedings. We review findings of fact, including credibility findings, for clear error. See 8 C.F .R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i); Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 260 (BIA 2007); Matter of S-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 462 (BIA 2002). We review issues of law, discretion, or judgment, and all other issues de novo. See 8 C.F.R. § J003.l(d)(3)(ii). On , 2009, the respondent entered into a “deferred prosecution agreement” for charges of felony breaking and entering a motor vehicle and felony larceny, violations of North Carolina General Statutes§§ 14-56 and 14-72 (2008), respectively (l.J. at I; Exh. 2, Attach. A at 5). This agreement was entered into in accordance with North Carolina General Statutes § 15A-134l(al), which provides in relevant part as follows: (A] person who has been charged with a Class Hor I felony or a misdemeanor may be placed on probation as provided in this Article on motion of the defendant and the prosecutor ifthe court finds each of the following facts: (I) Prosecution has been deferred by the prosecutor pursuant to written agreement with the defendant, with the approval of the court, for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct. (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (2) Each known victim of the crime has been notified of the motion for probation by subpoena or certified mail and has been given an opportunity to be heard. (3) The defendant has not been convicted of any felony or of any misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. ( 4) The defendant has not previously been placed on probation and so states under oath. (5) The defendant is wtlikely to commit another offense other than a Class 3 misdemeanor. As part of this agreement, the respondent was ordered to complete a period of supervised probation and community service and pay $ 1, 145 in restitution and fees (I.J. at 4; Exh. 2, Attach. A at 5-6). The Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent’s offenses qualify as “convictions” pursuant to section !Ol(a)(48)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § I !Ol(a}(48)(A), and pretermitted his applications for cancellation of removal and TPS (I.J. at 3). Specifically, the Immigration Judge concluded that the larceny offense rendered the respondent ineligible for cancellation of removal as an alien who has been convicted of an offense described under section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (a crime involving moral turpitude for which a sentence of at least 1 year may be imposed), 1 see section 240A(b)(l)(C) of the Act, and that both the larceny and breaking and entering offenses qualify as felonies and therefore render him ineligible for TPS, see section 244(c)(2)(B)(i) of the Act. The respondent does not challenge the fact that, if these offenses are regarded as convictions, they would render him ineligible for the requested relief. Instead, he takes issue with whether the deferred prosecution agreement he entered into meets the requirements of section 10l(a)(48)(A) of the Act. Where, as here, adjudication of guilt has been withheld, the Act provides that an alien will be regarded as having been convicted only if: (i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed. Section !Ol(a)(48)(A) of the Act. Because, as noted, the respondent was placed on probation and ordered to complete community service and pay a monetary sum as a result of his deferred prosecution agreement (I.J. at 4; Exh. 2, Attach. A at 5-6), “some form of punishment, penalty, 1 The Immigration Judge also concluded that this offense meets the definition of a generic theft offense for purposes of the aggravated felony definition under section IOl(a)(43)(G) of the Act (I.J. at 8). However, we note that the respondent was not sentenced to a period of confinement for at least 1 year for this offense (see Exh. 2, Attach. A at 5), which prevents it from qualifying as an aggravated felony under section 10l(a)(43)(G) of the Act. 2 (b) (6) or restraint on [his] liberty” was imposed. Section 101(a)(48)(A)(ii) of the Act. Thus, the determinative issue is whether the deferred prosecution satisfies one of the conditions under subsection (i). See generally Crespo v. Holder, 631 F.3d 130, 134-35 (4th Cir. 2011). Notably, North Carolina General Statutes§ 15A-1341(al) does not require the occurrence of any of the alternative conditions under subsection (i) of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act (see Respondent’s Br. at 5).2 First, the fact that the statute permits a prosecutor to agree to defer prosecution while an accused seeks to satisfy certain conditions, the completion of which prevents a prosecution from ever occurring, necessarily precedes any sort of finding of guilt by a judge or jury. Secondly, the statute does not require, as a prerequisite for qualifying for deferred prosecution, that the accused either enter a “plea of guilty or nolo contendere or . . . admit[] sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt.” Section 101(a)(48)(A}(i) of the Act; cf. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1341(a4) (establishing an alternative procedure called “conditional discharge,” which applies where the accused has pied guilty or been found guilty of the underlying offense). Despite the lack of any such statutory requirement, some North Carolina prosecutors require individuals to admit responsibility for the underlying offense(s}, either on the record or in writing, in order to participate in the deferred prosecution program. See. e.g., State v. Ross, 620 S.E.2d 33, 36-37 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); Mecklenburg County Bar, Deferred Prosecution Program (8100), http://www.meckbar.org/publications/pr _handbook_ detail.cfrn?hand id=5960 (last accessed Apr. 23, 2015), as quoted in Respondent’s Memorandum in Support at 5, Exh. 2. This may include an admission of guilt or an admission to the underlying facts, or both, or it may take some other form altogether. See State v. Ross, supra, at 37. As relevant here, the prosecutor in the respondent’s case required that he assent to the following provision: I fully understand the charges against me and I agree that the admission of responsibility given by me and any stipulation of fact shall be used against me and admitted into evidence without objection in the State’s prosecution against me for this offense should prosecution become necessary …. (Exh. 2, Attach. A at 6). Citing this language, the Immigration Judge reasoned, and the OHS argues, that subsection (i) of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act is satisfied. The fust part of this provision-“the admission of responsibility given by me”–clearly contemplates that an admission of responsibility was provided (l.J. at 4-5). However, such an admission, which we construe as being the equivalent of an acknowledgment of guilt, does not fall within one of the conditions required under subsection (i) of section I 01(a)(48)(A) of the Act. An admission of responsibility, or guilt, is not the same as a formal “plea of guilty or nolo contendere.” Section 101(a)(48)(A)(i) of the Act; see State v. Ross, supra, at 37 (“The acknowledgement of guilt contained in the [deferred prosecution] agreement, without more, is insufficient to raise the legal inference that a guilty plea was entered and accepted.”). Nor is 2 The brief submitted by the respondent on appeal is not paginated. We will refer to each page in this submission numerically by order, front to back, starting with the first page after the cover page. 3 (b) (6) such an admission the equivalent of “admitt[ing] sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt.” Section 101(a)(48)(A)(i) of the Act; see State v. Ross, supra, at 36 (“A defendant’s bare admission of guilt … does not provide the factual basis for the [underlying offense].”). The second part of this provision-“and any stipulation of fact”-is similarly unavailing. This appears to be nothing more than boilerplate language that has no connection to the respondent’s case in particular. It merely suggests that, if the prosecutor required that he stipulate to a certain fact, or to all of the relevant facts, the prosecutor would be able to use such stipulations if prosecution became necessary. While we acknowledge, as the Immigration Judge observed, that any inconclusiveness in the evidence shall be construed against the party with whom the burden of proof lies, see Salem v. Holder, 647 F.3d 111, 119-20 (4th Cir. 2011), the boilerplate reference to any stipulation the respondent may have provided, without indicating that a stipulation was actually provided (let alone one that “admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt”) is far too attenuated to conclude, based on the present record, that the respondent has failed to show that his offenses are not “convictions.” We do not mean to suggest, however, that the respondent has necessarily met his burden of proof. The Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent did not meet his burden based on the record as it was presented below, without having the opportunity to consider whether additional corroborating evidence should be required. During the proceedings below and while on appeal, references have been made with respect to a transcript from the underlying criminal proceeding and the statement that accompanied the deferred prosecution agreement (see Tr. at 18, 21; Respondent’s Br. at 5), neither of which is part of the current record. On remand, if the Immigration Judge determines that the respondent should provide such evidence, or any other evidence, “the respondent must [do so! unless he demonstrates that he does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain it.” Matter of Almanza, 24 I&N Dec. 771, 773 (BIA 2009). Accordingly, the following orders will be entered. ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision. 3 In this regard, we note that the respondent has purported to explain why there is no transcript from the proceeding during which the deferred prosecution agreement was accepted by the reviewing court (see Respondent’s Br. at 5), which the Immigration Judge may consider, as necessary, on remand. 4 (b) (6) .U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for ,Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 22041 File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Date: SEP 2 2 2015 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Mo Idlibby, Esquire APPLICATION: Continuance The respondent, a native and citizen of Senegal, has appealed the Immigration Judge’s decision dated April 28, 2014, denying his motion for a continuance to await the adjudication of the immediate relative visa petition filed on his behalf by his United States citizen spouse. It would appear that in the interim this immediate relative visa petition has been approved. Under the circumstances of the present case, we find that remand is warranted to allow the respondent the opportunity to pursue an application for adjustment of status. We express no opinion on the ultimate outcome of the case and note that the respondent bears the burden of establishing eligibility for adjustment of status. See section 240(c)(4)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A). ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. FOR THE BOARD (b) (6) (b) (6) .U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 2204.1 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: AUG 212015 In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Mark J. Devine, Esquire APPLICATION: Convention Against Torture The respondent, a native and citizen of Honduras, has appealed from the decision of an Immigration Judge dated April 22, 2014, in which the Immigration Judge determined that the respondent’s application for protection under the Convention Against Torture was abandoned because she failed to submit evidence that her biometrics were completed. The decision of the Immigration Judge will be vacated and the record will be remanded. The applicable regulations state that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) “shall notify the respondent of the need to provide biometrics and other biographical information and shall provide a biometrics notice and instructions to the respondent for such procedures.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(d). The regulations further state that the “immigration judge shall specify for the record when the respondent receives the biometrics notice and instructions and the consequences for failing to comply …. ” (Id.) On appeal, the respondent argues that the Immigration Judge erred in denying her request for a continuance in order to complete the required biometrics because the DHS did not notify her of the need to provide that information at any of her hearings. She further contends that the Immigration Judge did not specify for the record when the respondent received the biometrics notice from DHS and did not inform her of the consequences of failing to comply. We will remand the record. It does not appear that the Immigration Judge provided the respondent with notice of the requirement to have her fingerprints taken and the consequences of failing to comply at any of her hearings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(d). We recently clarified these requirements in a published decision. Matter of D-M-C-P-, 26 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 2015) (It is improper to deem an application for relief abandoned based on an applicant’s failure to comply with the biometrics filing requirement where the record does not reflect that the applicant received notification advisories concerning that requirement, was given a deadline for submitting the biometrics, and was advised of the consequences of his or her failure to comply). Accordingly, we will remand the record for further proceedings on the respondent’s application for protection under the Convention Against Torture, and any other form of relief for which she may be eligible. ORDER: The Immigration Judge’s decision is vacated. (b) (6) (b) (6) FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision . .::::,,,, 2 (b) (6) 􀀂 􀀁 􀀃 􀀂􀀄 􀀅􀀁􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀃􀀈􀀌􀀆􀀍􀀏􀀊􀀈􀀋􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀅􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀎􀀏􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀓 􀀆􀀧􀀏􀀍􀀤􀀢􀀘􀀥􀀏􀀨􀀉􀀒􀀍􀀐􀀨􀀓􀀟􀀨􀀈􀀛􀀘􀀕􀀌􀀣􀀘􀀝􀀜􀀨􀀊􀀏􀀥􀀘􀀏􀀦􀀨 􀀇􀀌􀀙􀀙􀀡􀀨􀀄􀀖􀀤􀀟􀀍􀀗􀀁􀀨􀀋􀀘􀀠􀀔􀀘􀀜􀀘􀀌􀀨􀀃􀀃􀀁􀀄􀀂􀀇 􀀥􀁏􀁒􀁂􀀚􀁩 􀁩􀀇 􀀡􀁍􀀼􀁛􀁒􀁘􀁞􀁞􀁂􀀆􀁩􀀭􀀡􀁩 􀀨􀁖􀁩􀁛􀁂􀀛􀁩 􀁩 􀀨􀀮􀁩􀀱􀀣􀀬􀀯􀀵􀀞􀀫􀁩􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀡􀀣􀀣􀀢􀀨􀀭􀀦􀀲􀁩 􀀞􀀰􀀰􀀣􀀟􀀫􀁩 􀀯􀀭􀁩􀀠􀀣􀀧􀀞􀀫􀀥􀁩􀀯􀀥􀁩􀀱􀀤􀀲􀀰􀀯􀀭􀀢􀀣􀀭􀀳􀀚􀁩 􀀧􀁏􀁒􀀼􀁩􀀬􀁘􀁝􀁝􀀆􀁩􀀣􀁝􀁚􀁢􀁏􀁛􀁂􀁩 􀀯􀀭􀁩􀀠􀀣􀀧􀀞􀀫􀀥􀁩􀀯􀀥􀁩􀀢􀀧􀀲􀀚􀁩 􀀲􀀿􀁘􀁞􀁞􀁩􀀢􀀊􀁩􀀡􀁛􀁏􀁝􀁝􀁩 􀀞􀁝􀁝􀁏􀁝􀁞􀀼􀁗􀁞􀁩􀀡􀁍􀁏􀁂􀁃􀁩􀀡􀁘􀁢􀁖􀁝􀁂􀁒􀁩 􀀡􀀧􀀞􀀱􀀦􀀣􀀚􀁩 􀀅􀀏􀀍􀀘􀀡􀀘􀀝􀀜􀀨􀀝􀀑􀀨􀀣􀀗􀀏􀀨􀀃􀀝􀀌􀀟􀀎􀀨􀀝􀀑􀀚􀀛􀀘􀀕􀀌􀀢􀀘􀀝􀀜􀀨􀀂􀀞􀀞􀀏􀀌􀀙􀀡􀀨 􀀢􀀼􀁞􀁂􀀚􀁩 􀀍􀀋􀀑􀀠 􀀇􀀠 􀀈􀀠 􀀊􀀆􀀉􀀁􀀠 􀀭􀁘􀁞􀁏􀀿􀁂􀀚􀁩 􀀲􀁂􀀿􀀎􀁩 􀀒􀀑􀀒􀀃􀀼􀀅􀀃􀀖􀀅􀀃􀀡􀀅􀀃􀁏􀀅􀀆􀁩 􀁓􀀁􀀭􀁩􀀞􀀿􀁞􀁩 􀀺􀀘􀁩􀀴􀀉􀀲􀀉􀀡􀀊􀁩􀀑􀀓􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀒􀀃􀀼􀀅􀀃􀀖􀀅􀀃􀀡􀀅􀀄􀁏􀀅􀀻􀁩 􀀈 􀀥􀁛􀀼􀁢􀁀􀁩􀁘􀁛􀁩 􀁥􀁏􀁒􀁒􀁊􀁒􀁩􀁕􀁏􀁝􀁛􀁂􀁙􀁛􀁂􀁝􀁂􀁖􀁞􀀼􀁞􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁩􀁘􀁃􀁩􀀼􀁩􀁕􀀼􀁞􀁂􀁛􀁏􀀼􀁒􀁩􀁅􀀿􀁞􀁩 􀀲􀁂􀀿􀀊􀁩 􀀒􀀑􀀒􀀃􀀼􀀅􀀃􀀗􀀅􀀃􀀞􀀅􀀃􀁏􀀅􀀃􀀨􀀅􀀆􀁩 􀁓􀀁􀀭􀁩􀀞􀀿􀁞􀁩 􀀺􀀘􀁩􀀴􀀊􀀲􀀎􀀡􀀊􀁩􀀑􀀓􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀒􀀃􀀼􀀅􀀃􀀗􀀅􀀃􀀞􀀅􀀃􀁏􀀅􀀃􀀨􀀅􀀻􀁩 􀀈 􀀨􀁕􀁕􀁏􀁋􀁛􀀼􀁖􀁞􀁩 􀀈 􀁖􀁘􀁩􀁤􀀼􀁒􀁏􀁀􀁩􀁏􀁕􀁕􀁏􀁋􀁛􀀼􀁗􀁞􀁩􀁤􀁏􀁝􀀼􀁩􀁘􀁛􀁩􀁂􀁖􀁞􀁛􀁧􀁩􀁀􀁘􀀿􀁢􀁕􀁂􀁖􀁞􀁩 􀀞􀀰􀀰􀀫􀀩􀀡􀀞􀀳􀀨􀀯􀀭􀀚􀁩 􀀞􀁝􀁧􀁒􀁢􀁕􀀜􀁩􀁥􀁏􀁠􀁍􀁍􀁘􀁒􀁀􀁏􀁖􀁋􀁩􀁘􀁃􀁩􀁛􀁂􀁕􀁘􀁤􀀼􀁒􀀜􀁩 􀀡􀁘􀁖􀁤􀁂􀁖􀁞􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁩􀀞􀁋􀀼􀁏􀁖􀁝􀁞􀁩􀀳􀁘􀁛􀁞􀁢􀁛􀁂􀁩 􀀳􀁍􀁂􀁩􀁛􀁂􀁝􀁙􀁘􀁖􀁀􀁂􀁖􀁞􀀆􀁩 􀀼􀁩 􀁖􀀼􀁞􀁏􀁤􀁂􀁩􀀼􀁖􀁀􀁩􀀿􀁏􀁞􀁏􀁨􀁂􀁖􀁩 􀁘􀁃􀁩􀀬􀁂􀁦􀁏􀀿􀁘􀀆􀁩 􀁍􀀼􀁝􀁩 􀁞􀁏􀁕􀁂􀁒􀁧􀁩􀀼􀁙􀁙􀁂􀀼􀁒􀁂􀁀􀁩􀁞􀁍􀁂􀁩􀀨􀁕􀁕􀁏􀁋􀁛􀀼􀁞􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁩􀀪􀁢􀁀􀁋􀁂􀀂􀁝􀁩 􀀞􀁢􀁋􀁢􀁝􀁞􀁩 􀀗􀀆􀁩 􀀒􀀐􀀑􀀔􀀆􀁩 􀁀􀁂􀀿􀁏􀁝􀁏􀁘􀁖􀀊􀁩 􀀳􀁍􀁂􀁩 􀀨􀁕􀁕􀁏􀁋􀁛􀀼􀁞􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁩 􀀪􀁢􀁀􀁋􀁂􀁩 􀁀􀁂􀁖􀁏􀁂􀁀􀁩 􀁞􀁍􀁂􀁩 􀁛􀁂􀁝􀁙􀁘􀁖􀁀􀁂􀁖􀁞􀀂􀁝􀁩 􀀼􀁙􀁙􀁒􀁏􀀿􀀼􀁞􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁩 􀁈􀁛􀁩 􀀼􀁝􀁧􀁒􀁢􀁕􀀆􀁩 􀁥􀁏􀁞􀁍􀁍􀁘􀁒􀁀􀁏􀁖􀁋􀁩 􀁘􀁃􀁩􀁛􀁂􀁕􀁘􀁤􀀼􀁒􀀆􀁩 􀀼􀁖􀁀􀁩 􀁙􀁛􀁘􀁞􀁂􀀿􀁞􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁩􀁢􀁖􀁀􀁂􀁛􀁩 􀁞􀁍􀁂􀁩 􀀡􀁘􀁖􀁤􀁂􀁖􀁞􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁩􀀞􀁋􀀼􀁏􀁖􀁝􀁞􀁩􀀳􀁘􀁛􀁞􀁣􀁜􀁂􀁩 􀁙􀁢􀁛􀁝􀁢􀀼􀁖􀁞􀁩 􀁞􀁘􀁩 􀁝􀁂􀀿􀁞􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁝􀁩 􀀒􀀐􀀘􀁩 􀀼􀁗􀁀􀁩 􀀒􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀾􀀅􀀃􀀓􀀅􀁩 􀁘􀁃􀁩 􀁞􀁍􀁂􀁩 􀀨􀁕􀁕􀁏􀁋􀁛􀀼􀁞􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁩 􀀼􀁖􀁀􀁩 􀀭􀀼􀁞􀁏􀁘􀁖􀀼􀁒􀁏􀁞􀁧􀁩 􀀞􀀿􀁞􀀆􀁩 􀁛􀁂􀁝􀁙􀁂􀀿􀁞􀁏􀁤􀁂􀁒􀁧􀀆􀁩 􀀘􀁩􀀴􀀎􀀲􀀋􀀡􀀉􀁩 􀀑􀀑􀀓􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀘􀁩 􀀼􀁖􀁀􀁩 􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀑􀀃􀀾􀀅􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀆􀁩 􀀼􀁖􀁀􀁩 􀀘􀁩 􀀡􀀌􀀥􀀍􀀱􀀎􀁩 􀀑􀀓 􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀘􀀎􀀑􀀖􀀃􀀿􀀅􀀎􀁩 􀀳􀁍􀁂􀁩 􀁛􀁂􀁝􀁙􀁘􀁖􀁀􀁂􀁖􀁞􀁩 􀀿􀁘􀁖􀁞􀁂􀁝􀁞􀁝􀁩 􀁞􀁍􀁂􀁩 􀁀􀁂􀁖􀁏􀀼􀁒􀁩 􀁘􀁃􀁩􀀼􀁒􀁒􀁩 􀁈􀁛􀁕􀁝􀁩􀁘􀁃􀁩􀁛􀁂􀁒􀁏􀁂􀁄􀀉􀁩 􀀳􀁍􀁂􀁩􀁛􀁂􀀿􀁘􀁛􀁀􀁩􀁥􀁏􀁒􀁒􀁩􀀾􀁂􀁩􀁛􀁂􀁕􀀼􀁖􀁀􀁂􀁀􀁩􀁞􀁘􀁩􀁞􀁍􀁂􀁩􀀨􀁕􀁕􀁏􀁌􀀼􀁞􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁩􀀪􀁢􀁀􀁋􀁂􀁩􀁈􀁛􀁩􀁊􀁛􀁞􀁍􀁂􀁛􀁩􀁙􀁛􀁘􀀿􀁂􀁂􀁀􀁏􀁖􀁋􀁝􀀉􀁩 􀀶􀁂􀁩 􀁛􀁂􀁤􀁏􀁂􀁥􀁩 􀀼􀁖􀁩􀀨􀁕􀁕􀁏􀁋􀁛􀀼􀁞􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁩 􀀪􀁢􀁀􀁋􀁂􀀂􀁝􀁩 􀁇􀁖􀁀􀁏􀁖􀁋􀁝􀁩 􀁘􀁃􀁩 􀁅􀀿􀁞􀀆􀁩 􀁏􀁖􀀿􀁒􀁢􀁀􀁏􀁖􀁋􀁩 􀁇􀁖􀁀􀁏􀁖􀁋􀁝􀁩 􀁥􀁏􀁞􀁍􀁩 􀁛􀁂􀁋􀀼􀁛􀁀􀁩 􀁞􀁘􀁩 􀀿􀁛􀁂􀁀􀁏􀀾􀁏􀁒􀁏􀁞􀁧􀁩 􀀼􀁖􀁀􀁩􀁞􀁍􀁂􀁩􀁒􀁏􀁑􀁂􀁒􀁏􀁍􀁘􀁘􀁀􀁩 􀁘􀁃􀁩􀁊􀁞􀁢􀁛􀁂􀁩 􀁂􀁤􀁂􀁖􀁞􀁝􀀆􀁩 􀁞􀁘􀁩 􀁀􀁂􀁞􀁂􀁛􀁕􀁏􀁖􀁂􀁩 􀁥􀁍􀁂􀁞􀁍􀁂􀁛􀁩 􀁞􀁎􀁂􀁧􀁩 􀀼􀁛􀁂􀁩 􀀿􀁒􀁂􀀼􀁛􀁒􀁧􀁩 􀁂􀁛􀁛􀁘􀁖􀁂􀁘􀁢􀁝􀀎􀁩 􀀘􀁩 􀀡􀀎􀀥􀀎􀀱􀀏􀁩 􀀑􀀓􀀑􀀐􀀐􀀓􀀍􀁔􀀃􀁀􀀅􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀃􀁏􀀅􀀜􀁩 􀀜􀀕􀀕􀀠 􀀓􀀘􀀜􀀚􀀠 􀀐􀀞􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀙􀀠􀀃􀀁􀀄 􀀌􀀚􀀘􀀔􀀕􀀛􀀃􀀠 􀀖􀀖􀀗􀁩 􀀥􀀋􀀓􀁀􀁩 􀀕􀀒􀀓􀀆􀁩 􀀕􀀓􀀐􀁩 􀀃􀀔􀁞􀁍􀁩 􀀡􀁏􀁛􀀊􀁩 􀀒􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀅􀀜􀁩 􀀎􀀓􀀝􀀕􀀛􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀒􀀄􀀒􀀟􀀏􀀅􀀂􀀠 􀀒􀀖􀁩 􀀨􀀁􀀭􀁩 􀀢􀁂􀀿􀀎􀁩 􀀕􀀘􀀖􀁩 􀀃􀀠􀀨􀀞􀁩 􀀒􀀐􀀑􀀕􀀅􀀎􀁩 􀀶􀁂􀁩 􀁛􀁂􀁤􀁏􀁂􀁥􀁩 􀁀􀁂􀁩 􀁖􀁘􀁤􀁘􀁩 􀀼􀁒􀁒􀁩 􀁚􀁢􀁂􀁝􀁞􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁝􀁩 􀁘􀁃􀁩 􀁒􀀼􀁥􀀆􀁩 􀁀􀁏􀁝􀀿􀁛􀁂􀁞􀁏􀁘􀁖􀀆􀁩 􀀽􀁁􀁩􀁐􀁢􀁀􀁋􀁕􀁂􀁖􀁞􀁩 􀀼􀁖􀁀􀁩 􀀼􀁖􀁧􀁩 􀁘􀁞􀁍􀁂􀁛􀁩 􀁏􀁝􀁝􀁢􀁂􀁝􀁩 􀁏􀁖􀁩 􀀼􀁙􀁙􀁂􀀼􀁒􀁝􀁩 􀁉􀁘􀁕􀁩 􀁀􀁂􀀿􀁏􀁝􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁝􀁩 􀁘􀁃􀁩􀀨􀁕􀁕􀁏􀁋􀁛􀀼􀁞􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁩 􀀪􀁢􀁀􀁋􀁂􀁝􀀍􀁩 􀀘􀁩􀀡􀀍􀀥􀀎􀀱􀀎􀁩􀀑􀀓􀀑􀀐􀀐􀀓􀀍􀁩􀁒 􀀃􀁀􀀅􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀃􀁏􀁏􀀅􀀊􀁩 􀀳􀁍􀁂􀁩 􀁛􀁂􀁝􀁙􀁘􀁖􀁀􀁂􀁖􀁞􀁩 􀀿􀁒􀀼􀁏􀁕􀁝􀁩 􀁞􀁍􀀼􀁞􀁩 􀁍􀁂􀁛􀁩 􀁍􀁢􀁝􀀾􀀼􀁖􀁀􀁩 􀁥􀀼􀁝􀁩 􀁙􀁍􀁧􀁝􀁏􀀿􀀼􀁒􀁒􀁧􀁩 􀀼􀁖􀁀􀁩 􀁤􀁂􀁛􀀾􀀼􀁒􀁒􀁧􀁩 􀀼􀀾􀁢􀁝􀁏􀁤􀁂􀁩 􀁞􀁘􀁥􀀼􀁛􀁀􀁝􀁩 􀁍􀁂􀁛􀁩 􀁀􀁢􀁜􀁏􀁖􀁋􀁩 􀁞􀁍􀁂􀁩 􀁂􀁖􀁟􀁏􀁛􀁂􀁠􀁧􀁩 􀁘􀁃􀁩 􀁞􀁍􀁂􀁏􀁛􀁩 􀁕􀀼􀁛􀁛􀁏􀀼􀁋􀁂􀁩 􀀃􀀱􀁂􀁝􀁙􀁘􀁖􀁀􀁂􀁖􀁞􀀂􀁝􀁩 􀀠􀁛􀁏􀁂􀁃􀁩 􀀼􀁞􀁩 􀀖􀀅􀀊􀁩 􀀳􀁍􀁂􀁩 􀁛􀁂􀁝􀁙􀁘􀁖􀁀􀁂􀁖􀁞􀁩 􀁕􀀼􀁛􀁛􀁏􀁂􀁀􀁩 􀁍􀁂􀁛􀁩 􀁍􀁢􀁝􀀾􀀼􀁖􀁀􀁩 􀁏􀁖􀁩 􀀑􀀙􀀙􀀑􀁩 􀀃􀀱􀁂􀁝􀁙􀁘􀁖􀁀􀁂􀁖􀁞􀀂􀁝􀁩 􀀠􀁛􀁏􀁂􀁃􀁩􀀼􀁞􀁩 􀀖􀀅􀀊􀁩 􀀳􀁍􀁂􀁩 􀁛􀁂􀁝􀁙􀁘􀁖􀁀􀁂􀁖􀁞􀁩 􀁆􀀼􀁛􀁝􀁩 􀁛􀁂􀁡􀁖􀁋􀁩 􀁞􀁘􀁩 􀀬􀁂􀁦􀁏􀀿􀁘􀁩 􀀾􀁂􀀿􀀼􀁢􀁝􀁂􀁩 􀁝􀁍􀁂􀁩􀀾􀁂􀁒􀁏􀁂􀁤􀁂􀁝􀁩􀁍􀁂􀁛􀁩􀁍􀁢􀁝􀀾􀀼􀁖􀁀􀁩􀁥􀁏􀁒􀁒􀁩􀁑􀁏􀁒􀁒􀁩􀁍􀁂􀁛􀁩􀀃􀀱􀁂􀁝􀁙􀁘􀁖􀁀􀁂􀁖􀁞􀀂􀁝􀁩􀀠􀁛􀁏􀁂􀁃􀁩􀀼􀁞􀁩􀀖􀀅􀀎􀁩 (b) (6) (b) (6) 􀀁􀀂 􀁨 􀀰􀀹􀁨 􀀿􀁑􀀸􀁨 􀀷􀁊􀀹􀀱􀁕􀁨 􀀹􀁘􀁓􀁕􀁨 􀁈􀁑􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀀨􀁎􀁎􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀱􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨 􀀪􀁞􀀸􀁄􀀹􀀁􀁙􀁨 􀀱􀀸􀁢􀀹􀁕􀁙􀀹􀁨 􀀷􀁕􀀹􀀸􀁈􀀶􀁈􀁊􀁈􀁛􀁥􀁨 􀀸􀀹􀁚􀀹􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁑􀀱􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀀆􀁨 􀀂􀀃􀀃􀀄 􀀟􀁨􀀤􀀈􀀦􀀉􀀭􀀊􀁨 􀁧􀁨 􀀖􀀔􀀔􀀙􀀋􀁋􀀂􀀸􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀃􀀂􀁈􀀃􀀡􀁨 􀁙􀀹􀀷􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨 􀀘􀀔􀀟􀀂􀀶􀀃􀀂􀁋􀀃􀀂􀀣􀀃􀀂􀁈􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁨 􀁓􀀺􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀀢􀀷􀁚􀀒􀁨 􀀯􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀀸􀁈􀁙􀀷􀁕􀀹􀁔􀀱􀁑􀀷􀁈􀀹􀁙􀁨 􀀷􀁈􀁚􀀹􀀸􀁨 􀀶􀁥􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀀨􀁏􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀱􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨 􀀪􀁞􀀸􀁄􀀹􀁨 􀀱􀁕􀀹􀁨 􀁑􀁓􀁚􀁨 􀁙􀁞􀀾􀀷􀁈􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨 􀁚􀁓􀁨 􀁙􀁞􀁔􀁔􀁓􀁕􀁚􀁨 􀁈􀁚􀀆􀁨 􀀦􀁓􀁕􀁨 􀀹􀁤􀀱􀁎􀁔􀁊􀀹􀀄􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀀨􀁎􀁎􀁈􀁅􀀱􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨􀀪􀁞􀀸􀁄􀀹􀁨 􀁁􀁞􀁑􀀸􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨􀁕􀀹􀁙􀁔􀁓􀁑􀀸􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨􀁑􀁓􀁚􀁨􀀷􀁕􀀹􀀸􀁈􀀶􀁊􀀹􀁨􀀶􀀱􀁙􀀹􀀸􀀄􀁨 􀁈􀁑􀁨􀁔􀀱􀁖􀁚􀀄􀁨 􀁓􀁑􀁨􀀸􀁈􀁙􀀷􀁕􀀹􀁔􀀱􀁑􀀷􀁈􀀹􀁙􀁨􀀶􀀹􀁚􀁣􀀹􀀹􀁑􀁨􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨􀁚􀀹􀁙􀁚􀁈􀁎􀁓􀁑􀁥􀁨􀀱􀁚􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨􀁆􀀹􀀱􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁨 􀀱􀁑􀀸􀁨􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨􀀷􀁕􀀹􀀸􀁈􀀶􀁊􀀹􀁨􀀼􀀱􀁕􀁨􀁈􀁑􀁚􀀹􀁖􀁢􀁈􀀹􀁣􀀌􀁨 􀀯􀁆􀀹􀁨􀀨􀁎􀁎􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀱􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨􀀪􀁞􀀸􀁄􀀹􀁨􀁑􀁓􀁚􀀹􀀸􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨􀁕􀀹􀁙􀁔􀁓􀁑􀀸􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨􀁚􀁓􀁊􀀸􀁨􀀱􀁑􀁨􀀱􀁙􀁥􀁊􀁞􀁎􀁨 􀁓􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀹􀁕􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁛􀁨􀁙􀁆􀀹􀁨􀁕􀀹􀁔􀁓􀁖􀁚􀀹􀀸􀁨􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨􀁆􀁞􀁙􀀶􀀱􀁑􀀸􀁨􀁚􀁓􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨􀁔􀁓􀁊􀁈􀀷􀀹􀁨􀀞􀁨􀁓􀁕􀁨􀀟􀁨􀁚􀁈􀁎􀀹􀁙􀁨􀀶􀁞􀁚􀁨􀁚􀀹􀁙􀁚􀁈􀀿􀀹􀀸􀁨􀀱􀁚􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨􀁆􀀹􀀴􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨􀁙􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀁕􀀹􀁔􀁓􀁕􀁚􀀹􀀸􀁨􀁆􀁈􀁎􀁨􀀕􀀔􀁨􀁚􀁓􀁨􀀕􀀛􀁨􀁚􀁈􀁎􀀹􀁙􀁨􀀂􀁌􀀌􀀪􀀌􀁨 􀀱􀁚􀁨􀀟􀀡􀁨􀀥􀁤􀁆􀀍􀁨 􀀙􀀄􀁨􀀯􀀱􀀶􀁨􀀣 􀀱􀁚􀁨􀀜􀀚􀀡􀁨􀀯􀁕􀀌􀁨 􀀱􀁚􀁨􀀚􀀠􀀅􀀛􀀔􀀄􀁨 􀀟􀀔􀀅􀀟􀀕􀀃􀀎􀁨 􀀯􀁆􀀹􀁨􀁕􀀹􀁙􀁔􀁓􀁑􀀸􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨 􀀷􀁊􀀱􀁈􀁎􀁙􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨􀁙􀁆􀀹􀁨􀁑􀀹􀀹􀀸􀀹􀀸􀁨􀁚􀁈􀁎􀀹􀁨􀁚􀁓􀁨􀁔􀁕􀀹􀁔􀀱􀁕􀀹􀁨􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨􀁚􀀹􀁙􀁚􀁈􀁎􀁓􀁑􀁥􀁨􀁁􀁕􀁨􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨􀁆􀀹􀀴􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁨􀀱􀁑􀀸􀁨􀁚􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁨􀀱􀀶􀁓􀁞􀁚􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨􀀘􀀔􀀅􀁥􀀹􀀱􀁕􀁨 􀁔􀀹􀁕􀁈􀁓􀀸􀁨􀀸􀁞􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁨􀁣􀁆􀁈􀀷􀁆􀁨 􀁙􀁆􀀹􀁨􀀹􀁑􀀸􀁞􀁕􀀹􀀸􀁨􀀸􀁓􀁎􀀹􀁙􀁚􀁈􀀷􀁨􀁢􀁈􀁓􀁊􀀹􀁑􀀷􀀹􀁨􀀂􀀭􀀹􀁙􀁔􀁓􀁑􀀸􀀹􀁑􀁚􀀁􀁙􀁨􀀣􀁕􀁈􀀹􀀺􀁨􀀱􀁚􀁨􀀕􀀘􀀃􀀏􀁨 􀀮􀁆􀀹􀁨􀀷􀁊􀀱􀁈􀁎􀁙􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀁈􀁚􀁨 􀁣􀀱􀁙􀁨 􀀸􀁞􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀁚􀁈􀁎􀀹􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀁙􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀁕􀀹􀀱􀁊􀁈􀁦􀀹􀀸􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀁙􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀁆􀀱􀀸􀁨 􀁕􀀹􀁔􀁓􀁕􀁚􀀹􀀸􀁨 􀁆􀁈􀁎􀁨 􀁎􀁓􀁕􀀹􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁑􀁨 􀀞􀁨 􀁓􀁕􀁨 􀀟􀁨 􀁚􀁈􀁎􀀹􀁙􀁨 􀀂􀀭􀀹􀁙􀁔􀁓􀁑􀀸􀀹􀁑􀁚􀀁􀁙􀁨􀀣􀁕􀁈􀀹􀀺􀁨 􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀀕􀀘􀀃􀀍􀁨 􀀦􀁞􀁕􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁎􀁓􀁕􀀹􀀄􀁨 􀁙􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀀷􀁓􀁑􀁚􀀹􀁑􀀸􀁙􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀀸􀁈􀀽􀀹􀁕􀀹􀁑􀀷􀀹􀁨􀀶􀀹􀁚􀁣􀀹􀀹􀁑􀁨􀀝􀁨 􀁓􀁕􀁨 􀀟􀁨􀁚􀁈􀁎􀀹􀁙􀁨 􀀱􀁑􀀸􀁨􀀕􀀔􀁨􀁚􀁓􀁨􀀕􀀛􀁨􀁚􀁈􀁎􀀹􀁙􀁨􀁈􀁙􀁨􀁑􀁓􀁚􀁨􀁙􀁞􀀾􀀷􀁈􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨􀁚􀁓􀁨􀁙􀁞􀁔􀁔􀁓􀁕􀁚􀁨􀀱􀁑􀁨􀀱􀀸􀁢􀀹􀁕􀁙􀀹􀁨􀀷􀁕􀀹􀀸􀁈􀀶􀁈􀁊􀁈􀁛􀁥􀁨􀀸􀀹􀁚􀀹􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁑􀀱􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨􀀂􀀭􀀹􀁙􀁔􀁓􀁑􀀸􀀹􀁑􀁚􀀁􀁙􀁨 􀀣􀁕􀁈􀀹􀀺􀁨 􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀀕􀀘􀀃􀀌􀁨 􀀰􀀹􀁨 􀀱􀁄􀁖􀀹􀀹􀀌􀁨 􀀦􀁞􀁕􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁎􀁓􀁕􀀹􀀄􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀁚􀁕􀀱􀁑􀁙􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁚􀁨 􀁓􀀺􀁨 􀁔􀁕􀁓􀀷􀀹􀀹􀀸􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁙􀁨 􀀸􀁓􀀹􀁙􀁨 􀁑􀁓􀁚􀁨 􀁕􀀹􀁀􀀹􀀷􀁚􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀁕􀀹􀁙􀁔􀁓􀁑􀀸􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨􀁣􀀱􀁙􀁨􀀱􀁙􀁉􀀹􀀸􀁨􀀱􀀶􀁓􀁞􀁚􀁨􀁚􀁆􀁈􀁙􀁨􀀸􀁈􀁙􀀷􀁕􀀹􀁔􀀱􀁑􀀷􀁥􀁨􀀸􀁞􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁨􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨􀁆􀀹􀀱􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁄􀀌􀁨 􀀯􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀀨􀁏􀁎􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀱􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨 􀀪􀁞􀀸􀁄􀀹􀁨 􀀱􀁊􀁙􀁓􀁨 􀁁􀁟􀁑􀀸􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀁕􀀹􀁙􀁔􀁓􀁑􀀸􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨 􀀸􀁈􀀸􀁨 􀁑􀁓􀁚􀁨 􀁚􀀹􀁙􀁚􀁈􀀺􀁥􀁨 􀁚􀁓􀁨 􀁙􀀹􀁢􀀹􀁕􀀱􀁊􀁨 􀀸􀀹􀁚􀀱􀁈􀁊􀁙􀁨 􀁕􀀹􀁄􀀱􀁕􀀸􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁨 􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀀷􀁊􀀱􀁈􀁎􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨􀁙􀁆􀀹􀁨􀁈􀁑􀀷􀁊􀁞􀀸􀀹􀀸􀁨􀁈􀁑􀁨􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨􀀷􀁕􀀹􀀸􀁈􀀶􀁊􀀹􀁨􀀼􀀱􀁖􀁨 􀁈􀁑􀁚􀀹􀁕􀁢􀁈􀀹􀁣􀁨􀀂􀁌􀀌􀀪􀀐􀁨 􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀀟􀀃􀀇􀁨 􀀦􀁓􀁕􀁨 􀀹􀁤􀀱􀁎􀁔􀁊􀀹􀀄􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀀨􀁎􀁎􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀱􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨 􀀪􀁞􀀸􀁄􀀹􀁨 􀁓􀀶􀁙􀀹􀁕􀁢􀀹􀀸􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀁕􀀹􀁙􀁔􀁓􀁑􀀸􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨 􀁚􀁓􀁊􀀸􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀀱􀁙􀁥􀁊􀁟􀁎􀁨 􀁓􀀾􀀷􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁙􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀀸􀁈􀁙􀀷􀁓􀁢􀀹􀁕􀀹􀀸􀁨 􀀷􀁆􀁈􀁊􀀸􀁨 􀁔􀁓􀁗􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀱􀁔􀁆􀁥􀁨 􀁓􀁑􀁨 􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁆􀁞􀁙􀀶􀀱􀁑􀀸􀀁􀁙􀁨 􀀷􀀹􀁊􀁊􀁨 􀁔􀁆􀁓􀁑􀀹􀁨 􀀱􀁑􀀸􀁨 􀀷􀁓􀁑􀁂􀁓􀁑􀁚􀀹􀀸􀁨 􀁆􀁈􀁎􀁨 􀀱􀀶􀁓􀁞􀁚􀁨 􀁈􀁚􀁨 􀀂􀀗􀀌􀀪􀀇􀁨 􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀀟􀀃􀀍􀁨 􀀯􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀀨􀁎􀁎􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀱􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨􀀪􀁞􀀸􀁄􀀹􀁨􀀱􀁊􀁙􀁓􀁨􀁑􀁓􀁚􀀹􀀸􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨􀁜􀀹􀁨􀁕􀀹􀁙􀁔􀁓􀁑􀀸􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨􀁚􀁓􀁊􀀸􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨􀀱􀁙􀁥􀁊􀁞􀁎􀁨􀁓􀀾􀀷􀀹􀁕􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨􀁙􀁆􀀹􀁨􀁕􀀹􀁊􀁓􀀷􀀱􀁚􀀹􀀸􀁨􀁚􀁓􀁨􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁙􀁈􀁙􀁚􀀹􀁕􀀁􀁙􀁨 􀁆􀁓􀁞􀁙􀀹􀁨 􀁈􀁑􀁨 􀀱􀁑􀁨 􀀹􀀽􀁓􀁕􀁚􀁨 􀁚􀁓􀁨 􀁊􀀹􀀱􀁢􀀹􀁨 􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁆􀁞􀁙􀀶􀀱􀁑􀀸􀀄􀁨 􀀶􀁞􀁚􀁨 􀀸􀁈􀀸􀁨 􀁑􀁓􀁚􀁨 􀁚􀀹􀁙􀁚􀁈􀁃􀁨 􀁕􀀹􀁄􀀱􀁕􀀸􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁨 􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀀹􀀽􀁓􀁕􀁚􀁙􀁨 􀁚􀁓􀁨 􀁈􀁑􀁚􀀹􀁗􀀱􀁊􀁊􀁥􀁨􀁕􀀹􀁊􀁓􀀷􀀱􀁚􀀹􀁨􀁈􀁑􀁨 􀀫􀀹􀁤􀁈􀀷􀁓􀁨 􀀂􀁌􀀎􀀪􀀏􀁨 􀀱􀁚􀁨􀀟􀀃􀀆􀁨 􀀧􀁓􀁣􀀹􀁢􀀹􀁕􀀄􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨􀁕􀀹􀁙􀁔􀁓􀁑􀀸􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨 􀀱􀁕􀁄􀁞􀀹􀁙􀁨 􀁓􀁑􀁨􀀱􀁔􀁔􀀹􀀱􀁊􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀁙􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀁣􀀱􀁙􀁨 􀁑􀁓􀁚􀁨􀀱􀁙􀁉􀀹􀀸􀁨􀀱􀁚􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨􀁆􀀹􀀱􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁨􀁣􀁆􀁥􀁨􀁙􀁆􀀹􀁨􀁓􀁎􀁈􀁚􀁚􀀹􀀸􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁙􀀹􀁨􀀸􀀹􀁚􀀱􀁈􀁊􀁙􀁨􀀂􀀭􀀹􀁙􀁔􀁓􀁑􀀸􀀹􀁑􀁚􀀁􀁙􀁨􀀣􀁕􀁈􀀹􀀺􀁨􀀱􀁚􀁨􀀕􀀙􀀃􀀑􀁨 􀀯􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀀨􀁎􀁎􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀱􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨 􀀪􀁞􀀸􀁄􀀹􀁨 􀀱􀁊􀁙􀁓􀁨 􀀶􀀱􀁙􀀹􀀸􀁨 􀁆􀁈􀁙􀁨 􀀱􀀸􀁢􀀹􀁕􀁙􀀹􀁨 􀀷􀁕􀀹􀀸􀁈􀀶􀁈􀁊􀁈􀁚􀁥􀁨 􀀸􀀹􀁚􀀹􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁑􀀱􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨 􀁓􀁑􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀀻􀀷􀁚􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀁕􀀹􀁙􀁔􀁓􀁑􀀸􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨􀁙􀁚􀀱􀁚􀀹􀀸􀁨 􀁈􀁑􀁨􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀀱􀁙􀁥􀁊􀁞􀁎􀁨 􀁈􀁑􀁚􀀹􀁕􀁢􀁈􀀹􀁣􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁆􀁞􀁙􀀶􀀱􀁑􀀸􀁨 􀁂􀀱􀀷􀁚􀁡􀀹􀀸􀁨 􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁙􀁉􀁞􀁊􀁊􀁨 􀀶􀁥􀁨 􀁙􀁊􀀁􀀂􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁨 􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁆􀀹􀀱􀀸􀁨 􀁈􀁑􀁚􀁓􀁨 􀀱􀁨 􀁣􀀱􀁊􀁊􀀄􀁨 􀀶􀁞􀁚􀁨 􀀸􀁈􀀸􀁨 􀁑􀁓􀁚􀁨 􀁎􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀁈􀁙􀁨 􀁔􀀱􀁖􀁚􀁈􀀷􀁞􀁊􀀱􀁕􀁨 􀁎􀁈􀁙􀁚􀁕􀀹􀀱􀁚􀁎􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨 􀁈􀁑􀁨 􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁚􀀹􀁙􀁚􀁈􀁎􀁓􀁑􀁥􀁨 􀀶􀀹􀁁􀁕􀀹􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀀨􀁎􀁎􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀱􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨 􀀪􀁞􀀸􀁄􀀹􀁨 􀀂􀁌􀀌􀀪􀀇􀁨 􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀀞􀀃􀀆􀁨 􀀯􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀁕􀀹􀁙􀁔􀁓􀁑􀀸􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨 􀀷􀁊􀀱􀁈􀁎􀁙􀁨 􀁓􀁑􀁨 􀀱􀁔􀁔􀀹􀀱􀁊􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀀸􀁈􀁙􀀷􀁕􀀹􀁔􀀱􀁑􀀷􀁥􀁨 􀁈􀁙􀁨 􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁞􀀾􀀷􀁈􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨􀁚􀁓􀁨􀀿􀁑􀀸􀁨 􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁑􀁓􀁚􀁨􀀷􀁕􀀹􀀸􀁈􀀶􀁊􀀹􀁨􀀶􀀹􀀷􀀱􀁞􀁙􀀹􀁨􀁙􀁆􀀹􀁨􀁚􀀹􀁙􀁚􀁈􀀿􀀹􀀸􀁨􀀷􀁓􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁙􀁚􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁊􀁥􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨􀁆􀁞􀁙􀀶􀀱􀁑􀀸􀁨􀀱􀀶􀁞􀁙􀀹􀀸􀁨􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀀱􀁚􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨􀁆􀀹􀀱􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁨􀀱􀁒􀀸􀁨􀁣􀀱􀁙􀁨􀁢􀀹􀁕􀁥􀁨􀀸􀁈􀁙􀁚􀁕􀀱􀁞􀁄􀁆􀁚􀁨􀀱􀁑􀀸􀁨􀀹􀁎􀁓􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀀱􀁊􀁊􀁥􀁨􀁞􀁔􀁙􀀹􀁚􀁨􀀸􀁞􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨􀀷􀁓􀁞􀁕􀁙􀀹􀁨􀁓􀀺􀁨􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁚􀀹􀁙􀁚􀁈􀁎􀁓􀁑􀁥􀁨 􀀂􀀭􀀹􀁙􀁔􀁓􀁑􀀸􀀹􀁑􀁚􀀁􀁙􀁨 􀀣􀁕􀁈􀀹􀀺􀁨 􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀀕􀀔􀀃􀀎􀁨 􀀯􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀁚􀁕􀀱􀁑􀁙􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁚􀁨 􀁓􀀺􀁨 􀁔􀁕􀁓􀀷􀀹􀀹􀀸􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁙􀁨 􀀱􀁊􀁙􀁓􀁨 􀀸􀁓􀀹􀁙􀁨 􀁑􀁓􀁚􀁨 􀁈􀁑􀀸􀁈􀀷􀀱􀁚􀀹􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀁕􀀹􀁙􀁔􀁓􀁑􀀸􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨 􀁣􀀱􀁙􀁨􀀱􀁙􀁉􀀹􀀸􀁨􀀱􀀶􀁓􀁞􀁚􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀁈􀁙􀁨􀁓􀁎􀁈􀁙􀁙􀁈􀁓􀁑􀀏􀁨 􀀦􀁟􀁕􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁎􀁓􀁕􀀹􀀄􀁨 􀁣􀁆􀁈􀁊􀀹􀁨 􀁙􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀀸􀁈􀀸􀁨􀁑􀁓􀁚􀁨 􀁙􀁔􀀹􀀷􀁈􀀿􀀷􀀱􀁊􀁊􀁥􀁨 􀁎􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀁂􀀱􀀷􀁚􀁞􀁕􀀹􀁨 􀁚􀁓􀁨 􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁙􀁉􀁞􀁊􀁊􀀄􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀁕􀀹􀁙􀁔􀁓􀁑􀀸􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨 􀁚􀀹􀁙􀁚􀁈􀀿􀀹􀀸􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁆􀁞􀁙􀀶􀀱􀁑􀀸􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀁖􀀹􀁣􀁨 􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀀱􀁄􀀱􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁚􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀁣􀀱􀁊􀁊􀀄􀁨 􀁉􀁈􀀷􀁉􀀹􀀸􀁨􀁆􀀹􀁕􀀄􀁨􀁆􀁈􀁚􀁨􀁆􀀹􀁕􀀄􀁨􀀳􀀸􀁨􀁔􀁞􀁊􀁊􀀹􀀸􀁨􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨􀁂􀁓􀁎􀁨􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨􀁆􀀱􀁈􀁕􀁨􀀂􀀯􀁕􀀍􀁨 􀀱􀁚􀁨􀀜􀀜􀀅􀀜􀀞􀀄􀁨􀀟􀀛􀀃􀀇􀁨 􀀁􀀄 􀀱􀀸􀀸􀁈􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀀄􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀀨􀁏􀁎􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀱􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨 􀀪􀁞􀀸􀁄􀀹􀁨 􀁁􀁟􀁑􀀸􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀁕􀀹􀁙􀁔􀁓􀁑􀀸􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨 􀁔􀁕􀁓􀁢􀁈􀀸􀀹􀀸􀁨 􀁈􀁑􀀷􀁓􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁙􀁚􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨 􀁙􀁚􀀱􀁚􀀹􀁎􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁙􀁨 􀁕􀀹􀁄􀀱􀁕􀀸􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁨 􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁎􀁓􀁚􀁈􀁢􀀱􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨 􀁚􀁓􀁨 􀁕􀀹􀁝􀁨 􀁚􀁓􀁨 􀀫􀀹􀁤􀁈􀀷􀁓􀁨 􀁈􀁑􀁨 􀀬􀀷􀁚􀁓􀀶􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀀘􀀔􀀕􀀕􀁨 􀀂􀁌􀀏􀀪􀀍􀁨 􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀀞􀀃􀀇􀁨 􀀯􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀀩􀁎􀁎􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀱􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨􀀪􀁞􀀸􀁄􀀹􀁨􀁓􀀶􀁙􀀹􀁕􀁢􀀹􀀸􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨􀁕􀀹􀁙􀁔􀁓􀁑􀀸􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨 􀁚􀀹􀁙􀁚􀁈􀀿􀀹􀀸􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨􀁙􀁆􀀹􀁨􀁕􀀹􀁝􀀹􀀸􀁨􀁚􀁓􀁨􀀫􀀹􀁤􀁈􀀷􀁓􀁨􀁚􀁓􀁨􀀱􀁙􀁙􀁈􀁙􀁚􀁨􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁙􀁓􀁑􀁨􀀶􀀹􀀷􀀱􀁞􀁙􀀹􀁨􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨􀁆􀁞􀁙􀀶􀀱􀁑􀀸􀁨􀁉􀁈􀀷􀁉􀀹􀀸􀁨􀁆􀁈􀁎􀁨􀁈􀁑􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨􀀶􀀱􀀷􀁉􀁨􀀸􀁞􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁨􀀱􀁨􀁔􀁆􀁥􀁙􀁈􀀷􀀱􀁊􀁨 􀀱􀁊􀁚􀀹􀁕􀀷􀀱􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨􀀂􀁍􀀆􀀪􀀆􀁨 􀀱􀁚􀁨􀀞􀀡􀁨􀀯􀁕􀀍􀁨 􀀱􀁚􀁨􀀛􀀙􀀃􀀋􀁨 􀀯􀁆􀀹􀁨􀀨􀁎􀁎􀁈􀁄􀁖􀀱􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨􀀪􀁞􀀸􀁄􀀹􀁨􀀶􀀹􀁊􀁈􀀹􀁢􀀹􀀸􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨􀁚􀁆􀁈􀁙􀁨􀁚􀀹􀁙􀁚􀁈􀁎􀁓􀁑􀁥􀁨􀀷􀁓􀁑􀁀􀁈􀀷􀁚􀀹􀀸􀁨􀁣􀁈􀁚􀁆􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨􀁕􀀹􀁙􀁔􀁓􀁑􀀸􀀹􀁑􀁚􀀁􀁙􀁨􀁙􀁚􀀱􀁚􀀹􀁎􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨􀁚􀁓􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀀱􀁙􀁥􀁊􀁞􀁎􀁨 􀁓􀀾􀀷􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀁙􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀁕􀀹􀁚􀁞􀁗􀀹􀀸􀁨 􀁚􀁓􀁨 􀀫􀀹􀁤􀁈􀀷􀁓􀁨 􀀶􀀹􀀷􀀱􀁞􀁙􀀹􀁨 􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁕􀀹􀁊􀀱􀁚􀁈􀁢􀀹􀁙􀁨 􀁣􀀹􀁕􀀹􀁨 􀀷􀁓􀁑􀀷􀀹􀁗􀀹􀀸􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁆􀁞􀁙􀀶􀀱􀁑􀀸􀁨􀁣􀁓􀁞􀁊􀀸􀁨􀁆􀀱􀁕􀁎􀁨􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨􀁎􀁓􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁕􀀄􀁨 􀁣􀁆􀁈􀀷􀁆􀁨􀁙􀁆􀀹􀁨􀀱􀁊􀁙􀁓􀁨􀁙􀁚􀀱􀁚􀀹􀀸􀁨􀁈􀁑􀁨􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨􀀵􀁥􀁊􀁟􀁎􀁨􀀱􀁔􀁔􀁊􀁈􀀷􀀱􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨 􀀂􀁌􀀌􀀪􀀌􀁨 􀀱􀁚􀁨􀀞􀀡􀁨􀀥􀁤􀁇􀀑􀁨 􀀙􀀃􀀇􀁨 􀀯􀁆􀀹􀁨􀀨􀁏􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀱􀁚􀁈􀁓􀁑􀁨􀀪􀁞􀀸􀁄􀀹􀁨􀁁􀁠􀀸􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁙􀀹􀁨􀁙􀁚􀀱􀁚􀀹􀁎􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁙􀁨􀁣􀀹􀁕􀀹􀁨􀁈􀁑􀀷􀁓􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁙􀁚􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨􀁣􀁈􀁚􀁆􀁨􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨􀁙􀁚􀀱􀁚􀀹􀁎􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨􀁚􀁓􀁨􀀱􀁨 􀀶􀁓􀁕􀀸􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁔􀀱􀁚􀁕􀁓􀁊􀁨 􀀱􀁄􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀁙􀁆􀀹􀁨 􀁕􀀹􀁚􀁟􀁗􀀹􀀸􀁨 􀀶􀀹􀀷􀀱􀁞􀁙􀀹􀁨 􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁔􀀱􀁕􀀹􀁑􀁚􀁙􀁨 􀀷􀀱􀁊􀁊􀀹􀀸􀁨 􀀲􀁑􀀸􀁨 􀁈􀁑􀁁􀁕􀁎􀀹􀀸􀁨 􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁚􀁆􀀱􀁚􀁨 􀁆􀀹􀁕􀁨 􀁆􀁞􀁙􀀶􀀱􀁒􀀸􀁨􀁣􀀱􀁙􀁨 􀁙􀁚􀀹􀀱􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁨􀁎􀁓􀁑􀀹􀁥􀁨􀁂􀁓􀁎􀁨􀁚􀁆􀀹􀁈􀁕􀁨􀀶􀁞􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀹􀁙􀁙􀁨􀀂􀁌􀀌􀀪􀀎􀁨 􀀱􀁚􀁨􀀝􀀡􀁨􀀥􀁤􀁆􀀌􀁨􀀙􀀄􀁨􀀯􀀱􀀶􀁨􀀣 􀀱􀁚􀁨􀀝􀀘􀀃􀀏􀁨 􀀘􀁨 (b) (6) 􀁩 􀀦􀁍􀁩 􀀬􀁓􀁓􀀳􀀬􀁈􀀇􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁩 􀀱􀁈􀀬􀁄􀁊􀁚􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁚􀀳􀁣􀀳􀁕􀀬􀁈􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀀬􀁚􀁒􀁍􀁚􀁩 􀁚􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁣􀁄􀀲􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀀼􀁕􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁟􀁎􀁁􀁩 􀀬􀁕􀀳􀁩 􀀬􀁈􀁈􀁩 􀁓􀀬􀁕􀁜􀁩 􀁒􀀶􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀀱􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁕􀀬􀁈􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀀬􀁚􀁒􀁍􀁩 􀀼􀁕􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁞􀁩 􀁜􀁒􀁩 􀀥􀀳􀁥􀁄􀀱􀁒􀀜􀁩 􀁜􀁒􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁈􀁓􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁊􀁒􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀀬􀁍􀀲􀁩 􀁚􀁒􀁍􀁩 􀀅􀀧􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁩 􀀟􀁕􀁆􀀳􀀶􀁩􀀬􀁝􀁩 􀀓􀀓􀁩􀀆􀀋􀁩 􀀨􀁂􀀳􀁩􀁕􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁩􀀱􀁈􀀬􀁄􀁊􀁚􀁩􀁚􀁂􀀳􀁩􀁕􀀳􀁞􀀳􀀲􀁩􀁜􀁒􀁩􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁜􀀳􀀱􀁜􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩􀀶􀀭􀁄􀁈􀁧􀁩􀀅􀀧􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁩􀀟􀁖􀁄􀀳􀀶􀁩􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀀓􀀓􀀉 􀀓􀀔􀀆􀀏􀁩 􀀡􀁠􀁕􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁊􀁒􀁕􀀳􀀇􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁩 􀀳􀁥􀁓􀁈􀀬􀁄􀁍􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀁄􀁍􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀀬􀁚􀁧􀁈􀁠􀁊􀁩 􀀬􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀀱􀀬􀁜􀁄􀁒􀁍􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁩 􀁎􀀳􀁄􀁁􀁂􀀰􀁒􀁕􀁚􀁩 􀀸􀀬􀁕􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀀼􀁕􀁩􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁊􀁒􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁩 􀁚􀀬􀀶􀀳􀁜􀁧􀀇􀁩 􀀬􀁍􀀲􀁩􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁂􀁠􀁚􀀰􀀬􀁍􀀲􀁩 􀀰􀁠􀁈􀁈􀁄􀀳􀀲􀁩􀀬􀁍􀀲􀁩􀁜􀁂􀁗􀀳􀀬􀁜􀀳􀁍􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁊􀁒􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀀼􀁕􀁩 􀁊􀁒􀁎􀀳􀁧􀁩 􀀬􀁍􀀲􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁜􀀬􀁇􀀳􀁚􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁊􀁒􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁩 􀁊􀁒􀁍􀀳􀁧􀁩 􀀅􀀠􀁥􀁂􀀌􀁩 􀀕􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀀓􀀔􀀆􀀍􀁩 􀀣􀁍􀀬􀁚􀁊􀁠􀀱􀁂􀁩 􀀬􀁚􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀀱􀁄􀁜􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀀬􀁚􀁒􀁍􀁚􀁩 􀀼􀁕􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁜􀁠􀁙􀁩 􀁜􀁒􀁩 􀀥􀀳􀁥􀁄􀀱􀁒􀁩 􀀬􀁈􀁈􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁈􀀬􀁜􀀳􀁩 􀁜􀁒􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀀲􀀳􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀳􀁩 􀁜􀁒􀁩 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁜􀀳􀀱􀁜􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀀶􀀬􀁊􀁄􀁈􀁧􀀇􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀀷􀀱􀁜􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁚􀁂􀀳􀁩􀀱􀁄􀁜􀀴􀀲􀁩􀁣􀀬􀁕􀁄􀁒􀁠􀁚􀁩 􀀶􀀬􀁋􀁄􀁉􀁧􀀉􀀰􀀬􀁚􀀳􀀲􀁩􀁕􀀳􀀬􀁚􀁒􀁍􀁚􀁩􀀼􀁕􀁩􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩􀁕􀀳􀁞􀁩􀀲􀁒􀀳􀁚􀁩 􀁍􀁒􀁜􀁩􀁠􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁎􀀳􀁩􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩􀀱􀁕􀀳􀀲􀁄􀀰􀁄􀁈􀁄􀁜􀁧􀀎􀁩 􀀨􀁂􀀵􀁩 􀀣􀁊􀁊􀁄􀁁􀁕􀀬􀁜􀁄􀁒􀁍􀁩 􀀤􀁠􀀲􀁁􀀳􀁩 􀀬􀁈􀁚􀁒􀁩 􀀼􀁠􀁍􀀲􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀀱􀁒􀁕􀀲􀁩 􀁤􀀬􀁚􀁩 􀁠􀁍􀀱􀁈􀀳􀀬􀁕􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁁􀀬􀁘􀀲􀁄􀁍􀁁􀁩 􀁤􀁂􀀳􀁍􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁂􀁠􀁚􀀰􀀬􀁍􀀲􀁩 􀁚􀁜􀀯􀁜􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀀬􀀰􀁠􀁚􀁄􀁍􀁁􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁩 􀀅􀀣􀀌􀀤􀀌􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀀙􀀆􀀌􀁩 􀀨􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀀣􀁊􀁊􀁄􀁁􀁕􀀬􀁜􀁄􀁒􀁍􀁩 􀀤􀁠􀀲􀁁􀀳􀁩 􀀼􀁠􀁍􀀲􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁝􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁎􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁩 􀁜􀀳􀁚􀁜􀁄􀀻􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁈􀀬􀁜􀁄􀁒􀁍􀁚􀁂􀁄􀁓􀁩 􀁤􀁄􀁜􀁂􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁂􀁠􀁚􀀰􀀬􀁎􀀲􀁩 􀀰􀀳􀀱􀀬􀁊􀀳􀁩 􀁣􀁄􀁒􀁈􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁩 􀀬􀁩 􀀸􀁤􀁩 􀁊􀁒􀁍􀁜􀁂􀁚􀁩 􀀬􀀾􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁧􀁩 􀁚􀁜􀀬􀁘􀁜􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀀲􀀬􀁜􀁄􀁍􀁁􀁩 􀁄􀁍􀁩 􀀓􀀛􀀚􀀛􀀇􀁩 􀀰􀁠􀁜􀁩 􀁍􀁒􀁜􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁚􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁜􀁒􀁈􀀲􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀀬􀁚􀁧􀁈􀁠􀁊􀁩 􀁒􀀹􀀱􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁤􀁂􀁒􀁩 􀀱􀁒􀁍􀀲􀁠􀀱􀁜􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀀱􀁕􀀳􀀲􀁄􀀰􀁈􀀳􀁩 􀀸􀀬􀁕􀁩 􀁄􀁍􀁜􀀳􀁕􀁣􀁄􀀵􀁤􀁩􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩􀁂􀁠􀁚􀀰􀀬􀁍􀀲􀁩􀀲􀁄􀀲􀁩􀁍􀁒􀁜􀁩􀁚􀁜􀀬􀁗􀁜􀁩􀀬􀀰􀁠􀁚􀁄􀁍􀁁􀁩􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩􀁠􀁍􀁜􀁄􀁈􀁩􀀔􀁩􀁊􀁒􀁎􀁜􀁂􀁚􀁩􀀬􀀾􀀳􀁕􀁩􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩􀁚􀁒􀁍􀁩􀁤􀀬􀁚􀁩􀀰􀁒􀁙􀁩􀁄􀁍􀁩􀀔􀀒􀀒􀀔􀁩 􀀅􀀣􀀋􀀤􀀋􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀀙􀀝􀁩 􀀨􀁕􀀋􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀀗􀀛􀀝􀁩 􀀠􀁥􀁂􀀏􀁩 􀀕􀀇􀁩 􀀨􀀬􀀰􀁩 􀀟􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀀗􀀚􀀆􀀍􀁩 􀀨􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁩 􀁓􀁒􀁄􀁍􀁜􀁚􀁩 􀁒􀁠􀁜􀁩 􀁒􀁍􀁩 􀀬􀁓􀁓􀀳􀀬􀁈􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁩 􀁚􀁒􀁍􀁩 􀁤􀀬􀁚􀁩 􀀰􀁒􀁙􀁩 􀁄􀁍􀁩 􀀓􀀛􀀛􀀔􀀇􀁩 􀁍􀁒􀁜􀁩 􀀔􀀒􀀒􀀔􀁩 􀀬􀁚􀁩 􀀱􀁄􀁜􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀀰􀁧􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀀣􀁊􀁊􀁄􀁁􀁕􀀬􀁜􀁄􀁒􀁍􀁩 􀀤􀁠􀀲􀁁􀀳􀁩 􀀅􀀧􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁩 􀀟􀁕􀁄􀀳􀀶􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀀛􀀝􀁩 􀀣􀀋􀀤􀀋􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀀛􀀝􀁩 􀀠􀁥􀁂􀀍􀁩 􀀕􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀀘􀀆􀀌􀁩 􀀨􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁩 􀀬􀁈􀁚􀁒􀁩 􀀯􀁁􀁠􀀳􀁚􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁚􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀀱􀁒􀁍􀁚􀁄􀁚􀁜􀀳􀁎􀁜􀁈􀁧􀁩 􀁄􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁄􀀻􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁓􀁂􀁧􀁚􀁄􀀱􀀬􀁈􀁩􀀬􀀰􀁠􀁚􀀳􀁩􀀬􀁚􀁩􀀰􀀳􀁁􀁄􀁍􀁍􀁄􀁍􀁁􀁩􀀬􀀾􀀳􀁕􀁩􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩􀀰􀁄􀁘􀁜􀁂􀁩􀁒􀀶􀁩􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁚􀁒􀁍􀀇􀁩 􀀬􀁈􀁜􀁂􀁒􀁠􀁁􀁂􀁩􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩􀁂􀁠􀁚􀀰􀀬􀁍􀀲􀁩􀁤􀀬􀁚􀁩􀁣􀀳􀁕􀀰􀀬􀁈􀁈􀁧􀁩􀀬􀀰􀁠􀁚􀁄􀁣􀀳􀁩 􀀳􀀬􀁕􀁈􀁄􀀳􀁕􀀏􀁩 􀀩􀀳􀁩 􀀬􀁁􀁕􀀳􀀳􀀋􀁩 􀀟􀀬􀁚􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀁒􀁍􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀀼􀁕􀀳􀁁􀁒􀁄􀁍􀁁􀀇􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀀲􀁄􀁚􀀱􀁕􀀳􀁓􀀬􀁍􀀱􀁄􀀳􀁚􀁩 􀀱􀁄􀁜􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀀰􀁧􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀀣􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁁􀁕􀀬􀁜􀁄􀁒􀁍􀁩 􀀤􀁠􀀲􀁁􀀳􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁁􀀯􀀲􀁄􀁍􀁁􀁩 􀁤􀁂􀀳􀁍􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁂􀁠􀁚􀀰􀀬􀁍􀀲􀀃􀁚􀁩 􀀬􀀰􀁠􀁚􀀳􀁩 􀀰􀀳􀁁􀀬􀁍􀁩 􀀬􀁕􀀳􀁩 􀁍􀁒􀁜􀁩 􀀬􀁩 􀁚􀁠􀀶􀀻􀀱􀁄􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁩 􀀰􀀬􀁚􀁄􀁚􀁩 􀀼􀁕􀁩 􀁂􀁄􀁚􀁩 􀀬􀀲􀁣􀀳􀁕􀁚􀀳􀁩 􀀱􀁕􀀳􀀲􀁄􀀰􀁄􀁈􀁄􀁜􀁧􀁩 􀀲􀀳􀁜􀀳􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁍􀀬􀁜􀁄􀁒􀁍􀀋􀁩 􀀨􀁂􀀵􀁩 􀀣􀁊􀁊􀁄􀁁􀁕􀀬􀁜􀁄􀁒􀁍􀁩 􀀤􀁠􀀲􀁁􀀳􀁩 􀀼􀁠􀁍􀀲􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁩 􀁊􀁄􀁚􀀱􀁂􀀬􀁕􀀬􀀱􀁜􀀳􀁕􀁄􀁨􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀀳􀁣􀁄􀀲􀀳􀁍􀀱􀀳􀁩 􀁄􀁍􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀀱􀀬􀁚􀀳􀁩 􀀬􀁍􀀲􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀁄􀁚􀁩 􀁊􀁄􀁚􀀱􀁂􀀬􀁗􀀬􀀱􀁜􀀳􀁕􀁄􀁨􀀬􀁜􀁄􀁒􀁍􀁩 􀁡􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁍􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀀱􀁕􀀳􀀲􀁄􀀰􀁄􀁈􀁄􀁜􀁧􀁩 􀀅􀀣􀀌􀀤􀀋􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀀚􀀆􀀌􀁩 􀀨􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀀣􀁊􀁊􀁄􀁁􀁕􀀬􀁜􀁄􀁒􀁍􀁩 􀀤􀁠􀀲􀁁􀀳􀁩 􀁒􀀰􀁚􀀳􀁕􀁣􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀀬􀁈􀁜􀁂􀁒􀁠􀁁􀁂􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩􀁕􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁐􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁩 􀀱􀁈􀀬􀁄􀁊􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀁚􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀀱􀀳􀁄􀁣􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀀲􀀳􀀬􀁜􀁂􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀁕􀀳􀀬􀁜􀁚􀁩 􀀽􀁒􀁊􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁂􀁠􀁚􀀰􀀬􀁎􀀲􀀇􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁜􀁃􀁕􀀳􀀬􀁜􀁚􀀈􀁩 􀀬􀁚􀁩 􀀲􀀳􀁚􀀱􀁕􀁄􀀰􀀳􀀲􀁩􀀰􀁧􀁩􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩􀁕􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀀇􀁩􀀲􀁄􀀲􀁩 􀁍􀁒􀁜􀁩􀁔􀁠􀀬􀁈􀁄􀁀􀁩􀀬􀁚􀁩 􀀲􀀳􀀬􀁜􀁂􀁩􀁜􀁃􀁕􀀳􀀬􀁜􀁚􀁩􀀬􀁚􀁩 􀁚􀁂􀀳􀁩􀀱􀁈􀀬􀁄􀁊􀀳􀀲􀁩􀀅􀀣􀀍􀀤􀀍􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀀚􀀆􀀍􀁩 􀀣􀁍􀁩 􀁓􀀬􀁗􀁜􀁅􀀱􀁠􀁈􀀬􀁕􀀇􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀀣􀁊􀁊􀁄􀁁􀁕􀀬􀁜􀁄􀁒􀁍􀁩 􀀤􀁠􀀲􀁁􀀳􀁩 􀁒􀀰􀁚􀀳􀁕􀁣􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁩􀁜􀀳􀁚􀁜􀁄􀀻􀀳􀀲􀁩􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩􀁂􀁠􀁚􀀰􀀮􀀲􀁩 􀁜􀁒􀁈􀀲􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁂􀁒􀁓􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁚􀁠􀁄􀀱􀁄􀀲􀀳􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁜􀀳􀁊􀁓􀁜􀁚􀁩 􀁤􀁒􀁠􀁈􀀲􀁩 􀀰􀀳􀁩 􀁚􀁠􀀱􀀱􀀳􀁚􀁚􀀿􀁈􀁩 􀁄􀁍􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀀿􀁜􀁠􀁕􀀳􀁩 􀀅􀀣􀀋􀀤􀀏􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀀚􀀝􀁩 􀀨􀁕􀀌􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀀗􀀓􀁩􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄 􀀨􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁛􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁩 􀀱􀁒􀁍􀁜􀀳􀁍􀀲􀁚􀁩 􀁒􀁍􀁩 􀀬􀁓􀁓􀀳􀀬􀁈􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁚􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁤􀀬􀁚􀁩 􀀳􀁥􀁜􀁕􀀳􀁊􀀳􀁈􀁧􀁩 􀁠􀁓􀁚􀀳􀁜􀁩 􀁤􀁂􀀳􀁍􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁂􀁠􀁚􀀰􀀬􀁍􀀲􀁩 􀁊􀀬􀀲􀀳􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁚􀀳􀁩 􀁚􀁜􀀬􀁜􀀳􀁊􀀵􀁍􀁜􀁚􀁩 􀁜􀁒􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀀇􀁩 􀀬􀁍􀀲􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁚􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁓􀀳􀁕􀀱􀀳􀁄􀁣􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁊􀁩 􀀬􀁚􀁩 􀀲􀀳􀀬􀁜􀁂􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀁕􀀳􀀬􀁜􀁚􀁩 􀀅􀀧􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁩 􀀟􀁕􀁆􀀳􀀶􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀀓􀀕􀀉􀀓􀀖􀀆􀀏􀁩 􀀩􀀳􀁩 􀀬􀁁􀁖􀀳􀀳􀁩 􀁤􀁄􀁜􀁂􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁓􀀳􀁕􀀱􀀳􀁓􀁜􀁄􀁒􀁍􀁩 􀁒􀀶􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁂􀁠􀁚􀀰􀀬􀁍􀀲􀀃􀁚􀁩 􀁚􀁜􀀬􀁜􀀳􀁊􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁚􀁩 􀁄􀁚􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀀬􀁚􀁒􀁍􀀬􀀰􀁈􀀳􀁩 􀀬􀁎􀀲􀁩 􀀲􀁒􀀳􀁚􀁩􀁍􀁒􀁜􀁩􀁚􀁠􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁜􀁩􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩􀀣􀁊􀁊􀁄􀁁􀁕􀀬􀁜􀁄􀁒􀁍􀁩􀀤􀁠􀀲􀁁􀀳􀀃􀁚􀁩􀀬􀀲􀁣􀀳􀁕􀁚􀀳􀁩􀀱􀁕􀀳􀀲􀁄􀀰􀁄􀁈􀁄􀁜􀁧􀁩􀀲􀀳􀁜􀀳􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁍􀀬􀁜􀁄􀁒􀁍􀀌􀁩 􀀨􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀀣􀁊􀁊􀁄􀁁􀁕􀀬􀁜􀁄􀁒􀁍􀁩 􀀤􀁠􀀲􀁁􀀳􀁩 􀀬􀁉􀁚􀁒􀁩 􀀼􀁠􀁍􀀲􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁩 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁣􀁄􀀲􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀁄􀁍􀀱􀁒􀁍􀁚􀁄􀁚􀁜􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁩 􀁚􀁜􀀬􀁜􀀳􀁊􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁚􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁁􀀬􀁗􀀲􀁄􀁎􀁁􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀀶􀀬􀁊􀁄􀁉􀁧􀀃􀁚􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁜􀁄􀁜􀁠􀀲􀀳􀁩 􀁜􀁒􀁤􀀬􀁕􀀲􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁂􀁠􀁚􀀰􀀬􀁍􀀲􀁩 􀀅􀀣􀀋􀀤􀀌􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀀚􀀆􀀋􀁩 􀀨􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀀣􀁊􀁊􀁄􀁁􀁕􀀬􀁜􀁄􀁒􀁎􀁩 􀀤􀁠􀀲􀁁􀀳􀁩 􀀼􀁠􀁍􀀲􀁩􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁩 􀀱􀁈􀀬􀁄􀁊􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀀶􀀬􀁊􀁄􀁈􀁧􀁩 􀀲􀁒􀀳􀁚􀁩 􀁍􀁒􀁜􀁩 􀁚􀁠􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁜􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀀳􀀶􀀼􀁕􀁜􀁚􀁩 􀁜􀁒􀁩 􀁈􀀳􀀬􀁣􀀳􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁂􀁠􀁚􀀰􀀬􀁍􀀲􀁩􀀰􀀳􀀱􀀬􀁠􀁚􀀳􀁩􀁒􀀶􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁩 􀁕􀀵􀁈􀁄􀁁􀁄􀁒􀁠􀁚􀁩 􀀰􀁕􀁄􀀳􀀶􀁚􀁩 􀁄􀁍􀀱􀁒􀁍􀁚􀁄􀁚􀁜􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁩 􀁤􀁄􀁜􀁂􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀀱􀁈􀀬􀁄􀁊􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁚􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁂􀀬􀀲􀁩 􀁜􀁒􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁜􀁢􀁩 􀁜􀁒􀁩 􀀥􀀳􀁥􀁄􀀱􀁒􀁩 􀀰􀀳􀀱􀀬􀁠􀁚􀀳􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁊􀁒􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁖􀁩 􀁤􀀬􀁚􀁩 􀁚􀀱􀀬􀁗􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀁒􀀶􀁩 􀁂􀁄􀁊􀁩 􀀬􀁍􀀲􀁩 􀁤􀀬􀁎􀁜􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀁂􀁄􀁊􀁩 􀁜􀁒􀁩 􀁉􀀳􀀬􀁣􀀳􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀀬􀁈􀁒􀁍􀀳􀁩 􀀅􀀣􀀏􀀤􀀋􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀀚􀀆􀀐􀁩 􀀢􀁒􀁤􀀳􀁣􀀳􀁕􀀇􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁩 􀁜􀀳􀁚􀁜􀁄􀁊􀁒􀁎􀁧􀁩 􀁄􀁍􀀲􀁄􀀱􀀬􀁜􀀳􀁚􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁚􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁤􀀬􀁚􀁩 􀁒􀀰􀁉􀁄􀁁􀀬􀁜􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀁜􀁒􀁩 􀁊􀀬􀁕􀁕􀁧􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁂􀁠􀁚􀀰􀀬􀁍􀀲􀁩 􀀰􀀳􀀱􀀬􀁠􀁚􀀳􀁩 􀁒􀀶􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀀶􀀬􀁋􀁄􀁈􀁧􀀄􀁚􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁈􀁄􀁁􀁄􀁒􀁠􀁚􀁩 􀁣􀁄􀀳􀁤􀁚􀁩 􀀅􀀨􀁕􀀌􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁩􀀗􀀛􀀊􀀘􀀓􀀆􀀋􀁩 􀀞􀁚􀁩􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀀰􀁈􀀳􀁊􀁚􀁩 􀁤􀁄􀁜􀁂􀁩􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁂􀁠􀁚􀀰􀀬􀁑􀀲􀁩􀁤􀁒􀁕􀁚􀀳􀁍􀀳􀀲􀀇􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩􀁊􀁒􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀀬􀁈􀁚􀁒􀁩 􀀳􀁦􀁓􀀳􀁕􀁄􀀳􀁍􀀱􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀀲􀁄􀀺􀀱􀁠􀁈􀁜􀁄􀀳􀁚􀁩 􀁤􀁄􀁜􀁂􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁂􀁠􀁚􀀰􀀬􀁍􀀲􀁩 􀀬􀁍􀀲􀁩 􀁄􀁚􀁩 􀀬􀀽􀀬􀁄􀀲􀁩 􀁒􀀶􀁩 􀁂􀁄􀁊􀁩 􀀅􀀨􀁕􀀏􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀀙􀀓􀀆􀀏􀁩 􀀩􀀳􀁩 􀀻􀁍􀀲􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀀁􀀂 􀀨􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁕􀀳􀁚􀁓􀁒􀁍􀀲􀀳􀁍􀁜􀁩 􀁜􀀳􀁚􀁜􀁄􀀻􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀬􀁜􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀁂􀁠􀁚􀀰􀀬􀁍􀀲􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀁕􀀳􀀬􀁜􀀳􀁍􀀳􀀲􀁩 􀁂􀀳􀁕􀁩 􀀬􀁚􀁩 􀀼􀁈􀁈􀁒􀁤􀁚􀀜􀁩 􀀁􀀪􀀨􀀫􀁂􀁄􀁚􀁩 􀁜􀁄􀁊􀀳􀁩 􀁜􀁂􀀳􀁩 􀁚􀁠􀁄􀀱􀁄􀀲􀀬􀁈􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁜􀀳􀁊􀁓􀁜􀁚􀁩􀁤􀁆􀁈􀁈􀁩􀁤􀁒􀁕􀁇􀀂􀁩 􀀅􀀨􀁕􀀑􀁩 􀀬􀁜􀁩􀀗􀀓􀁩􀀆􀀏􀁩 􀀕􀁩 (b) (6) 􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀀁􀁇􀁓 􀀭􀀷􀀨􀁅􀀨􀀭􀁈􀀯􀁅􀀹􀁑􀀨􀁈􀀹􀁂􀁀􀁓 􀁂􀀰􀁓 􀀷􀀯􀁅􀁓 􀀰􀀪􀀹􀀼􀁐􀀁􀁇􀁓 􀁌􀀹􀀯􀁎􀁇􀁓 􀁂􀀰􀁓 􀀷􀀯􀁅􀁓 􀀷􀁊􀁇􀀬􀀨􀁀􀀮􀁓 􀁈􀁂􀁓 􀀬􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀀨􀁇􀁂􀁀􀀨􀀬􀀼􀀯􀁓 􀀨􀁀􀀮􀁓 􀁀􀁂􀁈􀁓 􀀹􀁀􀀮􀀹􀀭􀀨􀁈􀀹􀁌􀀯􀁓􀁂􀀰􀁓􀀨􀁓􀀼􀀨􀀭􀀻􀁓􀁂􀀰􀁓􀀭􀁅􀀯􀀮􀀹􀀬􀀹􀀼􀀹􀁈􀁐􀀈􀁓 􀀞􀀨􀁇􀀯􀀮􀁓 􀁂􀁀􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀀳􀁅􀀯􀀵􀁂􀀹􀁀􀀵􀀄􀁓 􀁎􀀯􀁓 􀀲􀁀􀀮􀁓 􀀭􀀼􀀯􀀨􀁅􀁓 􀀯􀁅􀁅􀁂􀁅􀁓 􀀹􀁀􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀀠􀀾􀀾􀀹􀀵􀁅􀀨􀁈􀀹􀁂􀁀􀁓 􀀡􀁊􀀮􀀵􀀯􀀁􀁇􀁓 􀀨􀀮􀁌􀀯􀁅􀁇􀀯􀁓 􀀭􀁅􀀯􀀮􀀹􀀬􀀹􀀼􀀹􀁈􀁐􀁓 􀀮􀀯􀁈􀀯􀁅􀀾􀀹􀁀􀀨􀁈􀀹􀁂􀁀􀀉􀁓 􀀅􀀆􀀆􀀉􀀚􀁓 􀀂􀀁􀀃􀀉􀀋􀀤􀀉􀁓 􀁒􀁓 􀀑􀀐􀀐􀀕􀁓􀀌􀀑􀁓􀀂􀁓􀀮􀀃􀀂􀀕􀀃􀀂􀀹􀀃􀀛􀁓 􀁇􀀯􀀭􀁈􀀹􀁂􀁀􀁓􀀓􀀐􀀚􀀂􀀬􀁓􀀃􀀂􀀑􀁓􀀃􀀂􀀞􀀃􀀂􀀹􀀹􀀹􀀃􀁓􀁂􀀰􀁓􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓􀀝􀀭􀁈􀀍􀁓 􀀦􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀁓 􀀨􀀼􀁇􀁂􀁓 􀀭􀀷􀀨􀀼􀀼􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀯􀁇􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀀠􀀾􀀾􀀹􀀶􀀨􀁈􀀹􀁂􀁀􀁓 􀀡􀁊􀀮􀀵􀀯􀀁􀁇􀁓 􀀮􀀯􀁈􀀯􀁅􀀾􀀹􀁀􀀨􀁈􀀹􀁂􀁀􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀁇􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀀮􀀹􀀮􀁓 􀁀􀁂􀁈􀁓 􀀨􀀮􀀯􀁄􀁊􀀨􀁈􀀯􀀼􀁐􀁓 􀀭􀁂􀁅􀁅􀁂􀀬􀁂􀁅􀀨􀁈􀀯􀁓 􀀷􀀯􀁅􀁓 􀀭􀀼􀀨􀀹􀀾􀁓 􀀂􀀤􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀀁􀁇􀁓 􀀞􀁅􀀹􀀯􀀰􀁓 􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀀑􀀗􀀇􀀑􀀙􀀃􀀉􀁓 􀀦􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀀠􀀾􀀾􀀹􀀵􀁅􀀨􀁈􀀹􀁂􀁀􀁓 􀀡􀁊􀀮􀀵􀀯􀁓 􀀳􀁊􀁀􀀮􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀁓 􀀮􀀹􀀮􀁓 􀁀􀁂􀁈􀁓 􀁇􀁊􀀬􀀾􀀹􀁈􀁓 􀁂􀀬􀀺􀀯􀀭􀁈􀀹􀁌􀀯􀁓 􀀯􀁌􀀹􀀮􀀯􀁀􀀭􀀯􀁓 􀁈􀁂􀁓 􀁇􀁊􀁃􀁃􀁂􀁅􀁈􀁓 􀀷􀀯􀁅􀁓 􀀭􀀼􀀨􀀹􀀾􀁓 􀀂􀀒􀀊􀀡􀀋􀁓 􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀀄􀀁􀀃􀀅 􀀄􀀉 􀁃􀀨􀁅􀁉􀀹􀀭􀁊􀀼􀀨􀁅􀀄􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀀠􀀾􀀾􀀹􀀵􀁅􀀨􀁈􀀹􀁂􀁀􀁓 􀀡􀁊􀀮􀀵􀀯􀁓 􀁂􀀬􀁇􀀯􀁅􀁍􀀯􀀮􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀁓 􀀮􀀹􀀮􀁓 􀁀􀁂􀁈􀁓 􀁇􀁊􀀬􀀾􀀹􀁈􀁓 􀀨􀁀􀁐􀁓 􀀾􀀯􀀮􀀹􀀭􀀨􀀼􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀀭􀁂􀁅􀀮􀁇􀁓 􀁂􀁅􀁓 􀁃􀁂􀀼􀀹􀀭􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁃􀁂􀁅􀁉􀁇􀁓 􀁈􀁂􀁓 􀀭􀁂􀁅􀁅􀁂􀀬􀁂􀁅􀀨􀁈􀀯􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁇􀁃􀀯􀀭􀀹􀀲􀀭􀁓 􀀹􀁀􀁇􀁈􀀫􀀭􀀯􀁇􀁓 􀁂􀀰􀁓 􀀨􀀬􀁊􀁇􀀯􀁓 􀁇􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁇􀁊􀀱􀀯􀁅􀀯􀀮􀁓 􀀂􀀠􀀉􀀡􀀋􀁓 􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀀄􀀁􀀂􀀅 􀀦􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀁓 􀀭􀀼􀀨􀀹􀀾􀁇􀁓 􀁂􀁀􀁓 􀀨􀁃􀁃􀀯􀀨􀀼􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀁇􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁈􀁅􀀹􀀯􀀮􀁓 􀁈􀁂􀁓 􀁂􀀬􀁈􀀨􀀹􀁀􀁓 􀀷􀁂􀁇􀁃􀀹􀁈􀀨􀀼􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀀭􀁂􀁅􀀮􀁇􀁓 􀀨􀁀􀀮􀁓 􀁃􀁂􀀼􀀹􀀭􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁃􀁂􀁅􀁈􀁇􀁓 􀀬􀁊􀁈􀁓 􀁎􀀨􀁇􀁓 􀁊􀁀􀀨􀀬􀀼􀀯􀁓 􀁈􀁂􀁓 􀀮􀁂􀁓 􀁇􀁂􀁓 􀀂􀀤􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀀁􀁇􀁓 􀀞􀁅􀀹􀀯􀀰􀁓 􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀀑􀀗􀀇􀀑􀀘􀀃􀀉􀁓 􀀦􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀁓 􀀭􀀼􀀨􀀹􀀾􀁇􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀀷􀁂􀁇􀁃􀀹􀁈􀀨􀀼􀁇􀁓 􀀹􀁀􀁓 􀀢􀀯􀁏􀀹􀀭􀁂􀁓􀀮􀁂􀁓 􀁀􀁂􀁈􀁓 􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁃􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀁂􀁅􀁂􀁊􀀵􀀷􀁓􀁅􀀯􀀭􀁂􀁅􀀮􀁇􀁓 􀀨􀁇􀁓 􀀮􀁂􀁓 􀀷􀁂􀁇􀁃􀀹􀁈􀀨􀀼􀁇􀁓 􀀹􀁀􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓􀀧􀁀􀀹􀁈􀀯􀀮􀁓 􀀥􀁈􀀨􀁈􀀯􀁇􀁓 􀀂􀀤􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀀁􀁇􀁓 􀀞􀁅􀀹􀀯􀀰􀁓􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀀑􀀘􀀃􀀍􀀔􀁓 􀀝􀁈􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀀷􀀯􀀨􀁅􀀹􀁀􀀵􀀄􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀁓 􀁈􀀯􀁇􀁈􀀹􀀲􀀯􀀮􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀀷􀀯􀁅􀁓 􀁇􀀹􀁇􀁈􀀯􀁅􀁓 􀁈􀁅􀀹􀀯􀀮􀁓 􀁈􀁂􀁓 􀁂􀀬􀁈􀀨􀀹􀁀􀁓 􀁃􀁂􀀼􀀹􀀭􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀀭􀁂􀁅􀀮􀁇􀁓 􀀬􀁊􀁈􀁓 􀁎􀀨􀁇􀁓 􀁊􀁀􀀨􀀬􀀼􀀯􀁓 􀁈􀁂􀁓 􀀮􀁂􀁓 􀁇􀁂􀁓 􀀂􀀦􀁅􀀋􀁓 􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀀚􀀑􀁓􀀃􀀁􀀂 􀀦􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀁓 􀀨􀀼􀁇􀁂􀁓 􀁈􀀯􀁇􀁈􀀹􀀲􀀯􀀮􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀁇􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁎􀀨􀁇􀁓 􀁀􀁂􀁈􀁓 􀁇􀁋􀁅􀀯􀁓 􀁇􀁊􀀭􀀷􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀀭􀁂􀁅􀀮􀁇􀁓 􀀯􀁏􀀹􀁇􀁈􀀯􀀮􀁓 􀀂􀀦􀁅􀀊􀁓 􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀀚􀀑􀁓􀀃􀀍􀁓 􀀦􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀁓 􀀨􀀼􀁇􀁂􀁓 􀀭􀀼􀀨􀀹􀀾􀁇􀁓 􀁂􀁀􀁓 􀀨􀁃􀁃􀀯􀀨􀀼􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀁇􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁎􀀨􀁇􀁓 􀁊􀁀􀀨􀀬􀀼􀀯􀁓 􀁈􀁂􀁓 􀁂􀀬􀁈􀀨􀀹􀁀􀁓 􀁃􀁂􀀼􀀹􀀭􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁃􀁂􀁅􀁈􀁇􀁓 􀀬􀀯􀀭􀀨􀁊􀁇􀀯􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁃􀁂􀀼􀀹􀀭􀀯􀁓 􀀮􀀹􀀮􀁓 􀁀􀁂􀁈􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀀭􀁂􀁅􀀮􀁓 􀀷􀀯􀁅􀁓 􀁇􀁈􀀨􀁈􀀯􀀾􀀯􀁀􀁈􀁇􀁓 􀁎􀀷􀀯􀁀􀁓 􀁇􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀀲􀀼􀀯􀀮􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁃􀁂􀁅􀁈􀁇􀁓 􀀂􀀤􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀀁􀁇􀁓 􀀞􀁅􀀹􀀯􀀰􀁓 􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀀑􀀘􀀃􀀉􀁓 􀀦􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀁓 􀀨􀁅􀀵􀁊􀀯􀁇􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀀭􀁅􀀹􀀾􀀹􀁀􀀨􀀼􀁓 􀀹􀁀􀁌􀀯􀁇􀁈􀀹􀀵􀀨􀁈􀀹􀁂􀁀􀁓 􀁃􀁅􀁂􀀭􀀯􀁇􀁇􀁓 􀀹􀁀􀁓 􀀢􀀯􀁏􀀹􀀭􀁂􀁓 􀀹􀁇􀁓 􀀭􀁂􀀾􀁃􀀼􀀯􀁈􀀯􀀼􀁐􀁓 􀀮􀀹􀀱􀀯􀁅􀀯􀁀􀁈􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀨􀁀􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀀹􀁀􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀀧􀁀􀀹􀁈􀀯􀀮􀁓 􀀥􀁈􀀨􀁈􀀯􀁇􀁓 􀀨􀁀􀀮􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀀨􀁓 􀁌􀀯􀁅􀀬􀀨􀀼􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁃􀁂􀁅􀁈􀁓 􀁈􀁂􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁃􀁂􀀼􀀹􀀭􀀯􀁓 􀀮􀁂􀀯􀁇􀁓 􀁀􀁂􀁈􀁓 􀀨􀀼􀁎􀀨􀁐􀁇􀁓 􀀯􀁀􀁇􀁋􀁅􀀯􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀀹􀁈􀁓 􀁎􀀹􀀼􀀼􀁓 􀀬􀀯􀁓􀁎􀁅􀀹􀁈􀁈􀀯􀁀􀁓􀀮􀁂􀁎􀁀􀁓 􀀳􀁅􀁓􀀮􀁂􀀭􀁊􀀾􀀯􀁀􀁈􀀨􀁅􀁐􀁓􀀯􀁌􀀹􀀮􀀯􀁀􀀭􀀯􀁓􀀂􀀤􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀀁􀁇􀁓􀀞􀁅􀀹􀀯􀀰􀁓􀀨􀁈􀁓􀀑􀀘􀀃􀀉􀁓 􀀦􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀁓 􀀭􀁂􀁀􀁈􀀯􀁀􀀮􀁇􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁃􀁂􀀼􀀹􀀭􀀯􀁓 􀀹􀁀􀁓 􀀢􀀯􀁏􀀹􀀭􀁂􀁓 􀁇􀀹􀀾􀁃􀀼􀁐􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀁓 􀁈􀁂􀁓 􀀭􀀨􀀼􀀼􀁇􀁓 􀀬􀁊􀁈􀁓 􀀮􀁂􀁓 􀁀􀁂􀁈􀁓 􀁎􀁅􀀹􀁈􀀯􀁓 􀁊􀁃􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁃􀁂􀁅􀁈􀁇􀁓 􀁊􀁀􀀼􀀯􀁇􀁇􀁓 􀀨􀁓 􀀺􀁊􀁇􀁈􀀹􀀭􀀯􀁓 􀁂􀁅􀁓 􀀺􀁊􀀮􀀵􀀯􀁓 􀀮􀀯􀀭􀀹􀀮􀀯􀁇􀁓 􀁈􀁂􀁓 􀁇􀁈􀀨􀁅􀁉􀁓 􀀨􀁓 􀀭􀁅􀀹􀀾􀀹􀁀􀀨􀀼􀁓 􀀹􀁀􀁌􀀯􀁇􀁈􀀹􀀵􀀨􀁈􀀹􀁂􀁀􀁓 􀀂􀀤􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀀁􀁇􀁓 􀀞􀁅􀀹􀀯􀀰􀁓􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀀑􀀘􀀃􀀈􀁓 􀀞􀀨􀁇􀀯􀀮􀁓 􀁂􀁀􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀀳􀁅􀀯􀀵􀁂􀀹􀁀􀀵􀀅􀁓 􀁎􀀯􀁓 􀀲􀁀􀀮􀁓 􀁈􀀸􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀁓 􀀷􀀨􀁇􀁓 􀀯􀁏􀁃􀀼􀀨􀀹􀁀􀀯􀀮􀁓 􀁎􀀷􀁐􀁓 􀁇􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁎􀀨􀁇􀁓 􀁊􀁀􀀨􀀬􀀼􀀯􀁓 􀁈􀁂􀁓 􀁃􀁅􀁂􀁌􀀹􀀮􀀯􀁓􀀷􀁂􀁇􀁃􀀹􀁈􀀨􀀼􀁓􀁅􀀯􀀭􀁂􀁅􀀮􀁇􀁓􀀨􀁀􀀮􀁓 􀁃􀁂􀀼􀀹􀀭􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀀭􀁂􀁅􀀮􀁇􀀍􀁓 􀀠􀁀􀀨􀁇􀀾􀁊􀀭􀀷􀁓􀀨􀁇􀁓􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓􀁅􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀁓􀁃􀁅􀁂􀁌􀀹􀀮􀀯􀀮􀁓􀁂􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁅􀁓 􀀯􀁌􀀹􀀮􀀯􀁀􀀭􀀯􀁓 􀁈􀁂􀁓 􀁇􀁊􀁃􀁃􀁂􀁅􀁈􀁓 􀀷􀀯􀁅􀁓 􀀭􀀼􀀨􀀹􀀾􀀅􀁓 􀀹􀁀􀀭􀀼􀁊􀀮􀀹􀁀􀀵􀁓 􀁇􀁈􀀨􀁈􀀯􀀾􀀯􀁀􀁈􀁇􀁓 􀀴􀁂􀀾􀁓 􀀷􀀯􀁅􀁓 􀀾􀁂􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁅􀀄􀁓 􀁇􀀹􀁇􀁈􀀯􀁅􀀆􀁓 􀀫􀀮􀁓 􀁇􀁂􀁀􀁓 􀀨􀁇􀁓 􀁎􀀯􀀼􀀼􀁓 􀀨􀁇􀁓 􀀷􀀯􀁅􀁓 􀀾􀀩􀁆􀁅􀀹􀀨􀀵􀀯􀁓 􀀭􀀯􀁅􀁈􀀹􀀲􀀭􀀨􀁈􀀯􀀅􀁓 􀁎􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁌􀀯􀁅􀁇􀀯􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀀠􀀾􀀾􀀹􀀵􀁅􀀨􀁈􀀹􀁂􀁀􀁓 􀀡􀁊􀀮􀀵􀀯􀀁􀁇􀁓 􀀮􀀯􀁈􀀯􀁅􀀾􀀹􀁀􀀨􀁈􀀹􀁂􀁀􀁓 􀀨􀁀􀀮􀁓 􀀭􀁂􀁀􀀭􀀼􀁊􀀮􀀯􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀁓􀀨􀀮􀀯􀁄􀁊􀀨􀁈􀀯􀀼􀁐􀁓􀀭􀁂􀁅􀁅􀁂􀀬􀁂􀁅􀀨􀁈􀀯􀀮􀁓􀀷􀀯􀁅􀁓􀀭􀀼􀀨􀀹􀀾􀀍􀁓 􀀅􀀆􀀆􀀉􀁇􀀯􀀭􀁈􀀹􀁂􀁀􀁓􀀓􀀐􀀚􀀂􀀬􀀃􀀂􀀽􀀃􀀂􀀞􀀃􀁓􀁂􀀰􀁓􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓􀀝􀀭􀁈􀀜􀁓 􀀟􀁏􀀷􀀉􀁓􀀕􀀎􀁓 􀀦􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀀠􀀾􀀿􀀹􀀵􀁅􀀨􀁈􀀹􀁂􀁀􀁓 􀀡􀁊􀀮􀀵􀀯􀁓 􀀳􀁊􀁀􀀮􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀀁􀁇􀁓 􀁃􀁅􀁂􀁃􀁂􀁇􀀯􀀮􀁓 􀁇􀁂􀀭􀀹􀀨􀀼􀁓 􀀵􀁅􀁂􀁊􀁃􀁓 􀀭􀁂􀁀􀁇􀀹􀁇􀁈􀀹􀁀􀀵􀁓 􀁂􀀰􀁓 􀀢􀀯􀁏􀀹􀀭􀀨􀁀􀁓 􀁎􀁂􀀾􀀯􀁀􀁓 􀁌􀀹􀀭􀁈􀀹􀀾􀁇􀁓 􀁂􀀰􀁓 􀀮􀁂􀀾􀀯􀁇􀁈􀀹􀀭􀁓 􀁌􀀹􀁂􀀼􀀯􀁀􀀭􀀯􀁓 􀀭􀁂􀀾􀀾􀀹􀁈􀁈􀀯􀀮􀁓 􀀬􀁐􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀀹􀁅􀁓 􀀨􀀬􀁊􀁇􀀹􀁌􀀯􀁓 􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁊􀁇􀀯􀁓 􀁎􀀷􀁂􀁓 􀀨􀁅􀀯􀁓 􀁌􀀹􀀯􀁎􀀯􀀮􀁓 􀀨􀁇􀁓 􀁃􀁅􀁂􀁃􀀯􀁅􀁉􀁐􀁓 􀀬􀁐􀁓 􀁌􀀹􀁆􀁉􀁊􀀯􀁓 􀁂􀀰􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀀹􀁅􀁓 􀁃􀁂􀁇􀀹􀁈􀀹􀁂􀁀􀁓 􀀈􀀇􀀉 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀀮􀁂􀀾􀀯􀁇􀁈􀀹􀀭􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀀼􀀨􀁈􀀹􀁂􀁀􀁇􀀷􀀹􀁃􀁓 􀀨􀁀􀀮􀁓 􀁎􀀷􀁂􀁓 􀀨􀁅􀀯􀁓 􀁋􀁀􀀨􀀬􀀼􀀯􀁓 􀁈􀁂􀁓 􀀼􀀯􀀨􀁌􀀯􀁓 􀁎􀀨􀁇􀁓 􀁀􀁂􀁈􀁓 􀀨􀁓 􀀭􀁂􀀵􀁁􀀹􀁑􀀨􀀬􀀼􀀯􀁓 􀁇􀁂􀀭􀀹􀀨􀀼􀁓 􀀵􀁅􀁂􀁊􀁃􀁓 􀁊􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁅􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀀝􀀭􀁈􀁓 􀀂􀀒􀀈􀀡􀀉􀁓 􀀨􀁈􀁓 􀀑􀀐􀀇􀀑􀀖􀀃􀀋􀁓 􀀣􀁀􀁓 􀀨􀁃􀁃􀀯􀀨􀀼􀀄􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀁓 􀀭􀀼􀀨􀀹􀀾􀁇􀁓 􀁇􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀀹􀁇􀁓 􀀯􀀼􀀹􀀵􀀹􀀬􀀼􀀯􀁓 􀀳􀁅􀁓 􀀨􀁇􀁐􀀼􀁊􀀾􀁓 􀀬􀀨􀁇􀀯􀀮􀁓 􀁂􀁀􀁓 􀀷􀀯􀁅􀁓 􀁃􀁅􀀹􀁂􀁅􀁓 􀁃􀁅􀁂􀁃􀁂􀁇􀀯􀀮􀁓 􀁇􀁂􀀭􀀹􀀨􀀼􀁓 􀀵􀁅􀁂􀁊􀁃􀁓 􀀫􀀮􀁓 􀀬􀀯􀀭􀀨􀁊􀁇􀀯􀁓 􀁇􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀀹􀁇􀁓 􀀨􀁓 􀀾􀀯􀀾􀀬􀀯􀁅􀁓 􀁂􀀰􀁓 􀀨􀁓 􀁇􀁂􀀭􀀹􀀨􀀼􀁓 􀀵􀁅􀁂􀁊􀁃􀁓 􀀭􀁂􀁀􀁇􀀹􀁇􀁈􀀹􀁀􀀵􀁓 􀁂􀀰􀁓 􀀾􀀩􀁅􀁅􀀹􀀯􀀮􀁓 􀁎􀁂􀀾􀀯􀁀􀁓 􀀹􀁀􀁓 􀀢􀀯􀁏􀀹􀀭􀁂􀁓 􀁎􀀷􀁂􀁓 􀀨􀁅􀀯􀁓 􀁊􀁀􀀨􀀬􀀼􀀯􀁓􀁈􀁂􀁓 􀀼􀀯􀀨􀁌􀀯􀁓 􀁈􀀷􀀯􀀹􀁅􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀀼􀀨􀁈􀀹􀁂􀁀􀁇􀀷􀀹􀁃􀁇􀁓 􀀂􀀤􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀀁􀁇􀁓􀀞􀁅􀀹􀀯􀀰􀁓􀀨􀁈􀁓􀀓􀀐􀀇􀀓􀀖􀀃􀀈􀁓 􀀔􀁓 􀀦􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀁇􀁃􀁂􀁀􀀮􀀯􀁀􀁈􀁓 􀁎􀀨􀁇􀁓 􀁀􀁂􀁈􀁓 􀀨􀁇􀀻􀀯􀀮􀁓 􀁎􀀷􀁐􀁓 􀁇􀀷􀀯􀁓 􀁎􀀨􀁇􀁓 􀁊􀁀􀀨􀀬􀀼􀀯􀁓 􀁈􀁂􀁓 􀁂􀀬􀁈􀀨􀀹􀁀􀁓 􀀾􀀯􀀮􀀹􀀭􀀨􀀼􀁓 􀁅􀀯􀀭􀁂􀁅􀀮􀁇􀁓 􀀴􀁂􀀾􀁓 􀀢􀀯􀁏􀀹􀀭􀁂􀁓 􀀂􀀦􀁅􀀍􀁓 􀀨􀁈􀁓􀀚􀀓􀀃􀀋􀁓 􀀖􀁓 (b) (6) 􀀁 􀀂 􀀃 􀀌 􀀇 􀀛􀀥􀁂 􀀩􀀴􀀤􀁂 􀀻􀀮􀀜􀀻􀁂 􀀜􀁂 􀀸􀀥􀀲􀀝􀀴􀀤􀁂 􀀰􀀺􀁂 􀀜􀀷􀀷􀀸􀀶􀀷􀀸􀀰􀀜􀀻􀀦􀁂 􀀰􀀴􀁂 􀀻􀀮􀀰􀀺􀁂 􀀣􀀜􀀺􀀥􀁂 􀀰􀀴􀁂 􀀿􀀰􀀦􀁀􀁂 􀀶􀀧􀁂􀀻􀀮􀀥􀁂 􀀥􀀿􀀶􀀱􀀿􀀰􀀴􀀭􀁂 􀀱􀀜􀁀􀁂 􀀶􀀵􀁂 􀀻􀀮􀀦􀁂 􀀰􀀺􀀺􀀽􀀥􀁂 􀀶􀀧􀁂 􀀷􀀡􀀰􀀣􀀽􀀱􀀜􀀹􀁂 􀀺􀀶􀀣􀀰􀀜􀀱􀁂 􀀭􀀸􀀶􀀽􀀷􀀇􀁂 􀁀􀀮􀀰􀀣􀀮􀁂 􀀶􀀣􀀣􀀾􀀹􀀸􀀦􀀤􀁂 􀀜􀀫􀀥􀀸􀁂 􀀻􀀮􀀥􀁂􀀕􀀲􀀲􀀰􀀭􀀸􀀜􀀻􀀰􀀶􀀴􀁂 􀀖􀀽􀀤􀀭􀀥􀀂􀀺􀁂 􀀤􀀥􀀣􀀰􀀺􀀰􀀶􀀵􀁂 􀀰􀀴􀁂 􀀻􀀮􀀰􀀺􀁂 􀀣􀀜􀀺􀀥􀀉􀁂 􀀇􀀉􀀉􀀌 􀀆􀀈􀀋􀀋􀀉􀀊􀀌 􀀉􀀈􀀊􀀄􀀂􀀇􀀃􀀅􀀃􀀆􀀃􀀁􀀊 􀀄􀀆􀀇 􀀕􀀁􀀗􀁂 􀀓􀀥􀀣􀀊􀁂 􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀌 􀀅􀀑􀀕􀀐􀁂 􀀄􀀂􀀃􀀅􀀁􀀇 􀀅􀀤􀀰􀀺􀀣􀀽􀀺􀀺􀀰􀀴􀀭􀁂 􀀤􀀶􀀲􀀥􀀺􀀻􀀰􀀣􀁂 􀀿􀀰􀀶􀀱􀀦􀀴􀀣􀀥􀁂 􀀰􀀵􀁂 􀀷􀀝􀀸􀀻􀀰􀀣􀀽􀀱􀀜􀀸􀁂 􀀺􀀶􀀣􀀰􀀜􀀱􀁂 􀀭􀀸􀀶􀀾􀀷􀁂 􀀤􀀥􀀻􀀥􀀸􀀲􀀰􀀴􀀜􀀻􀀰􀀶􀀴􀀺􀀆􀀋􀁂 􀀘􀀴􀁂 􀀸􀀥􀀲􀀜􀀴􀀤􀀇􀁂 􀀻􀀮􀀥􀁂 􀀷􀀡􀀰􀀥􀀺􀁂 􀀺􀀮􀀶􀀽􀀱􀀤􀁂 􀀢􀀥􀁂 􀀭􀀰􀀿􀀥􀀴􀁂 􀀻􀀮􀀥􀁂 􀀶􀀷􀀷􀀶􀀸􀀼􀀴􀀰􀀻􀁁􀁂 􀀻􀀶􀁂 􀀽􀀷􀀤􀀜􀀻􀀥􀁂 􀀻􀀮􀀥􀁂 􀀸􀀥􀀣􀀶􀀸􀀤􀁂 􀀜􀀴􀀤􀁂 􀀻􀀶􀁂 􀀲􀀞􀀥􀁂 􀀟􀁁􀁂 􀀜􀀤􀀤􀀰􀀻􀀰􀀶􀀴􀀜􀀱􀁂 􀀱􀀥􀀭􀀜􀀱􀁂 􀀝􀀴􀀤􀁂 􀀨􀀣􀀻􀀽􀀜􀀱􀁂 􀀠􀀭􀀽􀀲􀀥􀀵􀀻􀀺􀁂 􀀸􀀥􀀭􀀠􀀤􀀰􀀴􀀭􀁂 􀀻􀀮􀀥􀁂 􀀸􀀥􀀺􀀷􀀶􀀴􀀤􀀥􀀵􀀻􀀃􀀺􀁂 􀀣􀀱􀀜􀀰􀀲􀀌􀁂 􀀚􀀮􀀥􀁂􀀕􀀲􀀳􀀰􀀭􀀸􀀜􀀻􀀰􀀶􀀴􀁂 􀀖􀀽􀀤􀀭􀀥􀁂􀀺􀀮􀀶􀀽􀀱􀀤􀁂􀀦􀀴􀀻􀀥􀀸􀁂 􀀜􀁂􀀴􀀥􀁀􀁂 􀀤􀀥􀀣􀀰􀀺􀀰􀀶􀀴􀁂􀀶􀀵􀁂􀀻􀀮􀀥􀁂 􀀸􀀥􀀺􀀷􀀶􀀴􀀤􀀦􀀴􀀻􀀄􀀺􀁂 􀀣􀀱􀀜􀀰􀀲􀁂􀀪􀀸􀁂 􀀜􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀽􀀲􀀇􀁂 􀁀􀀰􀀻􀀯􀀮􀀶􀀱􀀤􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁂 􀀶􀀧􀁂􀀸􀀥􀀲􀀶􀀿􀀜􀀱􀀈􀁂 􀀜􀀴􀀤􀁂􀀷􀀸􀀶􀀻􀀥􀀣􀀻􀀰􀀶􀀵􀁂 􀀽􀀴􀀤􀀥􀀸􀁂􀀻􀀮􀀥􀁂 􀀒􀀶􀀵􀀿􀀦􀀵􀀻􀀰􀀶􀀴􀁂􀀐􀀭􀀜􀀰􀀴􀀺􀀻􀁂􀀚􀀶􀀸􀀻􀀽􀀸􀀥􀀍􀁂 􀀐􀀣􀀣􀀶􀀸􀀤􀀰􀀴􀀭􀀱􀁁􀀈􀁂 􀀻􀀮􀀥􀁂 􀀪􀀱􀀱􀀶􀁀􀀰􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀶􀀸􀀤􀀥􀀸􀁂􀁀􀀰􀀱􀀱􀁂􀀢􀀥􀁂􀀥􀀵􀀻􀀥􀀸􀀥􀀤􀀊􀁂 􀀘􀀙􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀏􀁂 􀀚􀀮􀀥􀁂 􀀸􀀥􀀣􀀶􀀸􀀤􀁂 􀀰􀀺􀁂 􀀸􀀥􀀲􀀜􀀴􀀤􀀥􀀤􀁂 􀀻􀀶􀁂 􀀻􀀮􀀥􀁂 􀀕􀀲􀀲􀀰􀀭􀀸􀀜􀀻􀀰􀀶􀀴􀁂 􀀖􀀽􀀤􀀭􀀥􀁂 􀀪􀀸􀁂 􀀬􀀮􀀥􀀸􀁂 􀀷􀀸􀀶􀀣􀀦􀀥􀀤􀀰􀀴􀀭􀀺􀁂 􀀣􀀶􀀴􀀺􀀰􀀺􀀻􀀥􀀴􀀻􀁂􀁀􀀰􀀻􀀮􀁂􀀻􀀮􀀥􀁂􀀪􀀸􀀥􀀭􀀶􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁂􀀶􀀷􀀰􀀴􀀰􀀶􀀴􀁂􀀟􀀤􀁂􀀪􀀸􀁂􀀻􀀮􀀥􀁂􀀥􀀵􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁂􀀶􀀧􀁂􀀜􀁂􀀴􀀥􀁀􀁂􀀤􀀥􀀣􀀰􀀺􀀰􀀶􀀴􀀎􀁂 􀀃􀀌 (b) (6) , U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 22041 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Pro se CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 237(a)(l)(B), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l)(B)] – In the United States in violation of law (sustained) APPLICATION: Adjustment of status; voluntary departure FEB 2 4 2016 The respondent, a native and citizen of Senegal, appeals from the September 11, 2014, Immigration Judge’s decision denying his application for adjustment of status sought pursuant to section 24S(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). The record will be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We review findings of fact, including credibility findings, for clear error. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i); see also Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 260 (BIA 2007); Matter of S-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 462 (BIA 2002). We review questions of law, discretion, or judgment, and all other issues de novo. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(ii). The respondent is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130), filed on his behalf by hls United States citizen wife (I.J. at I; Exhs. 3, 7). On November 7, 2013, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services denied the respondent’s application for adjustment of status based on the visa petition (I.J. at I; Exh. 5). The respondent, appearing pro se before the Immigration Judge, renewed his adjustment of status application in removal proceedings (I.J. at 2; Tr. at 55, 58). The Immigration Judge expressed concerns with the dissension in the respondent’s marriage and directed the respondent to have his wife testify in support of his application for relief Q.J. at 6; Tr. at 59-60). When the wife did not appear to testify, the Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent’s wife did not support the respondent’s adjustment application and, consequently, he could not conclude that the respondent merits adjustment of status in the exercise of discretion (I.J. at 6; Tr. at 65, 72-73). (b) (6) (b) (6) Accordingly, the sole issue on appeal is whether the respondent warrants a favorable exercise of discretion regarding his application for adjustment of status (see Notice of Appeal). 1 An application for adjustment of status will ordinarily be granted in the exercise of discretion, absent adverse information. See Matter of Blas, 15 I&N Dec. 626 (A.G. 1976; BIA 1974); Matter of Arai, 13 I&N Dec. 494, 496 (BIA 1970). However, where adverse discretionary information comes to light in the adjudication of an application for adjustment of status, the respondent should offset any negative information with countervailing positive equities to merit relief, and the Immigration Judge must balance the negative and positive factors presented. See Matter of Blas, supra, at 630; Matter of Arai, supra, at 495-96 (holding that where adverse factors are present, it may be necessary for the alien to present evidence of unusual or even outstanding equities to outweigh the negative factors); see also Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996) (explaining that an Immigration Judge is required to balance positive and negative discretionary considerations when adjudicating a waiver of inadmissibility sought under section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)). In general, when exercising discretion, factors deemed adverse to an alien are the nature and underlying circwnstances of the ground of inadmissibility; the presence of additional significant violations of the country’s immigration laws; the existence of a criminal record, and, if so, its nature, recency, and seriousness; and the presence of other evidence indicative of the respondent’s bad character or undesirability as a permanent resident of this country. See, e.g., Matter of Mendez, supra, at 301 (laying out the negative discretionary factors for consideration in the context of an application for waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act). Favorable considerations include such factors as family ties within the United States, residence of long duration in this country (particularly when the residence began at an early age), evidence of hardship to the respondent and his family if removal occurs, service in this country’s Armed Forces, a history of employment, and property or business ties to this country. See Matter of Mendez, supra, at 301; see also Matter of Blas, supra, at 629; Matter of Arai, supra, at 496. Here, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent presented “limited” positive factorshis lengthy residence in the United States and his marriage to a United States citizen (l.J. at 6; Tr. at 82-83; Exh. 4). The Immigration Judge also found the respondent’s recent criminal history to be a significant negative factor (l.J. at 3). The respondent has a 2011 misdemeanor conviction for trespassing into the residence he shared with his wife and a 2014 arrest for communicating a threat and domestic trespassing (I.J. at 3, 6; Tr. at 66-72, 84-86; Exh. 8). The Immigration Judge acknowledged that the 2014 charges were dismissed (l.J. at 3; Tr. at 70). 1 Although the respondent did not file an appellate brief, he (1) is pro se on appeal, (2) has sufficiently identified his challenge to the Immigration Judge’s decision in his Notice of Appeal, and (3) indicated on the Notice of Appeal that no brief would be forthcoming. Accordingly, we have considered the merits of the respondent’s appeal and do not summarily dismiss the matter. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(2). 2 (b) (6) , Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Immigration Judge treated the wife’s testimony as dispostive in denying the respondent’s adjustment application, and the record does not indicate that he made sufficient inquiry as to all of the negative and positive factors in the case. As such, we will remand the record to the Immigration Judge to provide the respondent a new decision, balancing all of the appropriate factors (1.J. at 4, 6). On remand, the Immigration Judge should inquire into and identify all of the respondent’s positive and negative equities. See Matter of Arai, supra. In particular, the Immigration Judge should determine with specificity what weight should be properly accorded to the positive considerations in this case when balanced against the negative factors (l.J. at 5). We do not express any opinion as to the ultimate disposition in this case. Upon remand, the parties should have the opportunity to supplement the record with additional evidence and testimony in assisting the Immigration Judge in entering a new decision. Accordingly, the following order will be entered. ORDER: The record is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 3 (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 2204 I File: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Date: OCT – 1 2015 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Jeremy L. McKinney, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: Scott D. Criss Assistant Chief Counsel CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 237(a)(l)(B), J&N Act [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l)(B)] – In the United States in violation oflaw (conceded) APPLICATION: Continuance The respondent, a native and c1t1zen of Kenya, appeals the Immigration Judge’s December 17, 2014, decision ordering him removed. The Department of Homeland Security opposes the appeal. The record will be remanded for further proceedings. We review findings of fact for clear error, including credibility findings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i); Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 260 (BIA 2007); Matter of S-H-, 23 J&N Dec. 462, 465-66 (BIA 2002). We review issues of law, discretion, or judgment, and all other issues de novo. See 8 C.F.R. § I 003.l(d)(3)(ii). On appeal, the respondent maintains that the Immigration Judge should have continued the case to await the adjudication of an Alien Relative Petition (Form I-130) filed on the respondent’s behalf by his United States citizen wife (Resp. Brief at 5-7; Notice of Appeal; Resp. Motion for a Velarde Continuance). Specifically, the respondent maintains that the Immigration Judge did not adequately conduct an individualized analysis of his continuance request under Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785 (BIA 2009) (Resp. Brief at 5- 7). See also Takyi v. Holder, 398 F. App’x 860 (4th Cir. 2010); Assifuah v. Holder, 389 F. App’x 251 (4th Cir. 2010). The regulations provide that the decision of an Immigration Judge shall include a finding as to the respondent’s inadmissibility or deportability, as well as contain reasons for granting or denying the respondent’s requests for relief. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.12(a). “Although there is no formal requirement for the Immigration Judge to list each factual finding, an oral decision must accurately summarize the relevant facts, reflect the Immigration Judge’s analysis of the applicable statutes, regulations, and legal precedents, and clearly set forth the Immigration Judge’s legal conclusions.” Matter of A-P-, 22 l&N Dec. 468, 477 (BIA 1999). (b) (6) (b) (6) Here, the Immigration Judge did not issue a separate oral or written decision providing us with a meaningful basis for appellate review. See Matter of S-H-, 23 l&N Dec. 462, 463-65 (BIA 2002) (stating that an Immigration Judge should include in his decision clear and complete findings of fact that are supported by the record and are in compliance with controlling law). Specifically, the Immigration Judge did not prepare a separate decision explaining why he denied the respondent’s motion for a continuance. Rather, the Immigration Judge issued a summary decision ordering the respondent’s removal. See Matter of A-P-, supra, at 476 (explaining that the appellate process is best served when the oral decision is set apart from the transcript of the proceedings such that it is readily identifiable as the Immigration Judge’s complete decision); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.12(b) (explaining that a summary decision is appropriate only when removability is established by the respondent’s pleadings and the respondent has sought no relief from removal other than pre-conclusion voluntary departure under section 240B(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a), or is statutorily ineligible for all forms of relief from removal). While an explanation for the denial of a continuance is set forth in the transcript, see Tr. at 16-22, that is insufficient. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the record is inadequate for appellate review. Accordingly, the record will be returned to the Immigration Judge for preparation of a full decision. Id In remanding the case, we intimate no opinion as to the ultimate merits of the respondent’s appeal. ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. 2 (b) (6) \ ‘ U.S. Department o! Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board oflmmigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 22041 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: J.d.tl 2 2015 In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Allison Lukanich, Esquire APPLICATION: Cancellation of removal under section 240A In a decision dated March 31, 2015, an Immigration Judge pretennitted and denied the respondent’s application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(l) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l), finding that the respondent could not demonstrate the requisite period of continuous presence because it was broken by his voluntary return to Mexico in 2008 (I.I. at 3-5). Garcia v. Holder, 732 F.3d 308 (4th Cir. 2013) 1 Moreover, subsequent to the Immigration Judge’s decision, this Board decided Matter of Castrejon-Colino, 26 I&N Dec. 667 (BIA 2015), and Matter of Garcia-Ramirez, 26 I&N Dec. 674 (BIA 2015), which are directly applicable to these proceedings. In light of the foregoing, we will remand the proceedings to the Immigration Judge to reconsider his decision in light of the aforementioned decisions. Accordingly, the following order will be entered. ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Court for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision. 1 Garcia’s situation may differ from that of the respondent in the present case. Garcia was fingerprinted, photographed and offered an opportunity to appear before an Immigration Judge, which he declined. Here, the respondent was fingerprinted, photographed, but he testified that he did not remember being given an opportunity to appear before an Immigration Judge (I.I. at 2-3, 4; Tr. at 30, 41). (b) (6) (b) (6) U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 22041 Files: – Charlotte, NC In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS: Stephen T. Allen, Esquire ON BEHALF OF OHS: Susan Leeker Assistant Chief Counsel CHARGE: Date: Notice: Sec. 212(a)(6)(A)(i), I&N Act (8U.S.C.§l182(a)(6)(A)(i)] – Present without being admitted or paroled (both respondents) APPLICATION: Continuance AUG .20 2015 The respondents appeal the ·Immigration Judge’s April 6, 2015, decision denying their request for a continuance and ordering them removed. The appeal will be sustained and the record will be remanded for further proceedings. On appeal, the respondents assert that they entered the United States as unaccompanied alien children (“UACs”) and argue that the Immigration Judge should have granted a continuance to allow them to file an I-589 with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), rather than with the Immigration Judge (Respondents’ Br. at 3-5). Under the particular circwnstances presented in this case, including the young age of the respondents, we conclude that the respondents established good cause for a continuance, and we will remand the case to the Immigration Judge. On remand, the parties may address the issue whether the USCIS should take initial jurisdiction over the respondents’ applications for asylwn and withholding of removal, as well as whether proceedings should be administratively closed. Accordingly. the following order will be entered. ORDER: The appeal is sustained and the record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and the entry of a new decision. F6QHEBOARD (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) 􀀈􀀁􀀇􀀋 􀀁􀀅􀀉􀀃􀀊􀀌􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀎􀀊􀀉􀀋􀀂􀀍􀀋􀀌􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀎 􀀆􀀐􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀦􀀅􀀑􀀌􀀏􀀦􀀒􀀟􀀦􀀈􀀚􀀚􀀕􀀓􀀟􀀋􀀡􀀕􀀝􀀛􀀦􀀉􀀎􀀤􀀕􀀎􀀥􀀦 􀀇􀀋􀀗􀀘􀀠􀀦􀀄􀀔􀀣􀀟􀀌􀀔􀀁􀀦 􀀊􀀖􀀟􀀓􀀕􀀜􀀕􀀋􀀦􀀄􀀄􀀂􀀅􀀃􀀋 􀀞􀁈􀁊􀀽􀀓􀁥 􀀁 􀀙􀁆􀀵􀁓􀁊􀁎􀁗􀁗􀀽􀀅􀁥􀀪􀀙􀁥 􀀅􀀎􀀌􀀕􀀠􀀕􀀝􀀛􀀦􀀝􀀐􀀦􀀡􀀔􀀎􀀦􀀃􀀝􀀋􀀟􀀍􀀦 􀀝􀀐􀀦􀀈􀀚􀀚􀀕􀀓􀀟􀀋􀀢􀀕􀀝􀀛􀀦 􀀂􀀞􀀞􀀎􀀋􀀗􀀠􀀦 􀀚􀀵􀁗􀀽􀀓􀁥 􀀆􀀋􀁒􀀽􀀔􀁥 􀀦􀁥􀀮􀀝􀀩􀀫􀀴􀀖􀀨􀁥􀀬􀀭􀀫􀀙􀀜􀀜􀀚􀀦􀀡􀀰􀁥 􀀖􀀬􀀬􀀜􀀖􀀨􀁥 􀀫􀀪􀁥􀀗􀀜􀀢􀀖􀀨􀀟􀁥􀀫􀀞􀁥 􀀯􀀝􀀰􀀬􀀫􀀪􀀚􀀜􀀪􀀱􀀓􀁥 􀀖􀁍􀀻􀁒􀀽􀁖􀁥􀀨􀁎􀁐􀀽􀁤􀀅􀁥􀀜􀁖􀁑􀁟􀁈􀁒􀀽􀁥 􀀱􀁆􀀽􀁥 􀀣􀁋􀁋􀁉􀁅􀀵􀁘􀁈􀁎􀁍􀁥 􀀧􀁟􀀻􀁄􀀽􀁥 􀀼􀁈􀀻􀁥 􀁍􀁎􀁗􀁥 􀁐􀁒􀀽􀁐􀀵􀁓􀀽􀁥 􀀵􀁥 􀁖􀀽􀁐􀀵􀁒􀀵􀁗􀀽􀁥 􀁎􀁒􀀵􀁊􀁥 􀁎􀁒􀁥 􀁡􀁒􀁈􀁘􀁗􀀽􀁍􀁥 􀀻􀀽􀀹􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁎􀁍􀁥 􀁈􀁍􀁥 􀁗􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁥 􀁋􀀵􀁜􀀽􀁒􀁥 􀁖􀀽􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁍􀁄􀁥 􀁎􀁟􀁗􀁥 􀁗􀁆􀀽􀁥 􀁒􀀽􀀵􀁖􀁎􀁍􀁖􀁥 􀁁􀁒􀁥 􀁘􀁆􀀽􀁥 􀀼􀀽􀀹􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁎􀁍􀀇􀁥 􀀖􀁍􀁥 􀀽􀁢􀁐􀁊􀀵􀁍􀀵􀁗􀁈􀁎􀁍􀁥 􀁎􀀿􀁥 􀁗􀁆􀀽􀁥 􀁒􀀽􀀵􀁖􀁎􀁍􀁖􀁥 􀁈􀁍􀁥 􀁙􀀽􀁥 􀁘􀁓􀀵􀁍􀁖􀀹􀁔􀁈􀁐􀁗􀁥 􀁈􀁖􀁥 􀁍􀁎􀁗􀁥 􀁖􀁟􀁀􀀹􀁈􀀽􀁍􀁗􀀉􀁥 􀀖􀀺􀀹􀁎􀁒􀀼􀁈􀁍􀁄􀁊􀁣􀀆􀁥􀁙􀀽􀁥􀁒􀀽􀀹􀁎􀁒􀀼􀁥􀁡􀁈􀁊􀁊􀁥􀀸􀀽􀁥􀁒􀀽􀁝􀁒􀁍􀀽􀀼􀁥􀁗􀁎􀁥􀁗􀁆􀀽􀁥 􀀤􀁋􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁒􀀵􀁗􀁈􀁎􀁍􀁥􀀧􀁟􀀻􀁄􀀽􀁥􀁁􀁒􀁥􀁐􀁒􀀽􀁐􀀵􀁓􀀵􀁗􀁈􀁎􀁍􀁥􀁎􀀿􀁥􀀵􀁥 􀁂􀁊􀁊􀁥 􀀻􀀽􀀹􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁎􀁍􀀇􀁥 􀀉􀀋􀀋􀀑􀀇􀀊􀀏􀀏􀀋􀀎􀀑􀀍􀀌􀀑􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀃􀀁􀀑􀀌􀀌􀁥􀀣􀀁􀀪􀁥 􀀚􀀽􀀹􀀉􀁥 􀀍􀀎􀀑􀁥 􀀂􀀗􀀣􀀖􀁥 􀀋 􀀒􀀒􀀒􀀄􀀉􀁥 􀀳􀁐􀁎􀁍􀁥 􀁐􀁒􀀽􀁐􀀵􀁔􀀵􀁗􀁈􀁎􀁍􀁥 􀁎􀀿􀁥 􀁗􀁆􀀽􀁥 􀁃􀁊􀁊􀁥 􀀼􀀽􀀹􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁎􀁍􀀅􀁥 􀁗􀁆􀀽􀁥 􀀣􀁋􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁒􀀵􀁗􀁈􀁎􀁍􀁥 􀀧􀁟􀀼􀁄􀀽􀁥 􀁖􀁆􀀵􀁊􀁊􀁥 􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁟􀀽􀁥 􀀵􀁍􀁥 􀁎􀁒􀀻􀀽􀁒􀁥 􀀵􀀼􀁋􀁈􀁍􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁓􀀵􀁗􀁈􀁠􀀽􀁊􀁣􀁥 􀁒􀀽􀁗􀁟􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁍􀁄􀁥 􀁗􀁆􀀽􀁥 􀁒􀀽􀀹􀁎􀁒􀀼􀁥􀁗􀁎􀁥􀁗􀁆􀀽􀁥 􀀗􀁎􀀶􀁓􀀼􀀈􀁥 􀀱􀁇􀀽􀁥􀀣􀁌􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁔􀀵􀁗􀁈􀁎􀁍􀁥 􀀧􀁟􀀼􀁄􀀽􀁥 􀁖􀁆􀀵􀁊􀁊􀁥􀁖􀀽􀁒􀁠􀀽􀁥􀁗􀁆􀀽􀁥 􀀵􀀼􀁋􀁈􀁍􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁓􀀵􀁛􀁠􀀽􀁥 􀁒􀀽􀁗􀁟􀁕􀁥􀁎􀁒􀀼􀀽􀁒􀁥 􀁎􀁍􀁥 􀁚􀀽􀁥􀁒􀀽􀁖􀁐􀁎􀁍􀀼􀀽􀁍􀁗􀁥􀀵􀁍􀀼􀁥 􀁗􀁆􀀽􀁥 􀀚􀀽􀁐􀀶􀁓􀁘􀁋􀀾􀁍􀁗􀁥 􀁎􀀿􀁥 􀀢􀁎􀁋􀀽􀁊􀀵􀁍􀀻􀁥 􀀰􀀽􀀹􀁟􀁒􀁈􀁗􀁣􀁥 􀀃􀀚􀀢􀀰􀀄􀀉􀁥 􀀱􀁆􀀽􀁥 􀀗􀁎􀀷􀀼􀁥 􀁡􀁈􀁊􀁊􀁥 􀁘􀁆􀀽􀁒􀀽􀀵􀀿􀁗􀀽􀁒􀁥 􀁄􀁈􀁠􀀽􀁥 􀁘􀁆􀀽􀁥 􀁐􀀵􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀽􀁖􀁥 􀀶􀁍􀁥 􀁎􀁐􀁐􀁎􀁒􀁗􀁟􀁍􀁈􀁗􀁣􀁥􀁗􀁏􀁥􀁖􀁟􀀸􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁥􀀸􀁒􀁈􀀽􀀿􀁖􀁥􀁈􀁍􀁥􀀵􀀹􀀹􀁎􀁒􀀻􀀵􀁍􀀹􀀽􀁥􀁡􀁈􀁗􀁆􀁥􀁚􀀽􀁥􀁒􀀽􀁄􀁟􀁊􀀵􀁗􀁈􀁎􀁍􀁖􀀈􀁥 􀀫􀀮􀀛􀀜􀀭􀀕􀁥 􀀲􀀽􀁥 􀁒􀀽􀀹􀁎􀁒􀀻􀁥 􀁈􀁖􀁥 􀁒􀀽􀁞􀀽􀀼􀁥 􀁗􀁎􀁥 􀁗􀁆􀀽􀁥 􀀤􀁋􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁒􀀵􀁗􀁈􀁎􀁍􀁥 􀀙􀁎􀁟􀁓􀁗􀁥 􀁁􀁒􀁥 􀀿􀁟􀁒􀁗􀁆􀀽􀁒􀁥 􀀵􀀹􀁗􀁈􀁎􀁍􀁥 􀀵􀁖􀁥 􀁒􀀽􀁑􀁟􀁈􀁒􀀽􀀻􀁥 􀀵􀀸􀁎􀁠􀀽􀀈􀁥 􀀃􀀄 􀀂􀀄􀀁􀀄 􀀠􀀫􀀭􀁥􀀱􀀥􀀘􀁥􀀗􀀫􀀆􀀄􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀆 ( b ) ( 6 ) (b) (6) . U.S. Departnient of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 22041 File: – Charlotte, NC Date: FEB 2 3 2016 In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Andres Lopez, Esquire APPLICATION: Temporary Protected Status The respondent, a native and citizen of El Salvador, appeals the decision of the Immigration Judge, dated June 11, 2015, denying his application for Temporary Protected Status (”TPS”) and ordering his removal from the United States. The record will be remanded. We review the Immigration Judge’s findings of fact for clear error. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i). All other issues, including whether the parties have met the relevant burden of proof, and issues of discretion, we review de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003. l(d)(3)(ii). On appeal, the respondent has presented evidence from the District Court of County, North Carolina, dated , 2015, clarifying nunc pro tune that the respondent’s conviction was vacated because he had not been apprised of the possible immigration consequences resulting from his guilty plea pursuant to Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010). We conclude that this new evidence warrants remand for further consideration of the respondent’s application for TPS. See Matter of Adamiak, 23 I&N Dec. 878 (BIA 2006) (conviction vacated pursuant to section 2943.031 of the Ohio Revised Code for failure of the trial court to advise the alien defendant of the possible immigration consequences of a guilty plea is no longer a valid conviction for immigration purposes). Upon remand, the parties shall not be precluded from offering additional evidence, both testimonial and documentary, with respect to the relevant issues in this case. At the present time, we express no opinion regarding the ultimate outcome of these proceedings. The following order is entered. ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Court for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and the entry of a new decision. FOR THE BOARD (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) 􀀁􀀃 􀀗􀀫􀀖􀀈􀀬 􀀏􀀞􀀤􀀛􀀦􀀨􀀡􀀞􀀢􀀨􀀬 􀀣􀀟􀀬􀀔􀀪􀀧􀀨􀀠􀀜􀀞􀀬 􀀆􀀨􀀏􀀍􀀥􀀤􀀗􀀦􀀏􀀪􀀉􀀒􀀍􀀏􀀪􀀓􀀡􀀪􀀈􀀜􀀩􀀗􀀕􀀌􀀤􀀗􀀟􀀞􀀪 􀀊􀀏􀀦􀀗􀀏􀀧􀀪 􀀅􀀏􀀍􀀘􀀣􀀗􀀟􀀞􀀪􀀟􀀐􀀪􀀤􀀖􀀏􀀪􀀃􀀟􀀌􀀡􀀎􀀪􀀟􀀑􀀛􀀜􀀝􀀙􀀕􀀌􀀤􀀘􀀟􀀞􀀪 􀀂􀀠􀀠􀀏􀀌􀀚􀀣􀀪 􀀇􀀌􀀚􀀚􀀣􀀪 􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀢􀀍􀀖􀀁􀀪􀀋􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀙􀀞􀀗􀀌􀀪􀀋􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀊􀀬 􀀯􀁢􀁥􀁐􀀢􀁻 􀁻􀀊 􀀫􀁡􀁅􀁮􀁥􀁫􀁱􀁱􀁐􀀈􀁻􀀹􀀫􀁻 􀀳􀁪􀁻􀁮􀁐􀀤􀁻 􀁻 􀀴􀀹􀁻 􀀼􀀮􀀸􀀺􀁂􀀨􀀷􀁻􀀻􀀼􀀺􀀫􀀮􀀮􀀬􀀳􀀹􀀰􀀾􀁻 􀀨􀀻􀀻􀀮􀀨􀀷􀁻 􀀬􀁅􀁱􀁐􀀣􀁻 􀀺􀀹􀁻􀀪􀀮􀀱􀀨􀀷􀀯􀁻􀀺􀀯􀁻􀀼􀀮􀀾􀀻􀀺􀀹􀀭􀀮􀀹􀀿􀀥􀁻 􀀱􀁢􀁥􀁅􀁻􀀸􀁫􀁰􀁰􀀈􀁻􀀮􀁰􀁭􀁲􀁢􀁮􀁐􀁻 􀀨􀀻􀀻􀀷􀀳􀀫􀀨􀀿􀀳􀀺􀀹􀀦􀁻 􀀨􀁰􀁸􀁥􀁲􀁩􀀧􀁻 􀁶􀁢􀁱􀁡􀁡􀁫􀁥􀁎􀁢􀁪􀁝􀁻􀁫􀁑􀁻 􀁮􀁐􀁩􀁫􀁵􀁅􀁥􀁻 􀀄􀀃􀀅􀀌 􀀁􀀌 􀀂􀀌 􀀇􀀋􀀊􀀈􀀌 􀀿􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀁮􀁐􀁰􀁬􀁫􀁪􀁎􀁐􀁪􀁱􀀈􀁻 􀁅􀁻 􀁪􀁅􀁱􀁢􀁵􀁐􀁻 􀁅􀁪􀁎􀁻 􀁍􀁢􀁱􀁢􀁹􀁐􀁪􀁻 􀁫􀁑􀁻 􀀱􀁫􀁪􀁎􀁲􀁮􀁅􀁰􀀉􀁻 􀁡􀁅􀁰􀁻 􀁅􀁬􀁬􀁐􀁅􀁥􀁐􀁎􀁻 􀁛􀁫􀁩􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀀳􀁩􀁩􀁢􀁝􀁮􀁅􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀀵􀁲􀁎􀁝􀁐􀀄􀁰􀁻 􀁎􀁐􀁍􀁢􀁰􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀁎􀁅􀁱􀁐􀁎􀁻 􀀵􀁲􀁥􀁸􀁻􀀛􀀜􀀈􀁻 􀀛􀀘􀀙􀀞􀀈􀁻 􀁎􀁐􀁪􀁸􀁢􀁪􀁝􀁻 􀁡􀁐􀁮􀁻 􀁅􀁬􀁬􀁥􀁢􀁍􀁅􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁰􀁻 􀁙􀁮􀁻 􀁅􀁰􀁸􀁥􀁲􀁩􀀈􀁻 􀁶􀁢􀁱􀁡􀁡􀁫􀁥􀁎􀁢􀁪􀁝􀁻 􀁫􀁑􀁻 􀁮􀁐􀁩􀁫􀁵􀁅􀁥􀀈􀁻 􀁅􀁪􀁎􀁻 􀁬􀁮􀁫􀁱􀁐􀁍􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀁲􀁪􀁎􀁐􀁮􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀀫􀁫􀁪􀁵􀁐􀁪􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀀨􀁝􀁅􀁢􀁪􀁰􀁱􀁻 􀀿􀁫􀁮􀁱􀁲􀁮􀁐􀁻 􀀆􀀫􀀨􀀿􀀇􀀌􀁻 􀁃􀁐􀁻 􀁶􀁢􀁥􀁥􀁻 􀁮􀁐􀁩􀁅􀁪􀁏􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀁮􀁐􀁍􀁫􀁮􀁎􀁻 􀁱􀁫􀁻􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻􀀳􀁩􀁩􀁢􀁝􀁮􀁅􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁻􀀵􀁲􀁎􀁝􀁐􀁻􀁅􀁰􀁻 􀁎􀁢􀁰􀁍􀁲􀁰􀁰􀁐􀁎􀁻 􀁋􀁐􀁥􀁫􀁶􀀍􀁻 􀁃􀁐􀁻 􀁮􀁐􀁵􀁢􀁐􀁶􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀁗􀁪􀁎􀁢􀁪􀁝􀁰􀁻 􀁫􀁑􀁻 􀁓􀁍􀁱􀁻 􀁩􀁅􀁎􀁐􀁻 􀁋􀁸􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀀳􀁩􀁩􀁢􀁝􀁮􀁅􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀀵􀁲􀁎􀁝􀁐􀀈􀁻 􀁢􀁪􀁍􀁥􀁲􀁎􀁢􀁪􀁝􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀁭􀁲􀁐􀁰􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀁫􀁑􀁻 􀁍􀁮􀁐􀁎􀁢􀁋􀁢􀁥􀁢􀁱􀁸􀀈􀁻 􀁳􀁪􀁎􀁐􀁮􀁻 􀁅􀁻 􀀁􀁍􀁥􀁐􀁅􀁮􀁥􀁸􀁻 􀁐􀁮􀁮􀁫􀁪􀁐􀁫􀁲􀁰􀀂􀁻 􀁰􀁱􀁅􀁪􀁎􀁅􀁮􀁎􀀌􀁻 􀀍􀀬 􀀫􀀎􀀯􀀏􀀼􀀍􀁻 􀁺􀁻 􀀙􀀘􀀘􀀜􀀐􀀙􀁻􀀆􀁎􀀇􀀆􀀜􀀇􀀆􀁢􀀇􀀏􀁻 􀁃􀁐􀁻 􀁮􀁐􀁵􀁢􀁐􀁶􀁻 􀁭􀁲􀁐􀁰􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁰􀁻􀁫􀁑 􀁥􀁅􀁶􀀈􀁻􀁎􀁢􀁰􀁍􀁮􀁐􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀀈􀁻􀁅􀁪􀁎􀁻􀁤􀁲􀁎􀁟􀁐􀁪􀁱􀁻 􀁲􀁪􀁎􀁐􀁮􀁻􀁅􀁻􀁎􀁐􀁻􀁪􀁫􀁵􀁫􀁻􀁰􀁱􀁅􀁪􀁎􀁅􀁮􀁎􀀌􀁻 􀀍􀀬 􀀫􀀌􀀯􀀍􀀼􀀑􀁻 􀁺􀁻 􀀙􀀘􀀘􀀜􀀍􀁻􀁦􀀆􀁎􀀇􀀆􀀜􀀇􀀆􀁢􀁢􀀇􀀌􀁻 􀀿􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀁮􀁐􀁰􀁬􀁫􀁪􀁎􀁐􀁪􀁱􀀄􀁰􀁻 􀁅􀁰􀁸􀁥􀁲􀁩􀁻 􀁅􀁬􀁬􀁥􀁢􀁍􀁅􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀁶􀁅􀁰􀁻 􀁗􀁥􀁐􀁎􀁻 􀁅􀁜􀁐􀁮􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀁐􀁔􀁐􀁍􀁱􀁢􀁵􀁐􀁻 􀁎􀁅􀁱􀁐􀁻 􀁫􀁑􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀀼􀀮􀀨􀀷􀁻 􀀳􀀬􀁻 􀀨􀁍􀁱􀁻 􀁫􀁑􀁻 􀀛􀀘􀀘􀀞􀀈􀁻􀁱􀁡􀁲􀁰􀁻􀁢􀁱􀁻􀁢􀁰􀁻􀁰􀁲􀁋􀁤􀁐􀁍􀁱􀁻􀁱􀁫􀁻􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻􀁬􀁯􀁫􀁵􀁢􀁰􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁰􀁻􀁫􀁑􀁻􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻􀀽􀀮􀀨􀀷􀁻 􀀳􀀬􀁻􀀨􀁍􀁱􀀑􀁻 􀀿􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀀳􀁩􀁩􀁢􀁝􀁮􀁅􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀀵􀁲􀁎􀁝􀁐􀁻 􀁎􀁐􀁪􀁢􀁐􀁎􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀁮􀁐􀁰􀁬􀁫􀁪􀁎􀁐􀁪􀁱􀀄􀁰􀁻 􀁅􀁬􀁬􀁥􀁢􀁍􀁅􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁰􀁻 􀁙􀁮􀁻 􀁮􀁐􀁥􀁢􀁐􀁑􀀈􀁻 􀁗􀁪􀁎􀁢􀁪􀁝􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁅􀁱􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀁮􀁐􀁰􀁬􀁫􀁪􀁎􀁐􀁪􀁱􀁻 􀁎􀁢􀁎􀁻 􀁪􀁫􀁱􀁻 􀁰􀁲􀁖􀁍􀁢􀁐􀁪􀁱􀁥􀁸􀁻 􀁍􀁫􀁮􀁮􀁫􀁋􀁫􀁮􀁅􀁱􀁐􀁻 􀁡􀁐􀁮􀁻 􀁍􀁥􀁅􀁢􀁩􀁰􀀑􀁻 􀀿􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀀳􀁩􀁩􀁢􀁝􀁮􀁅􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀀵􀁲􀁎􀁝􀁐􀁻 􀁅􀁥􀁰􀁫􀁻 􀁙􀁲􀁪􀁎􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁅􀁱􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻􀁮􀁐􀁰􀁬􀁫􀁪􀁎􀁐􀁪􀁱􀁻􀁎􀁢􀁎􀁻􀁪􀁫􀁱􀁻􀁰􀁡􀁫􀁶􀁻􀁱􀁡􀁅􀁱􀁻􀁡􀁐􀁮􀁻􀁬􀁮􀁫􀁬􀁫􀁰􀁐􀁎􀁻􀁬􀁅􀁮􀁱􀁢􀁍􀁲􀁥􀁅􀁮􀁻􀁰􀁫􀁍􀁢􀁅􀁥􀁻􀁝􀁮􀁫􀁲􀁬􀀈􀁻􀀁􀀱􀁫􀁪􀁎􀁲􀁮􀁅􀁪􀁻􀁶􀁢􀁎􀁫􀁶􀁻􀁶􀁫􀁩􀁐􀁪􀁻 􀁫􀁑􀁻􀁝􀁅􀁪􀁝􀁻 􀁩􀁐􀁩􀁋􀁐􀁮􀁰􀁻􀁶􀁡􀁫􀁻􀁅􀁮􀁐􀁻􀁵􀁢􀁍􀁱􀁢􀁩􀁰􀁻􀁫􀁑􀁻􀁝􀁇􀁝􀁻 􀁮􀁐􀁱􀁅􀁥􀁢􀁅􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀁅􀁪􀁎􀁻 􀁬􀁐􀁮􀁰􀁐􀁍􀁲􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀁋􀁐􀁍􀁅􀁲􀁰􀁐􀁻􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁸􀁻 􀁉􀁐􀁻􀁬􀁐􀁮􀁍􀁐􀁢􀁵􀁐􀁎􀁻 􀁅􀁍􀁍􀁫􀁩􀁬􀁥􀁢􀁍􀁐􀁰􀁻 􀁫􀁑􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀁍􀁮􀁢􀁩􀁢􀁪􀁅􀁥􀁻 􀁅􀁍􀁱􀁢􀁵􀁢􀁱􀁢􀁐􀁰􀁻 􀁫􀁑􀁻 􀁥􀁫􀁍􀁅􀁥􀁻 􀁝􀁅􀁪􀁝􀁰􀀈􀀂􀁻 􀁶􀁅􀁰􀁻 􀁅􀁻 􀁍􀁫􀁝􀁪􀁢􀁹􀁅􀁋􀁥􀁐􀁻 􀁬􀁉􀁱􀁢􀁍􀁲􀁥􀁉􀁻 􀁰􀁫􀁍􀁢􀁅􀁥􀁻 􀁝􀁮􀁫􀁲􀁬􀀍􀁻 􀁀􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀀳􀁩􀁩􀁣􀁝􀁮􀁅􀁱􀁣􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀀶􀁲􀁎􀁝􀁐􀁻 􀁅􀁥􀁰􀁫􀁻 􀁙􀁳􀁪􀁎􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁅􀁱􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀁮􀁐􀁰􀁬􀁫􀁪􀁎􀁐􀁪􀁱􀁻 􀁎􀁢􀁎􀁻 􀁪􀁫􀁱􀁻 􀁰􀁡􀁫􀁶􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁅􀁱􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀁡􀁊􀁻 􀁰􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀁰􀁲􀁕􀁐􀁮􀁐􀁎􀁻 􀁅􀁪􀁎􀁻 􀁰􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀁑􀁐􀁅􀁮􀁰􀁻 􀁱􀁫􀁻 􀁰􀁲􀁔􀁐􀁮􀁻 􀁢􀁪􀁻 􀀲􀁫􀁪􀁎􀁲􀁮􀁅􀁰􀁻 􀁢􀁰􀁻 􀀁􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀁅􀁍􀁍􀁫􀁲􀁪􀁱􀁻 􀁫􀁒􀀄􀁻 􀁡􀁐􀁮􀁻 􀁩􀁐􀁩􀁋􀁐􀁮􀁰􀁡􀁣􀁬􀁻 􀁢􀁪􀁻 􀁰􀁲􀁍􀁡􀁻 􀁅􀁻 􀁰􀁫􀁍􀁢􀁅􀁥􀁻 􀁝􀁮􀁫􀁲􀁬􀀍􀁻 􀀿􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀁮􀁐􀁰􀁬􀁫􀁪􀁎􀁐􀁪􀁱􀁻􀁍􀁡􀁅􀁥􀁥􀁐􀁪􀁝􀁐􀁰􀁻􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁰􀁐􀁻 􀁗􀁪􀁎􀁢􀁪􀁝􀁰􀁻 􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀁅􀁬􀁬􀁐􀁅􀁥􀀍􀁻􀀂􀀃 􀁃􀁐􀁻 􀁶􀁢􀁥􀁥􀁻 􀁘􀁮􀁰􀁱􀁻 􀁅􀁎􀁎􀁮􀁐􀁰􀁰􀁻 􀁶􀁡􀁐􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁮􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀁮􀁐􀁰􀁬􀁫􀁪􀁎􀁐􀁪􀁱􀀅􀁰􀁻 􀁬􀁮􀁫􀁬􀁫􀁰􀁐􀁎􀁻 􀁝􀁮􀁫􀁲􀁬􀁻 􀁢􀁰􀁻 􀁅􀁻 􀁍􀁫􀁞􀁪􀁢􀁹􀁅􀁋􀁥􀁐􀁻 􀁬􀁆􀁯􀁱􀁢􀁍􀁲􀁥􀁉􀁻 􀁰􀁫􀁍􀁢􀁅􀁥􀁻 􀁝􀁮􀁫􀁲􀁬􀁻 􀁙􀁮􀁻 􀁅􀁰􀁸􀁥􀁲􀁩􀁻 􀁆􀁪􀁎􀁻 􀁶􀁢􀁱􀁡􀁡􀁫􀁥􀁎􀁢􀁪􀁝􀁻 􀁫􀁑􀁻 􀁮􀁐􀁩􀁫􀁵􀁅􀁥􀁻 􀁬􀁴􀁬􀁫􀁰􀁐􀁰􀀒􀁻 􀀿􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀀳􀁩􀁩􀁢􀁝􀁮􀁅􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀀵􀁲􀁎􀁝􀁐􀁻 􀁚􀁲􀁪􀁎􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁅􀁱􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀁮􀁐􀁰􀁬􀁫􀁪􀁎􀁐􀁪􀁱􀀅􀁰􀁻 􀁬􀁮􀁫􀁬􀁫􀁰􀁐􀁎􀁻 􀁬􀁅􀁮􀁱􀁢􀁍􀁲􀁥􀁉􀁻􀁰􀁫􀁍􀁢􀁅􀁥􀁻 􀁠􀁫􀁲􀁬􀁻􀁢􀁰􀁻􀁍􀁢􀁮􀁍􀁲􀁥􀁅􀁮􀁻 􀁢􀁪􀁻 􀁎􀁐􀁗􀁪􀁢􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀀈􀁻 􀁅􀁰􀁻 􀁢􀁱􀁻 􀁢􀁰􀁻 􀁎􀁐􀁗􀁪􀁐􀁎􀁻 􀁋􀁸􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀁬􀁐􀁮􀁰􀁐􀁍􀁲􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀁢􀁱􀁰􀁐􀁥􀁑􀁻 􀀆􀁨􀀌􀀵􀀓􀁻 􀁅􀁱􀁻 􀀙􀀘􀀇􀀍􀁻 􀀿􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀀪􀁫􀁅􀁮􀁎􀁻 􀁡􀁅􀁰􀁻 􀁡􀁐􀁥􀁎􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁅􀁱􀁻 􀁅􀁻 􀁰􀁫􀁍􀁢􀁅􀁥􀁻 􀁝􀁮􀁫􀁲􀁬􀁻 􀁍􀁈􀁪􀁫􀁱􀁻 􀁋􀁐􀁻 􀁎􀁐􀁗􀁪􀁐􀁎􀁻 􀁐􀁷􀁍􀁥􀁲􀁰􀁢􀁵􀁐􀁥􀁸􀁻 􀁋􀁸􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀁬􀁐􀁮􀁰􀁐􀁍􀁲􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀁫􀁮􀁻 􀁡􀁅􀁮􀁩􀁻 􀁱􀁫􀁻 􀁢􀁱􀁰􀁻 􀁩􀁐􀁩􀁋􀁐􀁮􀁰􀀏􀁻 􀀕􀀚􀀩􀀝􀀥􀀬 􀀉􀀆􀀌􀀕􀀃􀀐􀀄􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀂􀀬 􀀛􀀟􀁻􀀳􀀃􀀹􀁻 􀀬􀁐􀁍􀀔􀁻 􀀛􀀛􀀠􀀈􀁻 􀀛􀀝􀀛􀁻 􀀆􀀪􀀳􀀨􀁻 􀀛􀀘􀀚􀀝􀀇􀀧􀁻 􀀕􀀚􀀩􀀝􀀥􀀬 􀀉􀀆􀀌􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀇􀀑􀀇 􀀁􀀬 􀀓􀀇􀀒􀀇􀀘􀀇􀀂􀀬 􀀛􀀝􀁻 􀁧􀀃􀀹􀁻 􀀬􀁐􀁍􀀏􀁻 􀀟􀀡􀀈􀁻 􀀠􀀝􀁻 􀀆􀀪􀀳􀀨􀁻 􀀛􀀘􀀘􀀠􀀇􀀏􀁻 􀀲􀁫􀁶􀁐􀁵􀁐􀁮􀀈􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀀿􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀀳􀁩􀁩􀁢􀁠􀁅􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀀵􀁲􀁎􀁝􀁐􀁻 􀁎􀁐􀁪􀁢􀁐􀁎􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀁮􀁐􀁰􀁬􀁫􀁪􀁎􀁐􀁪􀁱􀀅􀁰􀁻 􀁅􀁬􀁬􀁥􀁢􀁍􀁅􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀁙􀁮􀁻 􀁬􀁮􀁫􀁱􀁐􀁍􀁱􀁢􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀁲􀁪􀁎􀁐􀁮􀁻 􀀫􀀨􀀿􀁻 􀀆􀁧􀀍􀀵􀀕􀁻 􀁅􀁱􀁻 􀀙􀀞􀀋􀀙􀀟􀀇􀁻 􀁌􀁲􀁱􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁐􀁻 􀁮􀁐􀁰􀁬􀁫􀁪􀁎􀁐􀁪􀁱􀁻 􀁎􀁢􀁎􀁻 􀁪􀁫􀁱􀁻 􀁰􀁬􀁐􀁍􀁢􀁗􀁍􀁅􀁥􀁥􀁸􀁻 􀁅􀁎􀁎􀁮􀁐􀁰􀁰􀁻 􀁱􀁡􀁢􀁰􀁻 􀁩􀁅􀁱􀁱􀁐􀁮􀁻 􀁫􀁪􀁻 􀁅􀁬􀁬􀁐􀁅􀁥􀀗􀁻 􀀿􀁡􀁐􀁮􀁐􀁙􀁮􀁐􀀈􀁻 􀁶􀁐􀁻 􀁎􀁐􀁐􀁩􀁻􀁱􀁡􀁢􀁰􀁻􀁩􀁅􀁱􀁱􀁐􀁮􀁻􀁶􀁅􀁢􀁵􀁐􀁎􀀖􀁻 (b) (6) (b) (6) 􀀇􀁷 􀁷 􀁤􀁃􀁪􀁢􀁡􀁟􀁁􀁃􀁟􀁮􀀄􀁪􀁷􀁢􀁤􀁡􀁢􀁡􀁪􀁃􀁁􀁷􀁪􀁡􀁀􀁗􀀺􀁚􀁷􀁑􀁤􀁡􀁰􀁢􀁷􀁗􀁪􀁷􀁟􀁡􀁮􀁷 􀁁􀁃􀁍􀁟􀁃􀁁􀁷 􀀁􀁃􀁵􀁀􀁚􀁰􀁪􀁗􀁲􀁃􀁚􀁶􀀂􀁷 􀀾􀁶􀁷􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁢􀁃􀁤􀁪􀁃􀁀􀁰􀁮􀁗􀁡􀁟􀀌􀁷 􀀲􀀺􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁤􀀈􀁷 􀁗􀁮􀁷 􀁗􀁪􀁷 􀁢􀁤􀁗􀁜􀀺􀁤􀁗􀁚􀁶􀁷 􀁁􀁃􀁍􀁟􀁃􀁁􀁷 􀀺􀁪􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀀁􀁳􀁗􀁁􀁡􀁳􀁷 􀁴􀁡􀁜􀁃􀁟􀁷 􀁡􀁇􀁷 􀁑􀀺􀁟􀁑􀁷 􀁜􀁃􀁜􀀾􀁃􀁩􀁪􀀈􀀂􀁷 􀁗􀀍􀁃􀀎􀀈􀁷 􀀾􀀺􀁪􀁃􀁁􀁷 􀁡􀁟􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁄􀁷 􀁗􀁟􀁁􀁗􀁲􀁗􀁁􀁰􀀺􀁚􀁪􀀄􀁷 􀁜􀀺􀁤􀁤􀁗􀀺􀁑􀁃􀁷 􀁮􀁡􀁷 􀁑􀀺􀁟􀁑􀁷 􀁜􀁃􀁜􀀾􀁃􀁤􀁪􀁷 􀁳􀁔􀁡􀁷 􀀺􀁧􀁃􀁷 􀁟􀁡􀁳􀁷 􀁁􀁃􀁀􀁃􀀺􀁪􀁃􀁁􀀌􀁷 􀀰􀀺􀁧􀁤􀁗􀀺􀁑􀁃􀁷 􀁗􀁪􀁷 􀀺􀁷 􀁮􀁗􀁃􀀈􀁷 􀁘􀁰􀁪􀁮􀁷 􀁚􀁗􀁙􀁃􀁷 􀁙􀁗􀁟􀁪􀁔􀁗􀁢􀀈􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀁀􀁤􀁃􀀺􀁮􀁃􀁪􀁷 􀀺􀁷 􀀁􀁇􀀺􀁜􀁗􀁚􀁶􀀈􀀂􀁷 􀁳􀁔􀁗􀁀􀁔􀁷 􀁮􀁕􀁃􀁷 􀀶􀁟􀁗􀁮􀁃􀁁􀁷􀀳􀁮􀀺􀁮􀁃􀁪􀁷 􀀨􀁡􀁱􀁮􀁷 􀁡􀁇􀁷 􀀥􀁢􀁢􀁃􀀺􀁚􀁪􀁷 􀁎􀁤􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀀫􀁡􀁰􀁤􀁮􀁔􀁷 􀀨􀁗􀁤􀁀􀁰􀁗􀁮􀁷 􀁎􀁰􀁟􀁁􀁷 􀁮􀁡􀁷 􀁢􀁤􀁡􀁲􀁗􀁁􀁃􀁷 􀀁􀀺􀁷 􀁢􀁤􀁡􀁮􀁡􀁮􀁶􀁢􀁗􀁀􀀺􀁚􀁷 􀁃􀁵􀀺􀁜􀁢􀁚􀁃􀀂􀁷 􀁡􀁇􀁷 􀀺􀁷 􀁢􀀽􀁮􀁗􀁀􀁰􀁚􀀺􀁤􀁷 􀁪􀁡􀁀􀁗􀀺􀁚􀁷 􀁑􀁤􀁡􀁰􀁢􀀍􀁷 􀀃􀀓􀀋􀀔􀀒􀀍􀀐􀀂􀀈􀀉􀀏􀀏􀀉􀀊􀀉􀀓􀀋􀀔􀀗 􀀇􀀃􀀈 􀀄􀀑􀀏􀀊􀀋􀀓􀀁􀀗 􀀟􀀛􀀙􀁷􀀫􀀌􀀛􀁁􀁷􀀗􀀗􀀠􀀈􀁷 􀀗􀀙􀀝􀁷􀀅􀀜􀁮􀁕􀁷 􀀨􀁗􀁤􀀏􀁷 􀀙􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀆􀀍􀁷 􀀫􀁰􀁧􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁧􀁜􀁡􀁤􀁃􀀈􀁷 􀀺􀁚􀁮􀁔􀁡􀁰􀁑􀁔􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀀮􀁜􀁜􀁗􀁑􀁤􀀺􀁮􀁗􀁡􀁟􀁷 􀀯􀁰􀁂􀁑􀁃􀁷 􀁎􀁰􀁟􀁁􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁮􀁃􀁤􀁜􀁷 􀀁􀁢􀁃􀁤􀁀􀁃􀁗􀁲􀁅􀁁􀁷 􀀺􀁀􀁀􀁡􀁜􀁢􀁚􀁗􀁀􀁃􀀂􀁷 􀁗􀁪􀁷 􀁲􀀺􀁑􀁰􀁃􀁷 􀀻􀁟􀁂􀁷 􀁁􀁗􀁇􀁐􀁪􀁃􀁷 􀀅􀀮􀀔􀀯􀀐􀁷 􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀀗􀀗􀁷􀀆􀀈􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁗􀁪􀁷 􀁮􀁃􀁧􀁜􀁷 􀁁􀁃􀁪􀁀􀁤􀁗􀀾􀁃􀁪􀁷 􀁀􀁔􀀺􀁧􀀺􀁀􀁮􀁃􀁤􀁗􀁪􀁮􀁗􀁀􀁪􀁷 􀁡􀁇􀁷􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷􀁤􀁃􀁪􀁢􀁡􀁟􀁁􀁃􀁟􀁮􀀄􀁪􀁷􀁇􀀺􀁜􀁗􀁚􀁶􀀉􀀾􀀺􀁪􀁃􀁁􀁷􀁢􀀺􀁤􀁮􀁗􀁀􀁰􀁚􀀺􀁤􀁷􀁪􀁡􀁀􀁗􀀺􀁚􀁷􀁑􀁧􀁡􀁰􀁢􀀈􀁷􀁳􀁕􀁗􀁀􀁕􀁷􀁗􀁮􀁪􀁃􀁚􀁇􀁷􀁗􀁪􀁷􀁟􀁡􀁮􀁷􀁲􀀺􀁑􀁰􀁃􀁷􀁡􀁤􀁷􀁁􀁗􀁇􀁐􀁪􀁃􀀍􀁷 􀀴􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀀮􀁜􀁜􀁗􀁓􀀺􀁮􀁗􀁡􀁟􀁷 􀀯􀁰􀁁􀁑􀁃􀁷 􀁎􀁰􀁟􀁁􀁷 􀁮􀁕􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁤􀁃􀁪􀁢􀁡􀁟􀁁􀁃􀁟􀁮􀀄􀁪􀁷 􀁀􀀺􀁪􀁃􀁷 􀁗􀁪􀁷 􀁁􀁗􀁪􀁮􀁗􀁟􀁑􀁰􀁗􀁪􀁔􀀺􀀾􀁚􀁃􀁷 􀁏􀁡􀁜􀁷 􀀃􀀓􀀋􀀔􀀒􀀍􀀐􀀂􀀈􀀉􀀏􀀏􀀉􀀊􀀉􀀓􀀋􀀔􀀗 􀀆􀀁􀀈 􀀄􀀑􀀏􀀊􀀋􀀓􀀁􀀗 􀀔􀀖􀀒􀀓􀀉􀀁􀀗 􀁗􀁟􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁤􀁃􀁪􀁢􀁡􀁟􀁁􀁃􀁟􀁮􀁷 􀁁􀁗􀁂􀁷 􀁟􀁡􀁮􀁷 􀁃􀁪􀁮􀀺􀀾􀁚􀁗􀁪􀁔􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁑􀀺􀁟􀁑􀁷 􀁳􀀺􀁪􀁷 􀀺􀁳􀀺􀁨􀁃􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀁪􀁕􀁃􀁷 􀁀􀁡􀁡􀁢􀁃􀁤􀀺􀁮􀁃􀁂􀁷 􀁳􀁗􀁮􀁕􀁷 􀁚􀀺􀁳􀁷 􀁃􀁟􀁎􀁤􀁀􀁃􀁜􀁃􀁟􀁮􀁷 􀀅􀁛􀀌􀀯􀀌􀁷 􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀀗􀀗􀀆􀀌􀁷 􀀬􀁡􀁳􀁃􀁲􀁃􀁤􀀈􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁤􀁃􀁪􀁢􀁡􀁟􀁁􀁃􀁟􀁮􀀄􀁪􀁷􀁪􀁡􀁀􀁗􀀺􀁚􀁷 􀁑􀁤􀁡􀁰􀁢􀁷 􀁗􀁪􀁷 􀁟􀁡􀁮􀁷 􀀿􀀺􀁪􀁃􀁁􀁷 􀁡􀁟􀁷 􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷 􀀅􀁡􀁤􀁷 􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷 􀁇􀀻􀁜􀁗􀁚􀁶􀁷 􀁜􀁃􀁜􀀾􀁃􀁤􀀄􀁪􀀆􀁷 􀁀􀁡􀁡􀁢􀁃􀁤􀀺􀁮􀁗􀁡􀁟􀁷 􀁳􀁗􀁮􀁔􀁷 􀁚􀀺􀁳􀁷 􀁃􀁟􀁎􀁤􀁀􀁃􀁜􀁃􀁟􀁮􀀍􀁷 􀀵􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁤􀁃􀁪􀁢􀁡􀁟􀁁􀁃􀁟􀁮􀁷 􀁔􀀺􀁪􀁷 􀁟􀁡􀁮􀁷 􀁀􀁚􀀺􀁗􀁜􀁃􀁁􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀁪􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁳􀀺􀁪􀁷 􀁮􀀺􀁤􀁑􀁃􀁮􀁃􀁁􀁷 􀀾􀁶􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁑􀀺􀁟􀁑􀁪􀁷 􀁎􀁤􀁷 􀁀􀁡􀁡􀁢􀁃􀁤􀀺􀁮􀁗􀁟􀁑􀁷 􀁳􀁗􀁮􀁔􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁚􀀺􀁳􀁷 􀁃􀁟􀁎􀁤􀁀􀁃􀁜􀁃􀁟􀁮􀁷􀁡􀁤􀁷􀁢􀁤􀁡􀁲􀁗􀁁􀁗􀁟􀁑􀁷􀁗􀁟􀁎􀁤􀁜􀀺􀁮􀁗􀁡􀁟􀁷􀀺􀀾􀁡􀁰􀁮􀁷􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁗􀁤􀁷􀁀􀁤􀁗􀁜􀁗􀁟􀀺􀁚􀁷􀀺􀁀􀁮􀁗􀁲􀁗􀁮􀁗􀁃􀁪􀀣􀁷􀁤􀀺􀁮􀁕􀁃􀁤􀀈􀁷􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷􀁤􀁃􀁪􀁢􀁡􀁟􀁁􀁃􀁟􀁮􀁷􀁪􀁮􀀺􀁮􀁃􀁪􀁷 􀁗􀁟􀁷 􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷 􀀺􀁢􀁢􀁃􀁚􀁚􀀺􀁯􀁃􀁷 􀀾􀁤􀁗􀁃􀁇􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁗􀁪􀁷􀁗􀁪􀁷 􀀺􀁷􀀁􀁜􀁗􀁪􀁀􀁡􀁟􀁀􀁃􀁢􀁮􀁗􀁡􀁟􀁷􀀺􀀾􀁡􀁰􀁮􀁷 􀀸􀁔􀁃􀁤􀀹􀁷 􀀺􀁪􀁶􀁚􀁰􀁜􀁷􀁀􀁚􀀺􀁗􀁜􀀂􀁷 􀀅􀀲􀁃􀁪􀁢􀀑􀁷 􀀥􀁢􀁢􀀌􀁷 􀀧􀁤􀁗􀁃􀁇􀀈􀁷 􀀺􀁮􀁷􀀗􀀙􀀆􀀒􀀚􀁷 􀀷􀁃􀁷􀁳􀁗􀁚􀁚􀁷􀁟􀁆􀁵􀁮􀁷 􀀺􀁁􀁁􀁤􀁃􀁪􀁪􀁷􀁳􀁕􀁃􀁮􀁕􀁃􀁤􀁷􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷􀁕􀀽􀁜􀁷􀁮􀁕􀁃􀁷􀁤􀁃􀁪􀁢􀁡􀁟􀁁􀁃􀁟􀁮􀁷􀁪􀁰􀁋􀁃􀁤􀁃􀁁􀁷􀀺􀁟􀁁􀁷􀁊􀀺􀁤􀁃􀁁􀁷􀁗􀁪􀁷􀀁􀁡􀁟􀁷􀀺􀁀􀁀􀁡􀁰􀁟􀁮􀁷􀁡􀁈􀀄􀁷 􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷􀁜􀁃􀁜􀀾􀁃􀁤􀁪􀁕􀁗􀁢􀁷􀁗􀁟􀁷 􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷􀁢􀀺􀁤􀁮􀁗􀁀􀁰􀁚􀀺􀁤􀁷􀁪􀁡􀁀􀁗􀀺􀁚􀁷􀁑􀁤􀁡􀁰􀁢􀀌􀁷 􀀴􀁔􀁃􀁷􀀮􀁜􀁝􀁗􀁒􀁤􀀺􀁮􀁗􀁡􀁟􀁷􀀯􀁰􀁁􀁑􀁃􀁷􀁎􀁰􀁟􀁁􀁷􀁮􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷􀁤􀁃􀁪􀁢􀁡􀁟􀁁􀁃􀁟􀁮􀁷 􀁁􀁗􀁁􀁷􀁟􀁡􀁮􀁷􀁃􀁪􀁮􀀺􀀾􀁚􀁗􀁪􀁔􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷􀁪􀁔􀁃􀁷􀁳􀀺􀁪􀁷􀁡􀁤􀁷􀁳􀁡􀁰􀁚􀁁􀁷􀀾􀁃􀁷􀁮􀀺􀁤􀁑􀁃􀁮􀁃􀁁􀁷 􀁡􀁟􀁷􀀺􀁀􀁀􀁡􀁰􀁟􀁮􀁷 􀁡􀁇􀁷 􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷􀁪􀁮􀀺􀁮􀁰􀁪􀁷􀀺􀁪􀁷􀀺􀁷􀁳􀁗􀁁􀁡􀁳􀁷 􀁡􀁇􀁷􀀺􀁷􀁑􀀼􀁑􀁷 􀁜􀁃􀁜􀀾􀁃􀁤􀀈􀁷 􀀺􀁪􀁷 􀁪􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁀􀁡􀁰􀁚􀁁􀁷 􀁟􀁡􀁮􀁷 􀁀􀁡􀁟􀁍􀁧􀁜􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁗􀁂􀁃􀁟􀁮􀁗􀁮􀁶􀁷 􀁡􀁇􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁡􀁪􀁃􀁷 􀁳􀁔􀁡􀁷 􀁔􀀺􀁤􀀺􀁪􀁪􀁃􀁁􀁷 􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷 􀁡􀁤􀁷 􀁳􀁔􀁶􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁶􀁷 􀁮􀀺􀁤􀁑􀁃􀁮􀁃􀁁􀁷 􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷 􀀅􀁛􀀍􀀯􀀌􀁷􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀀗􀀛􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀆􀀓􀁷 􀀵􀁔􀁃􀁷􀁤􀁃􀁪􀁢􀁡􀁟􀁁􀁃􀁟􀁮􀁷􀀺􀁤􀁑􀁰􀁃􀁪􀁷􀁮􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷􀁪􀁔􀁃􀁷􀁳􀀺􀁪􀁷􀁮􀀺􀁧􀁑􀁃􀁮􀁃􀁁􀁷􀁎􀁤􀁷􀁮􀁖􀁃􀀺􀁮􀁪􀁷􀀺􀁟􀁁􀁷􀁔􀀽􀁜􀁷􀀾􀁃􀁀􀀺􀁰􀁪􀁃􀁷􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁑􀀺􀁟􀁑􀁷 􀁪􀁢􀁃􀁀􀁗􀁍􀁀􀀺􀁚􀁚􀁶􀁷 􀀺􀁪􀁙􀁃􀁁􀁷 􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷 􀁎􀁤􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁜􀁡􀁟􀁃􀁶􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷 􀁔􀁰􀁪􀀾􀀼􀁁􀁷 􀁔􀀺􀁁􀁷 􀁮􀀺􀁙􀁃􀁟􀁷 􀁏􀁡􀁜􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁜􀀈􀁷 􀀾􀁃􀁀􀀺􀁰􀁪􀁃􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁶􀁷 􀀾􀁃􀁚􀁗􀁃􀁲􀁃􀁁􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀁪􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁔􀀺􀁁􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁜􀁡􀁟􀁃􀁶􀁷 􀁗􀁟􀁷 􀁢􀁡􀁪􀁪􀁃􀁫􀁪􀁗􀁡􀁟􀁷 􀀅􀀲􀁃􀁪􀁢􀀌􀁷 􀀥􀁢􀁢􀀌􀁷 􀀧􀁤􀁗􀁃􀁇􀀈􀁷 􀀺􀁮􀁷􀀗􀀜􀀆􀀍􀁷 􀀬􀁡􀁳􀁃􀁲􀁃􀁤􀀈􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁤􀁃􀁪􀁢􀁡􀁟􀁁􀁃􀁟􀁮􀁷 􀁔􀀺􀁪􀁷 􀁪􀁰􀀾􀁜􀁗􀁮􀁮􀁃􀁁􀁷 􀀺􀁟􀁷 􀀺􀁇􀁍􀁁􀀺􀁲􀁗􀁮􀁷 􀁗􀁟􀁷 􀁪􀁰􀁢􀁢􀁡􀁤􀁮􀁷 􀁡􀁇􀁷 􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷 􀀺􀁪􀁶􀁚􀁰􀁜􀁷 􀀺􀁢􀁢􀁚􀁗􀁀􀀺􀁮􀁗􀁡􀁟􀀈􀁷 􀁪􀁮􀀺􀁮􀁗􀁟􀁑􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀁪􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁤􀁃􀁀􀁃􀁗􀁲􀁃􀁁􀁷 􀀺􀁟􀁡􀁟􀁶􀁜􀁡􀁰􀁪􀁷 􀁮􀁃􀁚􀁃􀁢􀁔􀁡􀁟􀁃􀁷 􀁀􀀺􀁚􀁚􀁪􀁷 􀀺􀁟􀁁􀁷 􀁡􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁧􀁃􀀺􀁮􀁪􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀁪􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁕􀀺􀁁􀁷 􀁮􀁡􀁷 􀁑􀁗􀁲􀁃􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁜􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁜􀁡􀁟􀁃􀁶􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷 􀁔􀁰􀁪􀀾􀀺􀁟􀁁􀁷 􀁪􀁮􀁡􀁚􀁃􀁷 􀀾􀁃􀁀􀀺􀁰􀁪􀁃􀁷 􀁗􀁮􀁷 􀀾􀁃􀁚􀁡􀁟􀁑􀁃􀁁􀁷 􀁮􀁡􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁜􀁷 􀀅􀀪􀁵􀁔􀀌􀁷 􀀙􀀈􀁷 􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀀙􀀜􀀋􀀙􀀝􀀆􀀌􀁷 􀀵􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀀮􀁞􀁗􀁑􀁤􀀺􀁮􀁗􀁡􀁟􀁷 􀀯􀁰􀁁􀁑􀁃􀀄􀁪􀁷 􀁁􀁃􀁀􀁗􀁪􀁗􀁡􀁟􀁷 􀁁􀁗􀁁􀁷 􀁟􀁡􀁮􀁷 􀁪􀁢􀁃􀁀􀁗􀁍􀁀􀀺􀁚􀁚􀁶􀁷 􀀺􀁁􀁁􀁤􀁃􀁪􀁪􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁗􀁪􀁷 􀀺􀁇􀁍􀁂􀀺􀁲􀁗􀁮􀀈􀁷 􀁟􀁡􀁤􀁷 􀁡􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷 􀀺􀁌􀁁􀀺􀁲􀁗􀁮􀁪􀁷 􀁡􀁤􀁷 􀁁􀁡􀁀􀁰􀁜􀁃􀁟􀁮􀁪􀁷 􀁁􀁃􀁪􀁀􀁤􀁗􀀾􀁗􀁟􀁑􀁷 􀁗􀁟􀁀􀁗􀁁􀁃􀁟􀁮􀁪􀁷􀁡􀁇􀁷􀁮􀁕􀁧􀁃􀀺􀁮􀁪􀀍􀁷 􀀵􀁕􀁃􀁷 􀁜􀁡􀁮􀁗􀁲􀀺􀁮􀁗􀁡􀁟􀁷 􀁡􀁇􀁷 􀁢􀁃􀁤􀁪􀁃􀁀􀁰􀁮􀁡􀁤􀁷 􀁗􀁪􀁷 􀀺􀁷 􀁉􀁀􀁮􀁰􀀺􀁚􀁷 􀁣􀁰􀁃􀁪􀁮􀁗􀁡􀁟􀁷 􀁮􀁡􀁷 􀀾􀁃􀁷 􀁂􀁃􀁀􀁗􀁁􀁃􀁁􀁷 􀀾􀁶􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀀮􀁜􀁜􀁗􀁑􀁤􀀺􀁮􀁗􀁡􀁟􀁷 􀀯􀁰􀁁􀁑􀁃􀀑􀁷 􀀇􀀖􀀓􀀎􀀑􀀐􀀗 􀀇􀀄􀀈 􀀄􀀑􀀏􀀊􀀋􀀓􀀁􀀗 􀀟􀀟􀀠􀁷􀀫􀀏􀀛􀁁􀁷􀀝􀀙􀀛􀀈􀁷 􀀝􀀙􀀢􀁷 􀀅􀀜􀁮􀁔􀁷 􀀨􀁗􀁤􀀌􀁷 􀀙􀀕􀀗􀀙􀀆􀀣􀁷 􀀃􀀓􀀋􀀔􀀒􀀍􀀐􀀂􀀈􀀉􀀏􀀏􀀉􀀊􀀉􀀓􀀋􀀔􀀗 􀀆􀀂􀀈 􀀄􀀑􀀏􀀊􀀋􀀓􀀁􀀗 􀀔􀀖􀀒􀀓􀀉􀀁􀀗 􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀀗􀀙􀀠􀀌􀁷 􀀴􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁃􀁎􀁥􀁃􀀈􀁷 􀁳􀁃􀁷 􀁳􀁗􀁚􀁚􀁷 􀁤􀁃􀁜􀀺􀁟􀁁􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁤􀁃􀁀􀁡􀁤􀁁􀁷 􀁮􀁡􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀀮􀁜􀁜􀁗􀁑􀁤􀀺􀁮􀁗􀁡􀁟􀁷 􀀯􀁰􀁁􀁑􀁃􀁷 􀁮􀁡􀁷 􀁁􀁃􀁮􀁃􀁤􀁜􀁗􀁟􀁃􀁷 􀁳􀁔􀁃􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁤􀁃􀁪􀁢􀁡􀁟􀁁􀁃􀁟􀁮􀁷􀁔􀀺􀁬􀁷􀁪􀁔􀁡􀁳􀁟􀁷􀁮􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷􀁪􀁕􀁃􀁷􀁳􀀺􀁪􀁷􀁔􀀺􀁧􀁜􀁃􀁁􀁷 􀁡􀁤􀁷􀁊􀀺􀁤􀁪􀁷􀁔􀀽􀁜􀁷􀀁􀁡􀁟􀁷􀀺􀁀􀁀􀁡􀁰􀁟􀁮􀁷􀁡􀁈􀀄􀁷􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷􀁜􀁃􀁜􀀾􀁃􀁤􀁪􀁔􀁗􀁢􀁷􀁗􀁟􀁷 􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷 􀁢􀀺􀁧􀁮􀁗􀁀􀁰􀁚􀀺􀁤􀁷 􀁪􀁡􀁀􀁗􀀺􀁚􀁷 􀁑􀁤􀁡􀁰􀁢􀀌􀁷 􀀆􀀋􀀋􀀗 􀀅􀀉􀀕􀀕􀀋􀀓􀀗 􀀑􀀌􀀗 􀀇􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀆􀀃􀀁􀀈 􀀙􀀟􀁷􀀮􀀃􀀱􀁷 􀀩􀁃􀁀􀀍􀁷􀀙􀀕􀀡􀁷 􀀅􀀧􀀮􀀥􀁷􀀙􀀕􀀗􀀜􀀆􀀤􀁷 􀀔􀀋􀀋􀀗 􀀉􀀏􀀔􀀑􀀗 􀀅􀀈 􀀮􀁮􀁷 􀁗􀁪􀁷 􀁰􀁟􀁁􀁅􀁤􀁪􀁮􀀻􀁟􀁂􀀺􀀾􀁚􀁃􀁷 􀁳􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀁜􀀺􀁶􀁷 􀁔􀀺􀁲􀁃􀁷 􀁢􀁤􀁡􀁜􀁢􀁮􀁃􀁁􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀀮􀁜􀁜􀁗􀁑􀁤􀀺􀁮􀁗􀁡􀁟􀁷 􀀯􀁰􀁁􀁑􀁃􀁷 􀁮􀁡􀁷 􀁜􀀺􀁙􀁃􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁗􀁪􀁷 􀁡􀀾􀁪􀁃􀁤􀁲􀀺􀁮􀁗􀁡􀁟􀀈􀁷 􀀺􀁪􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁤􀁃􀁪􀁢􀁡􀁟􀁁􀁃􀁟􀁮􀁷 􀁪􀁰􀀾􀁜􀁗􀁮􀁮􀁃􀁁􀁷 􀀺􀁌􀁁􀀺􀁲􀁗􀁮􀁪􀁷 􀁪􀁮􀀺􀁮􀁗􀁟􀁑􀁷 􀁮􀁕􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀁪􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁳􀀺􀁪􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁤􀁃􀀺􀁮􀁃􀁟􀁃􀁁􀁷 􀁗􀁟􀁷 􀀯􀀻􀁟􀁰􀀺􀁤􀁶􀁷 􀀙􀀕􀀗􀀗􀁷􀀾􀁶􀁷􀀺􀁷􀁜􀀺􀁠􀁷􀁗􀁟􀁷􀀺􀁷􀁀􀀺􀁤􀁷􀁪􀁮􀀺􀁮􀁗􀁟􀁑􀁷􀁮􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷􀀁􀀷􀁃􀁷􀀺􀁚􀁤􀁃􀀺􀁁􀁶􀁷􀁙􀁟􀁡􀁳􀁷􀁳􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁃􀁷􀁶􀁡􀁰􀁷 􀁚􀁗􀁲􀁃􀀈􀁷􀀾􀁃􀁷 􀁀􀀺􀁤􀁃􀁐􀁚􀁷􀁡􀁟􀁷􀁡􀁢􀁃􀁟􀁗􀁟􀁑􀁷􀁶􀁡􀁰􀁤􀁷 􀁜􀁡􀁰􀁮􀁔􀁷 􀁡􀁤􀁷 􀁳􀁃􀁷 􀁳􀁗􀁚􀁚􀁷 􀁁􀁡􀁷 􀁮􀁡􀁷 􀁶􀁡􀁰􀁷 􀁳􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀁳􀁃􀁷 􀁁􀁗􀁁􀁷 􀁮􀁡􀁷 􀁶􀁡􀁰􀁤􀁷 􀁕􀁰􀁪􀀾􀀺􀁟􀁁􀀂􀁷 􀀅􀀪􀁵􀁔􀀌􀁷 􀀙􀀈􀁷 􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀀙􀀝􀀣􀁷 􀀪􀁵􀁔􀀌􀁷 􀀛􀀋􀀧􀁷 􀀵􀀺􀀾􀁷 􀀗􀀡􀀆􀀌􀁷 􀀭􀁡􀁳􀁃􀁲􀁃􀁤􀀈􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁤􀁃􀁪􀁢􀁡􀁟􀁁􀁃􀁟􀁮􀁷 􀁀􀁚􀀺􀁤􀁗􀁍􀁃􀁪􀁷 􀁡􀁟􀁷 􀀺􀁢􀁢􀁃􀀺􀁚􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁑􀀻􀁟􀁑􀀄􀁪􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁤􀁃􀀺􀁮􀁪􀁷 􀀺􀁤􀁃􀁷 􀁟􀁡􀁮􀁷 􀀾􀀺􀁪􀁃􀁂􀁷 􀁡􀁟􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁢􀁡􀁪􀁪􀁗􀀾􀁗􀁚􀁗􀁮􀁶􀁷􀁡􀁇􀁷􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷􀁀􀁡􀁡􀁢􀁃􀁤􀀺􀁮􀁗􀁡􀁟􀁷􀁳􀁗􀁮􀁔􀁷􀁚􀀺􀁳􀁷􀁃􀁟􀁎􀁤􀁀􀁃􀁜􀁃􀁟􀁮􀁷 􀀾􀁰􀁮􀁷􀁤􀀺􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷􀀾􀀺􀁪􀁃􀁁􀁷􀁡􀁟􀁷􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷􀁢􀁃􀁤􀁀􀁃􀁗􀁲􀁃􀁁􀁷􀁙􀁟􀁡􀁳􀁚􀁃􀁁􀁑􀁃􀁷 􀁡􀁦􀁷􀁢􀁡􀁪􀁪􀁃􀁪􀁪􀁗􀁡􀁟􀁷 􀁡􀁇􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀁃􀁷 􀁜􀁡􀁟􀁃􀁶􀁷 􀁮􀁔􀀺􀁮􀁷􀁳􀀺􀁪􀁷 􀁪􀁮􀁡􀁚􀁃􀁟􀁷 􀀾􀁶􀁷􀁔􀁃􀁤􀁷 􀁔􀁰􀁪􀀾􀀼􀁂􀁷􀀅􀀲􀁃􀁪􀁢􀀑􀁷 􀀥􀁢􀁢􀀌􀁷 􀀧􀁤􀁗􀁃􀁇􀀈􀁷 􀀺􀁮􀁷􀀗􀀙􀀊􀀘􀀛􀀆􀀈􀁷 􀀺􀁟􀁁􀁷 􀁳􀁃􀁷 􀁳􀁗􀁚􀁚􀁷􀀺􀁀􀁀􀁃􀁢􀁮􀁷􀁮􀁔􀁗􀁭􀁷􀁃􀁵􀁢􀁚􀀻􀁟􀀺􀁮􀁗􀁡􀁟􀀍􀁷 􀀙􀁷 (b) (6) 􀀁􀀂 􀁱 􀀇􀀌􀀒􀀏􀀉􀀏􀀋􀀌􀀖􀀂􀀅􀀔􀀉􀀎􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀔􀀃􀀗 􀀈􀀕􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀁􀀗􀀡􀀢􀀝􀁱􀀬􀀌􀀚􀀾􀁱􀀣􀀝􀀝􀀇􀁱􀀣􀀞􀀔􀁱􀀅􀀝􀁥􀁌􀁱􀀩􀁎􀁠􀀊􀁱􀀙􀀔􀀘􀀞􀀆􀁱􀀅􀁚􀁜􀁥􀁎􀁚􀁋􀁱􀁥􀁌􀀶􀁥􀁱􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁠􀁀􀁱􀁘􀀶􀁰􀁱􀀻􀁀􀁱􀁘􀁪􀁔􀁥􀁎􀁞􀁔􀁀􀁱 􀀁􀀼􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁠􀀶􀁔􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀀶􀁤􀁜􀁚􀁤􀀂􀁱 􀁇􀁠􀁱 􀁞􀁀􀁠􀁤􀁀􀀽􀁪􀁥􀁎􀁜􀁚􀁱 􀀶􀁚􀀿􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀀶􀁥􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀀸􀁗􀁎􀁀􀁛􀀄􀁤􀁱 􀁘􀀷􀁥􀁀􀁣􀀶􀁔􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀁔􀀶􀁨􀁎􀁜􀁚􀁤􀁌􀁎􀁞􀁱 􀁥􀁝􀁱 􀁌􀁁􀁠􀁱 􀁤􀁜􀁚􀁱 􀁏􀁤􀁱 􀀶􀁥􀁱 􀁔􀁀􀀶􀁤􀁦􀁱 􀁜􀁚􀁀􀁱 􀀼􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁠􀀶􀁔􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀀶􀁤􀁜􀁚􀁱 􀁇􀁠􀁱 􀁤􀁜􀁙􀁀􀁱 􀁜􀁂􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁡􀁀􀀶􀁥􀁤􀁱 􀁤􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀀼􀁀􀁎􀁬􀁀􀀾􀀆􀀥􀁱 􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀋􀀐􀀔􀀉􀀗 􀀔􀀄􀀗 􀀇􀀐􀀎􀀋􀀌􀀑􀀁􀀗 􀀡􀀞􀀣􀁱 􀀬􀀊􀀚􀀾􀁱 􀀚􀀚􀀙􀀇􀁱 􀀚􀀚􀀣􀁱 􀀅􀀝􀁥􀁌􀁱 􀀩􀁎􀁠􀀊􀁱􀀙􀀔􀀖􀀝􀀆􀁱 􀀅􀀼􀁜􀁚􀀼􀁔􀁪􀀾􀁎􀁚􀁋􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀀶􀁥􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱􀁋􀀶􀁚􀁋􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀀼􀁠􀁪􀁎􀁥􀁘􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁱 􀁘􀁜􀁥􀁎􀁬􀀶􀁥􀁎􀁜􀁚􀁱 􀁪􀁚􀀾􀁀􀁠􀁔􀁰􀁎􀁚􀁋􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱􀀶􀁔􀁎􀁀􀁚􀀄􀁤􀁱 􀁌􀀶􀁠􀁘􀁱 􀀾􀁎􀀾􀁱 􀁚􀁜􀁥􀁱􀁞􀁠􀁀􀀼􀁔􀁪􀀾􀁀􀁱􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱􀁀􀁯􀁎􀁤􀁥􀁀􀁚􀀼􀁀􀁱􀁜􀁂􀁱􀀶􀁚􀁜􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁠􀁱􀀼􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁠􀀶􀁔􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀀶􀁤􀁜􀁚􀀇􀁱 􀁎􀀐􀁀􀀋􀀇􀁱 􀁂􀀶􀁘􀁎􀁔􀁰􀁱 􀁥􀁎􀁀􀁤􀀇􀁱 􀁇􀁠􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀀶􀁥􀁱 􀁤􀀶􀁘􀁀􀁱􀁞􀁀􀁠􀁤􀁀􀀼􀁪􀁥􀁎􀁜􀁚􀀆􀀌􀁱 􀀵􀁀􀁱 􀁮􀁎􀁔􀁔􀁱 􀀶􀀾􀀾􀁠􀁀􀁤􀁤􀀇􀁱 􀁎􀁚􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁎􀁤􀁱 􀀼􀁜􀁚􀁚􀁀􀀼􀁥􀁎􀁜􀁚􀀇􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁎􀁤􀁤􀁪􀁀􀁱 􀁜􀁂􀁱 􀀻􀁪􀁠􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁱 􀁜􀁂􀁱 􀁞􀁠􀁜􀁜􀁂􀀊􀁱 􀀳􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀀮􀁙􀁘􀁎􀁋􀁠􀀶􀁥􀁎􀁜􀁚􀁱 􀀰􀁪􀀾􀁋􀁀􀁱 􀁇􀁪􀁚􀀾􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀀶􀁥􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀁤􀁞􀁜􀁚􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁱 􀀾􀁎􀀾􀁱 􀁚􀁜􀁥􀁱 􀁘􀁀􀁀􀁥􀁱 􀁌􀁀􀁠􀁱 􀀻􀁪􀁠􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁱 􀁜􀁂􀁱 􀁞􀁠􀁜􀁜􀁂􀁱 􀁜􀁚􀁱 􀀷􀁱 􀁚􀁪􀁘􀀻􀁀􀁠􀁱 􀁜􀁂􀁱􀁋􀁠􀁜􀁪􀁚􀀾􀁤􀁱 􀀅􀁕􀀏􀀰􀀑􀁱 􀀶􀁥􀁱 􀀠􀀈􀀡􀀆􀀊􀁱 􀀴􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀀮􀁘􀁘􀁎􀁋􀁠􀀶􀁥􀁎􀁜􀁚􀁱 􀀰􀁪􀀾􀁋􀁀􀁱 􀁆􀁠􀁤􀁥􀁱 􀁋􀀶􀁬􀁀􀁱 􀀃􀁔􀁎􀁥􀁥􀁔􀁀􀁱 􀁀􀁬􀁎􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁎􀀶􀁠􀁰􀁱 􀁭􀁀􀁎􀁋􀁌􀁥􀀂􀁱 􀁥􀁜􀁱 􀀶􀁅􀀾􀀶􀁬􀁎􀁥􀁤􀁱 􀁜􀁂􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀁤􀁞􀁜􀁚􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁥􀀄􀁤􀁱 􀁈􀁎􀁀􀁚􀀾􀁤􀀇􀁱􀀻􀁀􀀼􀀶􀁪􀁤􀁀􀁱􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀀾􀁀􀀼􀁔􀀶􀁢􀀶􀁚􀁥􀁤􀁱􀁮􀁀􀁠􀁀􀁱􀁚􀁜􀁥􀁱􀁤􀁪􀀻􀁒􀁀􀀼􀁥􀁱􀁥􀁜􀁱􀀼􀁠􀁜􀁤􀁤􀀉􀁀􀁯􀀶􀁘􀁎􀁚􀀶􀁥􀁎􀁜􀁚􀁱􀀶􀁚􀀾􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱􀁤􀁥􀀶􀁥􀁀􀁘􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁤􀁱􀁮􀁀􀁠􀁀􀁱􀁚􀁜􀁥􀁱 􀁞􀁠􀁀􀁞􀀶􀁠􀁀􀀾􀁱 􀀼􀁜􀁚􀁥􀁀􀁙􀁞􀁜􀁠􀀹􀁀􀁜􀁪􀁤􀁔􀁰􀁱 􀁭􀁎􀁥􀁌􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁎􀁚􀀼􀁎􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁤􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀁔􀀶􀁥􀁀􀀾􀁱 􀀅􀀗􀀒􀀰􀀓􀁱 􀀶􀁥􀁱 􀀠􀀆􀀊􀁱 􀀭􀁜􀁭􀁀􀁬􀁀􀁠􀀇􀁱 􀀾􀁀􀀼􀁔􀀶􀁢􀀶􀁚􀁥􀁤􀁱 􀁜􀁂􀁱 􀀶􀁅􀀾􀀶􀁬􀁎􀁥􀁤􀁱 􀀶􀁠􀁀􀁱 􀁜􀁉􀁀􀁚􀁱 􀁪􀁚􀀶􀁬􀀶􀁎􀁔􀀶􀀻􀁔􀁀􀁱 􀀶􀁤􀁱 􀁭􀁎􀁥􀁚􀁀􀁤􀁤􀁀􀁤􀀇􀁱 􀀶􀁚􀀾􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀁤􀁞􀁜􀁚􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁱 􀁘􀀶􀁰􀁱 􀁌􀀶􀁬􀁀􀁱 􀁌􀀶􀀾􀁱 􀁚􀁜􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀀶􀁤􀁜􀁚􀁱 􀁥􀁜􀁱 􀁡􀁀􀁟􀁪􀁀􀁤􀁥􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁤􀁀􀁱 􀀶􀁅􀀾􀀶􀁬􀁎􀁥􀁤􀁱 􀀶􀁥􀁱􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱􀁥􀁎􀁙􀁀􀁱􀁜􀁂􀁱􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁎􀁚􀀼􀁎􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁤􀀍􀁱 􀀳􀁌􀁪􀁤􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁤􀁀􀁱 􀀶􀁠􀁀􀁱􀁚􀁜􀁥􀀇􀁱 􀀻􀁰􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁙􀁤􀁀􀁔􀁬􀁀􀁤􀀇􀁱 􀁤􀁪􀁅􀀼􀁎􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁱 􀁡􀁀􀀶􀁤􀁜􀁚􀁤􀁱 􀁥􀁜􀁱 􀁋􀁎􀁬􀁀􀁱 􀀃􀁔􀁎􀁥􀁥􀁔􀁀􀁱 􀁀􀁬􀁎􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁎􀀺􀁰􀁱 􀁭􀁀􀁎􀁋􀁌􀁥􀀂􀁱 􀁥􀁜􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁤􀁀􀁱 􀀶􀁅􀀾􀀶􀁬􀁎􀁥􀁤􀀊􀁱 􀀳􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀀮􀁘􀁘􀁎􀁋􀁠􀀶􀁥􀁎􀁜􀁚􀁱 􀀰􀁪􀀾􀁋􀁀􀁱 􀀶􀁔􀁤􀁜􀁱􀁋􀀶􀁬􀁀􀁱 􀀁􀁙􀁐􀁚􀁎􀁘􀀶􀁔􀁱 􀁀􀁬􀁎􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁎􀀶􀁠􀁰􀁱 􀁭􀁀􀁎􀁋􀁌􀁥􀀂􀁱 􀁥􀁜􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱􀁠􀁀􀁤􀁞􀁜􀁚􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁥􀀄􀁤􀁱 􀁌􀁪􀁤􀀻􀀶􀁚􀀾􀀄􀁤􀁱 􀀾􀁀􀀶􀁥􀁌􀁱 􀀼􀁀􀁠􀁧􀁎􀁆􀀼􀀶􀁥􀁀􀁱 􀀻􀁀􀀼􀀶􀁪􀁤􀁀􀁱 􀁎􀁥􀁱􀀾􀁜􀁀􀁤􀁱􀁚􀁜􀁥􀁱 􀀼􀁜􀁠􀁠􀁜􀀻􀁜􀁠􀀶􀁥􀁀􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀁤􀁞􀁜􀁚􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁥􀀄􀁤􀁱 􀀼􀁔􀀶􀁎􀁙􀁤􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀀷􀁥􀁱􀁥􀁍􀁀􀁱􀁋􀀹􀁋􀁱 􀁓􀁎􀁔􀁔􀁀􀀾􀁱􀁌􀁀􀁠􀁱 􀁌􀁪􀁤􀀻􀀶􀁚􀀾􀁱 􀀹􀀾􀁱 􀁌􀀶􀁠􀀶􀁤􀁤􀁀􀀾􀁱 􀁌􀁀􀁠􀁱 􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀰􀀎􀁱􀀶􀁥􀁱 􀀠􀀆􀀍􀁱 􀀭􀁜􀁮􀁀􀁬􀁀􀁠􀀇􀁱 􀁎􀁥􀁱 􀀶􀁞􀁞􀁀􀀶􀁠􀁤􀁱􀁥􀁌􀀶􀁥􀁱􀁥􀁌􀁎􀁤􀁱􀀾􀁜􀀼􀁫􀁘􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁱􀁮􀀶􀁤􀁱􀁤􀁪􀀻􀁘􀁎􀁥􀁥􀁀􀀾􀁱􀁥􀁜􀁱􀀼􀁜􀁠􀁠􀁜􀀻􀁜􀁠􀀶􀁥􀁀􀁱􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀁤􀁞􀁜􀁚􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁥􀀄􀁤􀁱 􀀼􀁔􀀶􀁎􀁘􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀀶􀁥􀁱 􀁌􀁀􀁠􀁱 􀁌􀁪􀁤􀀻􀀶􀁚􀀾􀁱 􀁤􀁪􀁄􀁀􀁠􀁀􀀾􀁱 􀀶􀁱 􀁬􀁎􀁜􀁔􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁱 􀀾􀁀􀀶􀁥􀁌􀀇􀁱 􀀹􀀾􀁱 􀁎􀁥􀁱 􀀼􀀶􀁚􀁚􀁜􀁥􀁱 􀀻􀁀􀁱 􀁀􀁯􀁞􀁀􀀼􀁥􀁀􀀾􀁱 􀁥􀁜􀁱 􀀼􀁜􀁠􀁠􀁜􀀻􀁜􀁠􀀶􀁥􀁀􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁠􀁀􀀶􀁥􀁤􀁱 􀁤􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀀼􀁀􀁎􀁬􀁀􀀾􀁱 􀀶􀁉􀁀􀁠􀁱􀁌􀁎􀁤􀁱 􀀾􀁀􀀶􀁥􀁌􀀊􀁱 􀀨􀀶􀁤􀁀􀀾􀁱􀁜􀁚􀁱􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀀷􀀻􀁜􀁬􀁀􀀇􀁱􀁭􀁀􀁱􀀶􀁋􀁠􀁀􀁀􀁱 􀁭􀁑􀁥􀁌􀁱􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀁤􀁞􀁜􀁚􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀀶􀁥􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱􀀮􀁘􀁘􀁎􀁋􀁠􀀶􀁥􀁎􀁜􀁚􀁱 􀀰􀁪􀀾􀁋􀁀􀁱􀁤􀁌􀁜􀁪􀁔􀀾􀁱􀁌􀀶􀁬􀁀􀁱􀁋􀁎􀁬􀁀􀁚􀁱􀁊􀁔􀁔􀁱􀁭􀁀􀁎􀁋􀁌􀁥􀁱􀁥􀁜􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁤􀁀􀁱􀀾􀁜􀀼􀁪􀁘􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁤􀀋􀀛􀁱 􀀮􀁚􀁱 􀁤􀁫􀁙􀀇􀁱 􀁭􀁀􀁱 􀁭􀁎􀁔􀁔􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀁙􀀶􀁚􀀾􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱􀁠􀁀􀀼􀁜􀁠􀀾􀁱 􀁥􀁜􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱􀀮􀁘􀁘􀁎􀁋􀁠􀀶􀁥􀁎􀁜􀁚􀁱􀀰􀁪􀀾􀁋􀁀􀁱 􀁥􀁜􀁱􀁠􀁀􀀾􀁀􀁥􀁀􀁠􀁘􀁎􀁚􀁀􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱􀁠􀁀􀁤􀁞􀁜􀁚􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁥􀀄􀁤􀁱 􀁀􀁔􀁎􀁔􀁋􀁎􀀻􀁎􀁔􀁎􀁥􀁰􀁱 􀁇􀁠􀁱 􀀶􀁤􀁰􀁔􀁪􀁙􀁱􀀶􀁚􀀾􀁱􀁮􀁎􀁥􀁌􀁍􀁜􀁔􀀾􀁎􀁚􀁋􀁱 􀁜􀁂􀁱􀁠􀁀􀁘􀁜􀁬􀀶􀁔􀀇􀁱􀀻􀁰􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀀾􀁀􀁥􀁀􀁠􀁘􀁎􀁚􀁎􀁚􀁋􀁱􀁮􀁌􀁀􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁠􀁱􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱􀁠􀁀􀁤􀁞􀁜􀁚􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁱􀁌􀀶􀁤􀁱 􀁘􀁀􀁥􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀀻􀁪􀁠􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁱 􀁜􀁂􀁱 􀁀􀁤􀁥􀀶􀀻􀁔􀁎􀁤􀁌􀁎􀁚􀁋􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀀶􀁥􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁌􀀶􀁠􀁘􀁱 􀁤􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁤􀁪􀁄􀁀􀁠􀁀􀀾􀁱 􀁜􀁠􀁱 􀁃􀀶􀁠􀁤􀁱 􀁎􀁤􀁱 􀁜􀁚􀁱 􀀶􀀼􀀼􀁜􀁪􀁚􀁥􀁱 􀁜􀁂􀁱 􀁌􀁀􀁠􀁱 􀁘􀁀􀁙􀀻􀁀􀁠􀁤􀁌􀁎􀁞􀁱􀁎􀁚􀁱􀁌􀁀􀁠􀁱􀁞􀀸􀁢􀁧􀁎􀀼􀁪􀁔􀀶􀁠􀁱􀁤􀁜􀀼􀁎􀀶􀁔􀁱􀁋􀁠􀁜􀁪􀁞􀀋􀁱 􀀧􀀼􀀼􀁜􀁠􀀾􀁎􀁚􀁋􀁔􀁰􀀇􀁱􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱􀁇􀁔􀁔􀁜􀁭􀁎􀁚􀁋􀁱􀁜􀁠􀀾􀁀􀁠􀁱􀁤􀁌􀀶􀁔􀁔􀁱􀀻􀁀􀁱 􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁀􀁠􀁀􀀾􀀍􀁱 􀀱􀀲􀀪􀀫􀀲􀀤􀁱 􀀴􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀀼􀁜􀁠􀀾􀁱 􀁎􀁤􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀁘􀀹􀀾􀁀􀀾􀁱 􀁥􀁜􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀀮􀁘􀁘􀁎􀁋􀁠􀀶􀁥􀁎􀁜􀁚􀁱 􀀰􀁪􀀾􀁋􀁀􀁱 􀁇􀁠􀁱 􀁊􀁠􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁠􀁱 􀁞􀁠􀁜􀀼􀁀􀁀􀀾􀁎􀁚􀁋􀁤􀁱 􀀼􀁜􀁚􀁤􀁎􀁤􀁥􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁱􀁮􀁎􀁥􀁌􀁱􀁥􀁌􀁎􀁤􀁱􀁜􀁠􀀾􀁀􀁠􀀇􀁱􀀶􀁚􀀾􀁱􀁇􀁠􀁱􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱􀁀􀁚􀁩􀁰􀁱􀁜􀁂􀁱􀀶􀁱􀁚􀁀􀁭􀁱􀀾􀁀􀀼􀁎􀁤􀁎􀁜􀁚􀀊􀁱 􀀜􀁱 􀀴􀁌􀁀􀁱􀀮􀁙􀁙􀁎􀁋􀁠􀀶􀁥􀁎􀁜􀁚􀁱􀀰􀁪􀀾􀁋􀁀􀁱􀀶􀁔􀁤􀁜􀁱􀁚􀁜􀁥􀁀􀀾􀁱􀁥􀁌􀀶􀁥􀁱􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱􀁠􀁀􀁤􀁞􀁜􀁚􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁱􀀾􀁎􀀾􀁱􀁚􀁜􀁥􀁱􀁤􀁪􀀻􀁘􀁎􀁥􀁱􀀶􀁱􀁘􀀶􀁠􀁠􀁎􀀶􀁋􀁀􀁱􀀼􀁀􀁠􀁥􀁎􀁆􀀼􀀶􀁥􀁀􀁱􀁥􀁜􀁱 􀁤􀁌􀁜􀁭􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀀶􀁥􀁱 􀁤􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁭􀀶􀁤􀁱 􀁘􀀶􀁠􀁠􀁑􀁀􀀾􀁱 􀁥􀁜􀁱 􀁌􀁀􀁠􀁱 􀁌􀁪􀁤􀀻􀀹􀀾􀀇􀁱 􀀶􀁔􀁥􀁌􀁜􀁪􀁋􀁌􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀀮􀁘􀁘􀁎􀁋􀁠􀀶􀁥􀁎􀁜􀁚􀁱 􀀰􀁪􀀾􀁋􀁀􀁱 􀀼􀁠􀁀􀀾􀁎􀁥􀁀􀀾􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀁤􀁞􀁜􀁚􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁥􀀄􀁤􀁱 􀁥􀁀􀁤􀁥􀁎􀁘􀁜􀁚􀁰􀁱 􀀶􀁚􀀾􀁱 􀁚􀁜􀁥􀁀􀀾􀁱 􀁜􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁠􀁱 􀁀􀁬􀁎􀀾􀁀􀁚􀀼􀁀􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀀶􀁥􀁱 􀁥􀁀􀁚􀀾􀁀􀀾􀁱 􀁥􀁜􀁱 􀁀􀁤􀁥􀀶􀀻􀁔􀁎􀁤􀁌􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀁤􀁞􀁜􀁚􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁥􀀄􀁤􀁱 􀁘􀀶􀁢􀁠􀁑􀀶􀁋􀁀􀁱 􀀅􀀮􀀎􀀰􀀋􀁱 􀀶􀁥􀁱􀀡􀀆􀀍􀁱 􀀳􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁠􀁀􀁤􀁞􀁜􀁚􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁱 􀀶􀁔􀁤􀁜􀁱 􀀶􀁡􀁋􀁪􀁀􀁤􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀀶􀁥􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀀮􀁘􀁘􀁎􀁋􀁠􀀶􀁥􀁎􀁜􀁚􀁱 􀀰􀁪􀀾􀁋􀁀􀁱 􀀾􀁎􀀾􀁱 􀁚􀁜􀁥􀁱 􀀼􀁜􀁚􀁤􀁎􀀾􀁀􀁠􀁱 􀁜􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁠􀁱 􀀾􀁜􀀼􀁪􀁘􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁤􀁱 􀀶􀁚􀀾􀁱 􀁀􀁬􀁎􀀾􀁀􀁚􀀼􀁀􀁱 􀁜􀁂􀁱 􀀼􀁜􀁪􀁚􀁥􀁠􀁰􀁱 􀀼􀁜􀁚􀀾􀁎􀁥􀁎􀁜􀁚􀁤􀁱 􀀅􀀲􀁀􀁤􀁞􀀏􀁱 􀀧􀁞􀁞􀀌􀁱 􀀨􀁠􀁎􀁀􀁂􀀇􀁱 􀀶􀁥􀁱􀀡􀀈􀀘􀀔􀀆􀀏􀁱 􀀭􀁜􀁭􀁀􀁬􀁀􀁠􀀇􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀀯􀁘􀁙􀁎􀁋􀁠􀀶􀁥􀁎􀁜􀁚􀁱􀀰􀁪􀀾􀁋􀁀􀁱􀀾􀁎􀀾􀁱 􀀼􀁜􀁚􀁤􀁎􀀾􀁀􀁠􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁤􀁀􀁱 􀀾􀁜􀀼􀁪􀁘􀁀􀁚􀁥􀁤􀀇􀁱 􀀶􀁔􀁥􀁌􀁜􀁪􀁋􀁌􀁱􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀀮􀁘􀁘􀁎􀁋􀁠􀀶􀁥􀁎􀁜􀁚􀁱􀀰􀁪􀀾􀁋􀁀􀁱􀁚􀁜􀁥􀁀􀀾􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀀶􀁥􀁱 􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱 􀁀􀁬􀁎􀀾􀁀􀁚􀀼􀁀􀁱􀁜􀁂􀁱􀀼􀁜􀁪􀁚􀁥􀁡􀁰􀁱􀀼􀁜􀁚􀀾􀁎􀁥􀁎􀁜􀁚􀁤􀁱􀀾􀁎􀀾􀁱 􀁚􀁜􀁥􀁱􀁤􀁞􀁀􀀼􀁎􀁆􀀼􀀶􀁖􀁔􀁰􀁱􀀶􀀾􀀾􀁠􀁀􀁤􀁤􀁱􀁥􀁌􀁀􀁱􀁠􀁀􀁤􀁞􀁜􀁚􀀾􀁀􀁚􀁥􀀄􀁤􀁱􀁞􀀶􀁠􀁥􀁎􀀼􀁪􀁔􀀶􀁠􀁱􀁤􀁎􀁥􀁪􀀶􀁥􀁎􀁜􀁚􀀏􀁱 􀀚􀁱 (b) (6) 􀀁􀀂 􀀧􀀑􀀂􀀐􀀃􀀨􀀁􀀅􀀌􀀃􀀍􀀏􀀉􀀅􀀊􀀏􀀑􀀋􀀇􀀑􀀂􀀐􀀎􀀏􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀑 􀀌􀀦􀀗􀀔􀀣􀀠􀀛􀀥􀀗􀀨􀀅􀀎􀀊􀀌􀀤 􀀘􀀞􀀨􀀄􀀖􀀑􀀐􀀉􀀠􀀒􀀛􀀗􀀤 􀀆􀀌􀀢􀀓􀀌􀀣􀀤 􀀃􀀌􀀊􀀔􀀟􀀓􀀛􀀘􀀤􀀛􀀍􀀤􀀡􀀚􀀗􀀨􀀂􀀛􀀈􀀞􀀋􀀤􀀛􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀖􀀔􀀐􀀈􀀡􀀒􀀛􀀙􀀤􀀁􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀈􀀕􀀟􀀤 􀀍􀀒􀀝􀀝􀀟􀀨􀀋􀀙􀀤􀀄􀀙􀀁􀀨􀀇􀀔􀀝􀀏􀀓􀀚􀀓􀀈􀀤 􀀇􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀨 􀀸􀁴􀂀􀁟􀂕􀀧􀂫 􀀣􀀁 􀀱􀁰􀁘􀁿􀂉􀂘􀂚􀁟􀀌􀂫􀁆􀀲􀂫 􀀣 􀀣 􀀴􀁕􀂗􀁟􀀨􀂫 􀀎􀀨􀂏􀁟􀀩􀂫 􀂫 􀂫 􀂫 􀀿􀁆􀂫 􀁋􀀷􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀭􀁃􀂫􀁉􀁊􀁈􀀲􀀵􀀵􀀴􀀼􀁆􀀺􀁍􀂫 􀀭􀁉􀁉􀀵􀀭􀁄􀂫 􀁈􀁆􀂫􀀰􀀵􀀻􀀭􀁃􀀹􀂫􀁈􀀸􀂫􀁋􀀷􀁍􀁉􀁈􀁇􀀴􀀵􀁇􀁎􀁍􀀨􀂫 􀀵􀁜􀂠􀁗􀂑􀁜􀂉􀂫􀀭􀀦􀂫 􀀲􀁖􀂅􀁕􀁿􀀍􀂫 􀀵􀂕􀂍􀂠􀁳􀂑􀁟􀂫 􀀇􀀁􀀆􀀊􀀋 􀀃􀀋 􀀂􀀋 􀀄􀀈􀀅􀀉􀀋 􀀭􀁉􀁉􀁃􀀼􀀲􀀭􀁎􀀼􀁈􀁆􀀨􀂫 􀀭􀂕􀂪􀂀􀂠􀂃􀀪􀂫􀂧􀁴􀂗􀁲􀁱􀂉􀂀􀁜􀁴􀂅􀁭􀂫􀂉􀁤􀂑􀁟􀂃􀂉􀂣􀁕􀂀􀀫􀂫􀀲􀂉􀂄􀂣􀁟􀂄􀂗􀁳􀂉􀂄􀂫􀀭􀁭􀁕􀁶􀂄􀂕􀂘􀂫􀁎􀂉􀂐􀂛􀂡􀂏􀁡􀂫 􀁎􀁰􀁟􀂫 􀂑􀁟􀂕􀂋􀂉􀂄􀁜􀁟􀂄􀂘􀂕􀀎􀂫 􀁕􀂫 􀂃􀂉􀂗􀁰􀁟􀂏􀂫 􀁖􀂄􀁜􀂫 􀁰􀁟􀂑􀂫 􀂃􀁳􀂄􀂉􀂑􀂫 􀁛􀁰􀁴􀂀􀁞􀂐􀁟􀂄􀀏􀂫 􀁕􀂋􀂋􀁟􀁕􀁿􀂫 􀂘􀁰􀁟􀂫 􀁜􀁟􀁛􀁳􀂕􀁴􀂉􀂄􀂫 􀂉􀁣􀂫 􀂘􀁰􀁟􀂫 􀀼􀂃􀂃􀁳􀁭􀂐􀁕􀂘􀁴􀂉􀂄􀂫 􀁀􀂟􀁜􀁭􀁟􀀐􀂫􀁜􀁕􀂘􀁟􀁝􀂫􀁈􀁛􀂗􀂉􀁚􀁡􀂏􀂫􀀑􀀘􀀉􀀣􀀑􀀎􀀐􀀗􀀊􀀣 􀁎􀁰􀁟􀂫􀂏􀁟􀁛􀂉􀂐􀁜􀂫 􀂧􀁴􀁿􀁿􀂫􀁚􀁟􀂫􀂑􀁟􀂃􀁗􀂄􀁜􀁟􀁜􀀞􀂫 􀁒􀁟􀂫 􀂑􀁡􀂣􀁴􀁟􀂧􀂫 􀀼􀂃􀂃􀁳􀁯􀁕􀂗􀁳􀂉􀂄􀂫 􀁀􀂠􀁜􀁭􀁟􀂕􀀇􀂫 􀁥􀁹􀂄􀁜􀁳􀂄􀁭􀂕􀂫 􀂉􀁣􀂫 􀁨􀁛􀂗􀂫 􀁥􀂊􀂑􀂫 􀁛􀂂􀁟􀁖􀂒􀂫 􀁟􀂔􀂉􀂐􀀎􀂫 􀁚􀂠􀂘􀂫 􀂎􀂠􀁟􀂕􀂘􀁴􀂉􀂄􀂕􀂫 􀂉􀁤􀂫 􀁿􀁕􀂧􀀑􀂫 􀁜􀁵􀂕􀁛􀂑􀁟􀂗􀁴􀂉􀂄􀀒􀂫 􀁖􀂅􀁜􀂫􀁽􀂠􀁜􀁭􀂃􀁟􀂄􀂘􀀑􀂫 􀁕􀂄􀁜􀂫 􀁕􀂀􀁿􀂫 􀂉􀂗􀁰􀁟􀂏􀂫 􀁴􀂕􀂕􀂟􀁡􀂕􀂫 􀁳􀂄􀂫 􀁕􀂋􀂋􀁟􀁕􀂁􀂕􀀓􀂫 􀁜􀁟􀂫 􀂄􀂉􀂣􀂉􀀟􀂫 􀀉􀀨􀀲􀀞􀀸􀀠􀁊􀀞􀂫 􀀢􀀢􀀣􀀐􀀎􀀎􀀓􀀋􀀜􀀃􀀞􀀇􀀄􀀓􀀇􀀄􀀠􀀇􀀈􀀣 􀀉􀁳􀁳􀀋􀀞􀂫 􀀽􀂄􀂫􀂜􀁰􀁟􀂫􀁳􀂄􀂕􀂘􀁖􀂄􀂗􀂫􀁛􀁖􀂕􀁟􀀔􀂫􀂜􀁰􀁟􀂫􀀼􀂃􀂃􀁳􀁯􀁕􀂘􀁳􀂉􀂄􀂫􀁁􀂟􀁜􀁭􀁟􀂫􀁕􀂕􀁾􀁡􀁜􀂫􀂗􀁰􀁟􀂫􀂀􀁟􀁕􀁜􀂫􀂑􀁟􀂕􀂋􀂉􀂄􀁜􀁟􀂄􀂘􀀘􀂫􀂧􀁰􀂉􀂫􀂧􀁗􀂕􀂫􀂄􀂉􀂘􀂫􀂑􀁟􀂋􀂑􀁟􀂕􀁟􀂄􀂘􀁟􀁞􀂫 􀁚􀂪􀂫 􀁕􀂄􀂫 􀁕􀂘􀂘􀂉􀂓􀁟􀂪􀀕􀂫􀀁􀁓􀁱􀂪􀂫􀁜􀁴􀁜􀂫􀂪􀂉􀂠􀂫􀁛􀂉􀂃􀁟􀂫􀀢􀀨􀂘􀁱􀁟􀂫􀁐􀂄􀁼􀂘􀁟􀁞􀂫􀁍􀂘􀁕􀂘􀁟􀂕􀂫􀀜􀀨􀁅􀁗􀂒􀁛􀁰􀂫􀀡􀀟􀀑􀀎􀀐􀀗􀀚􀀣􀀉􀁎􀂑􀀠􀂫􀁕􀂗􀂫􀀐􀀑􀀇􀀌􀀣 􀁎􀁰􀁟􀂫􀂀􀁟􀁕􀁜􀂫 􀂏􀁟􀂕􀂋􀂉􀂄􀁜􀁟􀂄􀂘􀂫􀂏􀁟􀂋􀁿􀁳􀁟􀁜􀀌􀂫􀀂􀀼􀂫􀀂􀀃 􀂘􀁰􀂑􀁟􀁕􀂘􀁟􀂄􀁟􀁜􀂫􀁗􀂀􀂕􀂉􀂫􀁗􀂄􀁜􀂫􀀾􀂫􀂧􀁖􀂄􀂘􀁟􀁜􀂫􀂗􀂉􀂫􀁚􀁟􀂫 􀂧􀁴􀂘􀁲􀂫􀂃􀂪􀂫 􀁛􀁰􀁴􀁿􀁞􀂐􀁟􀂄􀂫􀁕􀂄􀁜􀂫􀁰􀁟􀁿􀂋􀂫􀂘􀁰􀁟􀂃􀂫􀁭􀁟􀂘􀂫 􀁖􀁰􀁟􀁕􀁜􀀔􀂫 􀂕􀂉􀂫 􀀼􀂫 􀁫􀁟􀁜􀂫 􀂃􀂪􀂫 􀁛􀂉􀂠􀂄􀂗􀂏􀂪􀀡􀀃􀂫 􀀉􀁎􀂏􀀢􀂫 􀁕􀂘􀂫 􀀐􀀑􀀇􀀋􀀣 􀁎􀁰􀁟􀂫 􀀿􀂃􀂃􀁴􀁭􀂑􀁗􀂙􀁴􀂉􀂄􀂫 􀁀􀂠􀁜􀁭􀁟􀂫 􀂗􀁰􀁟􀂄􀂫 􀁙􀁾􀁢􀀖􀂫 􀀄􀁓􀁱􀂉􀂫 􀀁􀀃 􀂜􀁰􀂏􀁟􀁕􀂗􀁟􀂆􀁳􀂄􀁭􀂫 􀂪􀂉􀂠􀀬􀀃􀂫 􀀉􀁎􀂐􀀡􀂫 􀀓􀀨 􀀏􀀓􀀇􀀌􀀣 􀁎􀁰􀁟􀂫 􀁿􀁠􀁕􀁜􀂫 􀂑􀁟􀂕􀂌􀂉􀂄􀁜􀁟􀂄􀂘􀂫 􀂏􀁟􀂋􀁿􀁴􀁟􀁜􀂫 􀀅􀁎􀁰􀁟􀂫 􀂕􀁗􀂃􀁟􀂫 􀂉􀂄􀁟􀂕􀂫 􀂧􀁰􀂉􀂫 􀁾􀁳􀂀􀂀􀁟􀁜􀂫 􀂃􀂪􀂫 􀁰􀂟􀂕􀁚􀁕􀂄􀁜􀀠􀀆􀂫􀀉􀀼􀁜􀀣􀀋􀀠􀂫 􀀊􀀨􀀼􀂃􀂃􀁳􀁯􀁕􀂜􀁳􀂉􀂄􀂫􀁀􀂠􀁜􀁭􀁟􀂫􀂕􀁰􀁕􀁿􀂀􀂫􀁳􀂄􀁣􀂉􀂐􀂃􀂫􀁕􀂄􀂫􀁕􀂀􀁳􀁟􀂄􀂫􀂉􀁤􀂫􀁲􀁼􀂕􀂫􀂉􀂐􀂫􀁰􀁟􀂐􀂫􀁕􀂋􀂋􀁕􀂑􀁟􀂄􀂗􀂫􀁟􀂂􀁳􀁭􀁴􀁚􀁴􀁿􀁴􀂗􀂪􀂫􀀢􀀨􀁕􀂋􀂋􀂀􀂪􀂫􀁥􀂊􀂏􀂫􀂑􀁟􀁿􀁴􀁟􀁣􀀡􀂫 􀀏􀀕􀀖􀀨􀀉􀀨􀀲􀀠􀀹􀀠􀁊􀀠􀂫􀀢􀀣􀀐􀀑􀀔􀀎􀀍􀀐􀀏􀀣􀀁􀀝􀀅􀀂􀀑􀀆􀀌􀀣 􀀼􀁤􀂫􀁗􀂆􀂫􀁕􀁿􀁳􀁟􀂄􀂫􀁟􀂩􀂋􀂑􀁟􀂕􀂕􀁟􀂕􀂫􀁩􀁖􀂑􀂫􀂉􀁣􀂫􀂋􀁟􀂑􀂕􀁟􀁛􀂠􀂗􀁳􀂉􀂄􀂫􀂉􀂏􀂫􀁰􀁗􀂑􀂃􀂫􀂠􀂋􀂉􀂄􀂫􀂐􀁟􀂞􀂫􀂗􀂉􀂫􀂜􀁱􀁟􀂫 􀁛􀂉􀂟􀂄􀂗􀂐􀂪􀂫􀂉􀁣􀂫􀂏􀁟􀂃􀂉􀂣􀁕􀂀􀀔􀂫􀁕􀂄􀁜􀂫􀂘􀁰􀁟􀂫􀁕􀁿􀁳􀁟􀂆􀂫􀁰􀁕􀂖􀂫􀂄􀂉􀂗􀂫􀂋􀂑􀁟􀂤􀁳􀂉􀂟􀂖􀁿􀂪􀂫􀁥􀁹􀂀􀁢􀂫􀁗􀂇􀂫􀁕􀂋􀂋􀁿􀁴􀁛􀁕􀂘􀁴􀂉􀂄􀂫􀁥􀂊􀂏􀂫􀁕􀂖􀂪􀂀􀂟􀂃􀂫􀂉􀂑􀂫􀂧􀁴􀂜􀁲􀁰􀂉􀁿􀁜􀁳􀂄􀁭􀂫 􀂉􀁤􀂫􀂏􀁟􀂃􀂉􀂥􀁕􀁿􀀔􀂫 􀂚􀁰􀁟􀂫􀀼􀂃􀂃􀁴􀁯􀁕􀂘􀁶􀂉􀂄􀂫 􀁀􀂟􀁜􀁭􀁟􀂫 􀂕􀁰􀁖􀂂􀂂􀂫 􀁕􀁞􀂤􀁳􀂕􀁟􀂫 􀂗􀁰􀁟􀂫􀁕􀁿􀁳􀁟􀂄􀂫 􀂘􀁰􀁕􀂗􀂫 􀁰􀁟􀂫 􀂉􀂐􀂫 􀂕􀁰􀁟􀂫 􀂃􀁕􀂪􀂫 􀁕􀂋􀂋􀁿􀂪􀂫􀁬􀂏􀂫 􀂕􀂠􀁛􀁰􀂫􀂏􀁟􀂀􀁳􀁟􀁣􀂫 􀁕􀂆􀁜􀂫 􀂃􀁖􀁾􀁟􀂫􀁕􀂣􀁕􀁳􀁿􀁕􀁚􀂀􀁟􀂫􀂘􀁰􀁟􀂫􀁕􀂋􀂋􀂏􀂉􀂋􀂏􀁴􀁕􀂘􀁟􀂫􀁬􀂐􀂃􀂕􀀤􀂫 􀀏􀀖􀀖􀀨􀀉􀀨 􀀲􀀞􀀸􀀠􀁊􀀠􀂫􀀢􀀣􀀐􀀑􀀕􀀎􀀌􀀏􀀣􀂀􀀉􀁛􀀊􀀈􀂀􀀊􀀠􀂫 􀁈􀂄􀂫􀁕􀂋􀂋􀁟􀁕􀁿􀀗􀂫􀂜􀁱􀁟􀂫􀂀􀁟􀁕􀁜􀂫􀂐􀁟􀂕􀂋􀂉􀂄􀁜􀁟􀂄􀂘􀂫􀁛􀂀􀁗􀁳􀂃􀂕􀂫􀂘􀁰􀁟􀂫􀀼􀂃􀂃􀁳􀁭􀂐􀁕􀂗􀁳􀂉􀂄􀂫􀁀􀂠􀁜􀁭􀁟􀂫􀁜􀁴􀁜􀂫􀂄􀂉􀂗􀂫􀁯􀁖􀂄􀂗􀂫􀁰􀁟􀂑􀂫􀁖􀂄􀂫􀂉􀂋􀂋􀂉􀂑􀂘􀂟􀂄􀁳􀂘􀂪􀂫 􀂗􀂉􀂫􀁦􀁺􀁿􀁟􀂫 􀁕􀂆􀂫 􀁕􀂋􀂋􀂀􀁳􀁛􀁕􀂘􀁴􀂉􀂄􀂫 􀁥􀂊􀂑􀂫􀁕􀂕􀂪􀁿􀂡􀂃􀀠􀂫 􀁏􀂄􀁜􀁟􀂐􀂫􀂘􀁰􀁟􀂫􀁛􀁳􀂏􀁛􀂠􀂃􀂕􀂘􀁗􀂇􀁛􀁟􀂕􀀘􀂫 􀂧􀁟􀂫 􀁦􀁻􀂄􀁜􀂫􀁳􀂗􀂫 􀁕􀂋􀂋􀂑􀂉􀂋􀂑􀁳􀁕􀂗􀁟􀂫􀂘􀂉􀂫􀂑􀁟􀂃􀁕􀂄􀁜􀂫 􀂗􀁰􀁟􀂫 􀂑􀁟􀁛􀂉􀂏􀁜􀂫􀁥􀂊􀂏􀂫 􀂜􀁲􀁟􀂫 􀀼􀂈􀂅􀁳􀁯􀁕􀂝􀁸􀂉􀂄􀂫􀁀􀂠􀁜􀁭􀁟􀂫 􀂗􀂉􀂫 􀂋􀂏􀂉􀂦􀁳􀁜􀁟􀂫􀂘􀁰􀁟􀂫 􀂑􀁟􀂕􀂋􀂉􀂄􀁜􀁟􀂄􀂗􀂕􀂫􀁗􀂄􀂫 􀂉􀂋􀂋􀂉􀂐􀂛􀂟􀂄􀁳􀂜􀂪􀂫􀂗􀂉􀂫 􀁕􀂋􀂋􀁿􀂪􀂫􀁬􀂏􀂫 􀁕􀂕􀂪􀂀􀂟􀂃􀀙􀂫 􀂨􀁷􀂙􀁲􀁱􀂉􀁿􀁜􀁸􀂄􀁭􀂫 􀂉􀁤􀂫􀂑􀁟􀂃􀂉􀂥􀁕􀁿􀂫 􀁕􀂆􀁜􀂫 􀂋􀂐􀂉􀂘􀁟􀁛􀂗􀁳􀂉􀂄􀂫 􀂠􀂄􀁜􀁟􀂏􀂫 􀂘􀁰􀁟􀂫 􀀲􀂉􀂄􀂣􀁟􀂄􀂗􀁳􀂉􀂄􀂫 􀀭􀁭􀁕􀁳􀂄􀂕􀂚􀂫 􀁎􀂉􀂏􀂗􀂡􀂑􀁟􀀥􀂫 􀀿􀂄􀂫 􀁿􀁴􀁭􀁰􀂘􀂫 􀂉􀁣􀂫 􀂉􀂢􀂐􀂫 􀁜􀁟􀁛􀁴􀂕􀁴􀂉􀂄􀀚􀂫􀂧􀁟􀂫􀁪􀂅􀁜􀂫􀁴􀂗􀂫􀂟􀂄􀂄􀁟􀁛􀁟􀂕􀂕􀁖􀂐􀂪􀂫􀂘􀂉􀂫􀁕􀁜􀁜􀂐􀁟􀂕􀂕􀂫􀂗􀁰􀁟􀂫􀂉􀂘􀁰􀁟􀂐􀂫􀁴􀂕􀂕􀂟􀁟􀂕􀂫􀂉􀂄􀂫􀁕􀂋􀂋􀁟􀁕􀁿􀀠􀂫 􀀭􀁛􀁛􀂉􀂐􀁜􀁳􀂄􀁮􀂀􀂪􀀔􀂫􀂜􀁱􀁟􀂫􀁧􀂊􀁿􀂀􀂉􀂧􀁴􀂄􀁭􀂫 􀂉􀂐􀁜􀁡􀂏􀂫􀂧􀁶􀂀􀁿􀂫􀁚􀁟􀂫􀁟􀂄􀂘􀁟􀂑􀁟􀁜􀀞􀂫 (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) 􀀁􀀂 􀀎 􀀍􀀌􀀁􀀎 􀀍􀀞􀀂􀀲 􀀉􀀋􀀄􀀅􀀊􀀃􀀲 􀀌􀀙􀀒􀀲􀀥􀀓􀀐􀀢􀀥􀀑􀀲􀀛􀀪􀀲􀀦􀀓􀀟􀀑􀀓􀀑􀀲􀀫􀀢􀀲􀀬􀀚􀀓􀀲􀀆􀀇􀀝􀀘􀀧􀀎􀀬􀀛􀀢􀀠􀀲􀀈􀀰􀀑􀀘􀀓􀀲􀀖􀀣􀀧􀀲􀀊􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀤􀀥􀀢􀀐􀀓􀀓􀀑􀀛􀀡􀀘􀀪􀀲􀀐􀀢􀀡􀀪􀀛􀀪􀀫􀀓􀀡􀀬􀀲 􀀱􀀝􀀭􀀚􀀲􀀭􀀙􀀓􀀲􀀕􀀣􀀨􀀓􀀘􀀢􀀛􀀠􀀘􀀲􀀢􀀤􀀛􀀡􀀛􀀢􀀠􀀲􀀏􀀠􀀑􀀲􀀗􀀩􀀲􀀮􀀙􀀓􀀲􀀓􀀡􀀯􀀲􀀢􀀔􀀲􀀎􀀲􀀡􀀓􀀱􀀲􀀑􀀓􀀐􀀛􀀪􀀜􀀢􀀠􀀁􀀲 􀀁􀀂 (b) (6)

Judge Pelletier Deprived Unaccompanied Children Right To Apply for Asylum

Dan Pelletier

Immigration Judge Dan Pelletier Wrongfully Denied Unaccompanied Children Right To Apply For Asylum

Since 2014, the Board of Immigration Appeals remanded Immigration Judge Dan Pelletier’a decisions a total of 8 times where he denied unaccompanied children their right to apply for asylum under the 2008 Trafficking and Victims Protection Reauthorization Act.

The text of decisions are below. You  can read or download the pdf version here: 

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

De.cision of the Board oflmmigration Appeals

Falls Church, Virginia 22041

File: – Atlanta, GA In re: (b) (6)

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL

Date: February 1, 2016

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Daniel Joseph Ortiz, Esquire

CHARGE:

Notice: Sec. 212(a)(6)(A)(i), I&N Act (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)] –

Present without being admitted or paroled APPLICATION: Asylum, withholding of removal; Convention Against Torture

The respondent, an 18-year-old native and citizen of Mexico, appeals the Immigration Judge’s July 28, 2015, decision denying her request for asylum, withholding of removal IB1de·r the Immigration and Nationality Act, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). See sections 208(b)(l)(A) and 24l (b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(l)(A), 123l(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.18.

The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has not opposed the appeal. The record will be remanded.

There is evidence in the- record indicating that the respondent may have been, at one point, determined to be an “unaccompanied alien child” (“UAC) (Exh. 2).    As  such we  find  that there is a threshold issue to be addressed regarding initial jurisdiction  over the respondent’s appticotion for asylum in light of the provisions of the William Wilbertorce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA), Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, and the procedures set forth by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) relating to the adjudication of asylum applications filed by UACs.

Section 235(d)(7)(B) of TVPRA, codified at section 208(b)(3)(C) of the Act, provides that “[a]n asylum officer … shall have initial jurisdiction over any asylum application filed by an unaccompanied alien child ….” The term “unaccompanied alien child” is defined in the Act by reference to “section 462(g) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. § 279(g)),» which in turn defines the term as “a child who (A) has no lawful immigration status in the United States;

(B) haB not attained 18 years of age; and (C) with respect to whom (i) there is no parent or legal guardi.m in the United States or (ii) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available to provide care and physical custody.

The USCIS subsequently issued a memorandum regarding updated procedures for determining initial jurisdiction over asylum applications filed by UACs. Memorandum from Ted Kim, USCIS Acting Chief, Asylum Division (May 28, 2013), Updated Procedures forDetermination of Initial Jurisdiction over Asylum Applications Filed by Unaccompanied Alien Children, HQRAIO 120/ l 2a (USCIS memo). This memorandum states that, effective June 10, 2013, in cases in which the Customs and Border Protection (CBP”) or Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) has already made a determination that an applicant is a UAC, “and that status determination was still in place on the date the asylum application was filed, Asylum Offices will adopt that determination without another factual inquiry.Id. at 1-2. The memo goes on to state that “[u]nless there was an affirmative act by [Health and Human Services], ICE or CBP to terminate the UAC finding before the applicant filed the initial application for asylum, Asylum Offices will adopt the previous DHS determination that the applicant was a UACand will take jurisdiction over the case.” Id at 2 (emphasis supplied). The memo further explains that in such cases, where there is a prior UAC determination which is still in place at the time the asylum application is filed, USCIS will take initial jurisdiction over the case “even if there appears to be evidence that the applicant may have turned 18 years of age or may have reunited with a parent or legal guardiansince the UAC determination was made. Id.

Neither Immigration Judges nor this Board are bound by the USCIS memo cited above. Seee.g. , Matter of C. Valdez, 25 I&N Dec. 824, 826 n.l (BIA 2012) (noting that a USCIS policy memorandum was persuasive, but not binding). However, as USCIS is the agency vested with initial jurisdiction over UAC asylum applications, we would defer to USCIS’s determination of whether it retains jurisdiction over the initial adjudication of an unaccompanied minor’s asylum application.

While we recognize that the respondent turned 18 after she filed her asylum application and was also released into the custody of her mother, based on the above, neither of these. factors would necessarily deprive USCIS of initial jurisdiction over this matter. However, we cannot make a determination as to jurisdiction on the record before us, and thus conclude that remand is necessary. In this regard, further fact-finding is needed to determine: 1) whether the respondent was detennined to be a UAC prior to the initial filing of her asylum application; 2) if so, whether that status has been terminated by an “affirmative actwithin the contemplation of the USCIS memo and 3) whether the announced position of the USCIS as set forth in the USCIS memo has been withdrawn or superseded.

If this respondent comes within the scope of the USCIS memo, the respondent shall be provided the opportunity to pursue an application for asylum before the USCIS. If after additional fact-finding, it is determined that the respondent does not fall within the provisions of this policy memo , the Immigration Judge may certify the case back to the Board. 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.7. I

Accordingly, the following order will be entered.

 We do not find the Immigration Judge’s discussion of the respondent’s sexual activity and medical history to be necessary or relevant to the analysis of the respondent’s daim (l.J. at 5-6; Tr. at 78-80).

2

(b) (6)

ORDER: The record is remanded to a different lmrnjgration Judge for further proceedings not inconsistent with the foregoing opinion.

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U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Falls Church, Virginia 2204 I

File: (b) (6) Atlanta, GA Date: In re: (b) (6)

NOV 2 2015

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Joseph Anthony Azar , Esquire

ON BEHALF OF OHS: Joy Lampley

Assistant Chief Counsel

CHARGE :

Notice : Sec. 212(a)(6)(A)(i), I&N Act (8 U .S.C. § I 182(a)(6)(A)(i)] –

Present without being admitted or paroled APPLICATION: Asylum

The respondent, a native and citizen of Guatemala, has appealed the lnunigration Judge’s decision dated June 19, 20 l 5, which denied his asylum application Wlder section 208(b)( l )(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (..Act”), 8 U .S.C. §§ l 158(b)(l )(A). The Department of Homeland Security (“OHS”) has requested that the Immigration Judge’s decision be affirmed. The record will be remanded to the Immigration Court.

We review the findings of fact, including the detennination of credibility, made by the Immigration Judge under a “clearly erroneous” standard. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(J)(i). We review all other issues, including whether tlle parties have met their relevant burden of proof, and issues of discretion, under a de novo standard. 8 C.F.R. § l003.l (d)(3)(ii). The respondent’s asylum application is governed by the amendments to the REAL ID Act. See Matter of S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 42 (BIA 2006).

There is evidence in the record indicating that the respondent was, at one point, determined to be an “unaccompanied alien child” (“UAC”) (Exh. 3). As such, we find that there is a threshold issue to be addressed regarding initial jurisdiction over the respondent’s application for asylum in light of the provisions of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (“TVPRA”), Pub. L. No. 1 l0-457. 122 Stat. 5044, and the procedures set forth by the United States Citizenship and tmmigration Services (“USCJS”) relating to the adjudication of asylum applications filed by UACs.

Section 235(d)(7)(B) of TVPRA, codified at section 208(b)(3)(C) of the Act, provides that ‘·[a]n asylum officer shall have initial jurisdiction over any asylum application filed by an unaccompanied alien child .... The term “unaccompanied alien child” is defined in the Act by reference tose:ction 462(.g) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. § 279(g)),” which in turn defines the term asa child who (A) has no lawful immigration status in the United States;(B) has not attained 18 years of age; and (C) with respect to whom (i) there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States; or (ii) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available to provide care and physical custody.”

The USCIS subsequently issued a memorandum regarding updated procedures for determining initial jurisdiction over asylum applications filed by UACs. Memorandum from Ted Kim, USCIS Acting Chief, Asylum Division (May 28, 2013), Updated Procedures for Determination of Initial Jurisdiction over Asylum Applications Filed by Unaccompanied Alien Children, HQRAIO I 20/l 2a (“USCIS memo”). This memorandum states that, effective June I 0, 2013, in cases in which the Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) or Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) has already made a determination that an applicant is a UAC, “and that status determination was still in place on the date the asylum application was filed, Asylum Offices will adopt that determination without another factual inquiry.” Id. at 1-2. The memo goes on to state that “[u]nless there was an affirmative act by [Health and Human Services], ICE or CBP to terminate the UAC finding before the applicant filed the initial application for asylum, Asylum Offices will adopt the previous DHS determination that the applicant was a UAC” and ..will take jurisdiction over the case.” Id at 2 (emphasis supplied). The memo further explains that in such cases, where there is a prior UAC determination which is still in place at the time the asylum application is filed, USCIS will take initial jurisdiction over the case “even if there appears to be evidence that the applicant may have turned 18 years of age or may have reunited with a parent or legal guardian” since the UAC determination was made. Id.

Neither Immigration Judges nor this Board are bound by the USCIS memo cited above. See, e.g., Matter of C. Valdez, 25 l&N Dec. 824, 826 n. I (B[A 2012) (noting that a USCJS policy memorandum was persuasive, but not binding). However, as users is the agency vested with initial jurisdiction over UAC asylum applications, we would defer to USCIS’s determination of whether it retains jurisdiction over the initial adjudication of an unaccompanied minor’s asylum application .

On the record before us, we conclude that a remand is necessary for a determination whether this is a case in which the USCIS would take initial jurisdiction over this respondent’s application for asylum. In this regard, further fact-finding is needed I ) whether the respondent was determined to be a UAC prior to the initial filing of his asylum application; 2) if so, whether that status has been terminated by an “affirmative act” within the contemplation of the USCIS memo; and 3) whether the announced position of the users as set forth in the users memo has been withdrawn or superseded.

If this respondent comes within the scope of the USCIS memo, the respondent shall be provided the opportunity to pursue an application for asylum before the USCIS. If after additional fact-finding, it is determined that the respondent does not fall within the provisions of this policy memo, the Immigration Judge may certify the case back to the Board. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.7.

Accordingly, the following order will be entered.

2

(b) (6)

ORDER : The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceed ings not

inconsistent with the foregoing opinion.

FOR THE BOARD

3

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for 1mmigratron Review

Dec1S1on of the Board oflmmigration Appeals

Falls Church, Virgrma 22041

File: – Atlanta, GA

Date:

October 16, 2015

In re:

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS A PPEAL

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: George E. Lee. Esqui re

ON BEHALF OF OHS: Abby L. Meyer

Assistant Chief Counsel

CHARGE:

Notice:    Sec.      212(a)(6)(A)(i), l&N Act  [8 U.S.C. §  1 182(a)(6)(A)(i)] 

Present without being admitted or  paroled

APPLICATION : Asylum; withholding ofremoval; Convention Against Torture

The respondent, a native and citizen of Guatemala. appeals the lmmigration Judge·s November 21. 2014, decision’ denying his application for asylum, wi thholdi ng of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). See sections 208. 241 (b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1231 (b)(3); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13,

1208.16-1208.18. The record will be remanded.

We review for clear error the findings of fact, i ncluding the determination of credibi l ity, made by the Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. § l 003. l(d)(3)(i). We review de novo all other issues, i ncluding whether the parties have met the relevant burden of proof, and issues of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § l 003. l (d)(3)(ii). The respondent’s application was filed after J\.fay 1 1, 2005, and therefore is governed by the provisions of the REAL ID Act. lv!atter of SB-, 24 l&N Dec. 42 (BIA 2006).

1 The respondent filed a timely appeal from the Immigration Judges November 21 , 2014, decision with this Board on December 22, 2014 ( see Notice of Appeal). On March 23, 2015, the Board remanded the proceedi ng to the Immigration Judge because portions of the hearing t ranscri pt were missing and there was no oral decision from the Immigration Judge (see BIA at 1 ). On May 27. 201 5. the Immigration Judge issued a decision clarifying that the testimony from the final heari ng and the Immigration Judge’s oral decision were mistakenly recorded in the digital audio record ing under a different alien number (I.J. at l ). The Immigration Judge took steps to correct the problem and certified the record back to the Board (LT . at l ). The record now contains a complete transcript and oral decision.

(b) (6)

The record reflects that the respondent in this case may have been an “unaccom panied alien chi ld” (UAC ). Thus, there is a threshold issue to be addressed regarding init ial jurisdiction over the respondent’s application for asylum in light of the provisions of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victi ms Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (“TVPRA”), Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, and the procedures set forth by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS’) relating to the adjudication of asylum applications filed by UACs.

Section 235(d)(7)(B) of TVPRA. codified at section 208(b)(3)(C) of the Act, provides that ‘[a]n asylwn officer … shall have initial jurisdiction over any asylum application filed by an unaccompanied alien child ....” The term “unaccompanied alien child” is defined in the Act by reference to “section 462(g) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S .C. § 279(g)),” which in tum defines the term as ‘a child who (A) has no lawful immigration status in the Uru ted States;

(B) has not attained 1 8 years of age; and (C) with respect lo whom (i) there is no parent or legal guardian i n the United States; or (ii) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available to provide care and physical custody.”

The USCIS subsequently y issued a memorandum regarding updated procedures for determining initial jurisdiction over asylum applications filed by UACs. Memorandum from Ted Kim, USCIS Acting Chief, Asylum Division (May 28, 2013), Updated Procedures for Determination of Initial Jurisdiction over Asylum Applications Filed by Unaccompanied Alien Children, HQRAIO 120/12a (“USCIS memo”). This memorandum states that, effective June 10, 2013, i n cases i n which the Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) or Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) has already made a detennination that an applicant is a UAC, “and that status determination was still in place on the date the asylum application was filed, Asylum Offices will adopt that determination without another factual inquiry.” id. at 1-2. The memo goes on to state that .;[u]nless there was an affirmative act by [Health and Human Services], ICE or CBP to tetminate the UAC finding before the applicant filed the ini tia l application for asylum, Asylum Offices will adopt the previous OHS determination that the applicant was a UAC” and will take jurisdiction over the case.Id. at 2 (emphasis supplied) . The memo further explains that in such cases, where there is a prior U AC determination which is still in place at the ti me the asylum application is filed, USCIS will take initial jurisdiction over the case ·even if there appears to be evidence that the applicant may have turned 18 years of age or may have reunited with a parent or legal guardian” since the UAC determination was made. Id.

Neither Immigration Judges nor this Board are bound by the USCIS memo cited above. See, e g., Matter of C Valdez, 25 I&N Dec. 824, 826 n. l (BIA 2012) (noting that a USCIS policy memorandum was persuasive, but not binding). However , as USCIS is the agency vested with initial jurisdiction over l.J AC asylum applications, we would defer to USCIS’ determination ofWhether it retains jurisdiction over the initial adjudication of an unaccompanied minor’s asylum application .

On the record before us, we conclude that a remand is necessary for a determination whether this is a case in which the USCIS would take initial jurisdiction over this respondent’s application for asylum. In this regard, further factfinding is needed 1) whether the respondent was determined to be a UAC prior to the initial filing of her asylum application ; 2) if so, whether that status has been terminated by an “affirmative act within the contemplation of the USCIS memo; and 3) whether the announced position of the USCIS as set forth in the USCIS memo has been ,withdrawn or superseded.

If this respondent comes within the scope of the USCIS memo, the respondent will be provided the opportunity to pursue an application for asylum before the USCIS. If after additional fact-finding, it is determined that the respondent does not fall within the provisions of this policy memo, the Immigration Judge may certify the case back to the Board. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.7.

Accordingly, the following order will be entered.

ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and entry of a new decision.

3

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Decision of the Board of 1mrnigration Appeals

Falls Church, Virginia 22041

File: Atlanta, GA Date:

In re: (b) (6)

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Joseph A. Azar, Esquire

ON BEHALF OF OHS: Sirce E. Owen

Assistant Chief Counsel

AUG 27 2015

APPLJCA TION: Asylum; withholding of removal; Convention Against Torture

The respondent, a native and citizen of Honduras, appeals from the Immigration Judge’s decision dated February 9, 2015, denying his applications for asylum pursuant to section 208(b)(l )(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(A), withholding of removal pursuant to section 24l(b)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and protection W1der the Convention Against Torture pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.I6(c)-.18. The Department of Homeland Security opposes the appeal. The record will be remanded.

There is evidence in the record indicating that the respondent was, at one point, determined to be an unaccompanied alien child” (“UAC) (Exh. 3).     As  such,  we  find  that  there  is  a threshold issue to be addressed regarding initial jurisdiction over the respondent’s application for asylum in  light of the provisions of the William Wilberforce Trafficking  Victims Protection Reauthorization  Act of 2008 (TVPRA), Pub. L. No.  110-457,  122 Stat. 5044, and the procedures set forth by the United  States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) relating to the adjudication of asylum applications filed by UACs.

Section 235(d)(7)(B) of TVPRA, codified at section 208(b)(3)(C) of the Act, provides that “[a]n asylum officer … shall have initial jurisdiction over any asylum application filed by an unaccompanied alien child ....” The tenn “unaccompanied alien child.’ is defined in the Act by reference to “section 462(g) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. § 279(g)),” which in turn defines the term as “a child who (A) has no lawful immigration status in the United States;

(B) has not attained 18 years of age; and with respect to whom (i) there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States; or (ii) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available to provide care and physical custody.

The  USClS  subsequently    issued  a  memorandum  regarding  updated  procedures  for determining initial jurisdiction over asyl um applications filed by UACs. Memorandum from Ted Kim,  USCIS  Acting  Chief: Asylum  Division  (May  28, 2013) Update Procedures for Determination of Initial Jurisdiction over Asylum Applications Filed by Unaccompanied Alien Children. HQRAIO I20/12a (USCIS memo). This memorandum states that, effective June 10, 2013, in cases in which  the Customs and Border Protection  (CBP) or Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE) has already made a determination that an applicant is a UAC,

(b) (6)

and that status determination  was still in place on the date the asylum application was filed, Asylwn Offices will adopt that determination without another factual inquiry.”  Id . at 1-2. The memo goes on to state  that “(u]nJess there was an  affirmative act by  [Health and Human Services], ICE or CBP to terminate  the UAC finding before the applicant  filed the initiaJ application for asylum, Asylum Offices will  adopt the previous DHS determination that the applicant was a UAC” and “will take jurisdiction over the ca<se .” Id. at 2 (emphasis supplied). The memo further explains that in such cases, where there is a prior UAC determination which is still in place at the time the asylum application is filed, users will take initial jurisdiction over the case even if there appears to be evidence that the applicant may have turned 18 years of age or may have reunited with a parent or legal guardian since the UAC determination was made. Id

Neither Immigration Judges nor this Board are bound by the USCIS memo cited above. See, e.g.. Matter of C. Valdez, 25 T&N Dec. 824, 826 n.l (BIA 2012) (noting that a USCIS policy memorandum was persuasive, but not binding). However, as USCIS is the agency vested with initial jurisdiction over UAC asylum applications , we would defer to USCIS’s determination of whether it retains jurisdiction over the initial adjudication of an unaccompanied minor’s asylum application .

On the record before us, we conclude that a remand is necessary for a determination whether this is a case in which the USCIS would take initial jurisdiction over this respondent’s application for asylum. In this regard, further fact-finding is needed l ) whether the respondent was determined to be a UAC prior to the initial filing of his asylum application; 2) if so, whether that status has been terminated by an affirmative actwithin the contemplation of the USCIS memo; and 3) whether the announced position of the USCIS as set forth in the USCIS memo has been withdrawn or superseded .

If this respondent comes within the scope of the USCIS memo, the respondent shall be provided the opportunity to pursue an application for asylum before the USCIS. If after additional fact-finding, it is determined that the respondent does not fall within the provisions of this policy memo, the Immigration Judge may certify the case back to the Board. 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.7.

Ac.cordingly, the following order will be entered.

ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings not inconsistent with the foregoing opinion .

2

…. U.S.Department of Justice

Exect1tive Office for Immigration Review

Decision of the Board oflmmigration Appeals

Falls Church, Virginia 20530

File: (b) (6) Atlanta, GA Date:

(b) (6)

In re:

JUN l 9 2015

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Amna Shirazi, Esquire CHARGE:

Notice:   Sec.     212(a)(6)(A)(i), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § l 182(aX6)(A)(i)] 

Present without being admitted or  paroled

APPLICATlON: Continuance

The respondent, a native and citizen of Guatemala, appeals from the Immigration Judge’s decisions dated December J and 3, 2014, denying his request for a continuance. The record wiJI be remanded.

We review the findings of fact, including the determination of credibility, made by the Immigration Judge for clear error. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i). We review all other issues, including questions of law and issues of discretion, de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(ii).

Both before the Immigration Judge and on appeal to the Board, the respondent has argued that U.S. Citraenship and Immigration Services or USCIS), rather than the Immigration Judge, should initially adjudicate his asylum application. The respondent relies on the provisions of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat 5044 (2008), which created procedural protections for W1accompanied alien children (UAC) who had “been forced to strugg]e through an immigration system designed for adults.’..2 Cong. Rec. S10886-0l (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Sen. Feinstein, cosponsor of original Senate version). One of these protections gives UACs, including those in removal proceedings, the right to have their asylum applications reviewed in the fll’St instance by an asylum officer with the USCIS. TVPRA § 235(d)(7)(B) (codified at section 208(b)(3)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(C)) (stating that “[a]n asylum officer . . . shall have initial jurisdiction over any asylum application filed by an unaccompanied alien child”).

1 The respondent has provided evidence that he filed an application for asylum with USCIS that is pending before that agency.

2 An ‘\maccompanied alien child” is defined as one who 1) “has no lawful immigration status in the United States,2) ”has not attained 18 years of aget and 3) either has no parent or legal guardian in the United States, or none is available to provide care and physical custody. 6 U.S.C.

§ 279(g).

(b) (6)

In a memorandum dated May 28, 2013, USCIS stated that in cases in which either U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) or U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) “has already made a determination that the applicant is a UAC, and that status detennination was still in place on the date the asylum application was filed, Asylum Offices will adopt that determination without another factual inquiry.” Memorandum from Ted Kim to Asylum Office Staff, Updated Procedures for Determination of Initial Jurisdiction over Asylum Applications Filed by Unaccompanied Alien Children (HQRAIO 120/12a) (May 28, 2013) at 2. Central to the issue now before us, the memo goes on to state that ”[u]nless there was an affirmative act by [the

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)], ICE or CBP to tenninate the UAC finding before the applicant filed the initial application for asylW11, Asylum Offices wiJJ adopt the previous OHS determination that the applicant was a UAC .Id. (emphasis supplied). Further, “if CBP or ICE determined that the applicant was a UAC, and, as of the date of initial filing of the asylum application, that UAC status determination was still in place, USCIS will take initial jurisdiction over the case, even if there appears to be evidence that the applicant may have turned 18 years of age or may have reunited with a parent or legal guardian since the CBP or ICE determination.” Id.

In the case before us, the Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s request for a continuance. concluding that the above memorandum was not binding on the court, that the respondent was no longer UAC given that he had been reunified with a parent, and that the court had jurisdiction over the respondent’s application for relief (Tr. at 26). Cowtsel for the

respondent indicated that he did not wish to proceed with the application filed before the court given his argument that initial jurisdiction was with users.

To the extent the Immigration Judge may have concluded that HHS’s release of the respondent from c.ustody constituted a “termination” of his UAC status, we note that while the USCIS memo specifically references the HHS‘s Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) Verificatjon of Release Form, it solely does so as evidence that a UAC detennination has been m:1de. And, it is clear from this memo that the reunification of a child with a parent is not in itself determinative that UAC status is no longer in place. Further, OHS did not argue before the Immigration Judge, and has not argued before the Board in response to the respondent’s appeal, th,i.t there has been ru1 “affirmative act” by HHS, ICE, or CBP to terminate the determination that the respondent was a U AC. Nor has the DHS explained what constitutes such an act within the contemplation of the USCIS memo or argued that the memo no longer represents the position of the Government.3

Neither Immigration Judges nor this Board is bound by the USCIS memo cited above. See. e.g . Matter of C. Valdez, 25 I&N Dec. 824, 826 n.l (BIA 2012) (noting that a USCIS policy memorandum was persuasive, but not binding).  However, as USCIS is the agency vested with initial jurisdiction over UAC asylum applications, we would defer to USCIS’s determination of whether it retains jurisdiction over the initial adjudication of the respondent s application On the record before us, we conclude that a remand is warranted pending a determination by the USCIS whether it ,viii take initial jurisdiction over this respondent s application for asylum.  On remand, the parties  will have the opportunity to present evidence regarding the status of the respondent’s application before USCIS.    Should the Immigration Judge find that U SCIS has accepted jurisdiction,  proceedings  should  be continued  or administratively  closed  pending adjudication of that application. Should the Immigration Judge find that USCIS has not accepted jurisdiction over the application, he may certify the record to the Board upon the conclusion of the proceedings on remand. See generally 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.l(c), 1003.7.

Accordingly, the record will be remanded as set forth below.

ORDER: The record is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing decision and for the entry of a new decision.

FOR THE BOARD

3 We note that while this appeal was pending, the respondent turned 18. However, the USCIS memorandum cited above states that in cases, such as this one, where a determination of UAC status is still in place on the date the asylum application is filed, USCIS will take jurisdiction even where there is evidence that the alien has since turned 18.

U,S. Department of Justice

Executivo Office for Immigration Review

Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Falls Church, Virginia 20530

File: NW Atlanta, GA

Date:May 29, 2015

In re: (b) (6)

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Amna Shirazi, Esquire

ON BEHALF OF DHS: Joy Lampley

Assistant Chief Counsel

CHARGE :

Notice: Sec. 212(a)(6)(A)(i), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(6)(A)(i)J –

Present without being admitted or paroled APPLICATION: Continuance; tennination

The respondent, a nati ve and citizen of Guatemala, appeals from the Immigration Judge’s November 17, 2014, decision ordering her removal from the United States. The record wil1 be remanded .

We review findings of fact, including credibiJity findings, under the “clearly erroneous” standard. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i); see also Mauer of J-Y-C-, 24 l&N Dec. 260 (BIA 2007); Mauer of S-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 462 (BIA 2002). We review questions of law, discretion, orjudgment, and all other issues de novo. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii).

The respondent filed an Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal (Fonn 1-589) before the Inunigration Judge on October 30, 2014 (J.J. at 2; Exh. 5). Thereafter, the respondent asserted that United States Citizenship and lmmigration Services (“USCIS”) had initial jurisdiction over her asylum application, based on the “Kim Memo” (I.J. at 2; Respondent’s Motion to Continue Individual Hearing, attached Memorandum from Ted Kim to Asyl um Office Staff, Updated Procedures for Determination of Initial Jurisdiction over Asylum Applications Filed by Unaccompanied Alien Children (HQRAIO 120/12a) (May 28, 2013)

(“Kim Memo”)). The respondent requested a continuance of the proceedings pending the adjudication of her Fonn 1-589 by users and, alternativel y, sought termination of removal

proceedings (I.J. at 2; Respondent’s Motion to Continue Individual Hearing).

The Immigration Judge found that the respondent did not appear to be an unaccompanied alien child, as contemplated by the Kim Memo, and that the Kim Memo was inappropriate with respect to the instant matter (U. at 2). Moreover , the Immigration Judge determined that the respondent was not an ‘”unaccompanied childbecause she was released into the care of her mother in July 2014 (I.J. at 2). Because the respondent, through counsel, declined to pursue her asylwn application in removal proceedings, the Immigration Judge deemed that application to be abandoned (U. at 2; Exh. 5).

On appeal, the respondent asserts that the Immigration Judge erred in concluding that the Immigration Court, rather than USCIS, was vested with jurisdiction over her asylum application (Respondent’s Brief at 3-5). She further asserts that the Immigration Judge erred in denying her request to continue removal proceedings in order to allow her the opportunity to pursue her asylum application before USCIS (Respondent’s Brief at 5). The respondent has provided documentation from USCIS acknowledging receipt of her asylum application.

We conclude that a remand is warranted pending a determination by USCIS as to whether it will  take  initial jurisdiction  over  the  respondent’s  application  for  asylum.     See  section 208(b)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U .S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(C) (providing that USCIS shall have initial jurisdiction over any asylum application filed by an unaccompanied alien child).  The respondent has identified evidence in the record, including‘Verification of Release” form issued by the Department of Health and Hwnan Services (HHS), which reflects

that she was designated an unaccompanied alien child (Respondent’s Motion to Continue Individual Hearing at ft 2-3; Respondent’s Brief at 4). The Immigration Judge properly observed that, according to the Kim Memo, the unaccompanied alien child determination must still be in place on the date on which the asylum application is filed (I.J. at 2; Kim Memo at 2).

However, the Kim Memo also states that a prior detennination that an applicant was an unaccompanied alien child will be adopted by Asylum Offices, absent an ”affirmative act” to terminate that determination by HHS or the Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) or Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) divisions of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). See Kim Memo at 2. While the Immigration Judge found that the respondent was not an unaccompanied alien child when she filed her asylum application, no specific finding was made with respect to whether HHS, CBP, or ICE undertook an “affirmative act” to terminate the prior determination that she was an unaccompanied alien child (I.J. at 2). See Kim Memo at 2. Nor did the OHS articulate its position with regard to whether an “affirmative act” effected termination of the respondent’s unaccompanied alien child status.’

Neither the Im.migration Judge nor this Board is bound by memoranda issued by USCIS. See, e.g., .Matter of C. Valdez, 25 I&N Dec. 824, 826 n.1 (BIA 2012) (noting that a USCIS policy memorandum was persuasive, but not binding). However, as USCIS is the agency vested with initial jurisdiction over the asylum applications of unaccompanied alien children, we would defer to USCIS’s determination of whether it retains jurisdiction over the initial adjudication of a respondent’s application. See section 208(b)(3)(C) of the Act. Therefore, we will remand the record to the Immigration Judge to await USCIS’s determination as to whether it has taken initial jurisdiction over this respondent’s application for asylum.

1 On appeal, the respondent indicates that her designation as an unaccompanied alien child has not been challenged by the DHS at any time (Notice of Appeal at 2).

2

  • t

(b) (6)

On remand, the parties will have the opportunity to present evidence regarding the status of the respondent’s application before USCIS. Should the Immigration Judge find that USCIS has accepted jurisdiction, the proceedings should be continued or administratively closed pending adjudication of that application. If the Immigration Judge determines that USCIS has not accepted jurisdiction over the asylwn application, the respondent should be provided a further opportunity to pursue her application in removal proceedings.

Accordingly, the following order will be entered.

ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion.

3

.,

U.S. Deparment of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Falls Church, Virginia 20530

File: – Atlanta, GA Date: June 5, 2015

ln re: (h) (6)

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Ana T. Fuentes, Esquire

ON BEHALF OF OHS: Joy Lampley

Assistant Chief Counsel

CHARGE:

Notice: Sec. 212(a)(6)(A)(i), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)] •

Present without being admitted or paroled APPLICATION: Asylum; withholding of removal

The respondent, an 18-year-old native and citizen of El Salvador, appeals the Immigration Judges November 17, 2014, decision denying the respondents applications for asylum and withholding of removal. See sections 208 and 24l(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ I 158. 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13, 1208.16. The record will be remanded.

There is evidence in the record indicating that the respondent was, at one point, determined to be an unaccompanied alien child” (“UAC”) (Exh. 3, printout of screenshot of “UAC Basic Information,” submitted August 20, 2014). As such, we find that there is a threshold issue to be addressed regarding irutial jurisdiction over the respondent’s application for asylum in light of the provisions of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (“TVPRA”), Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat 5044, and the procedures set forth by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) relating to the adjudication of asylum applications filed by UACs.

Section 235(d)(7)(B) of TVPRA, codified at section 208(b)(3)(C) of the Act, provides that “[a]n asylwn officer . . . shall have irutial jurisdiction over any asylum application filed by an unaccompanied alien chi]d . . . .” The term “unaccompanied alien child” is defined in the Act by reference to section 462(g) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. § 279(g)),” which in tum defines the tenn as “a child who (A) has no lawful immigration status in the United States; {B) has not attained 18 years of age; and (C) with respect to whom (i) there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States; or (ii) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available to provide care and physical custody.

The USCIS subsequently issued a memorandum regarding updated procedures for determining initial jurisdiction over asy]urn applications filed by UACs. Memorandum from Ted Kim, USCIS Acting Chief. Asylum Division (May 28, 2013), Updated Procedures for Determination of Initial Jurisdiction over Asylum Applications Filed by Unaccompanied Alien Children, HQRAIO 120/12a (“USCIS memo).  This memorandum states that, effective June 10, 2013, in cases in which the Customs and Border Protection  (CBP”) or Im.migration  and Customs Enforcement  (ICE) has already made a determination that an applicant is a UAC, and that status determination was still in place on the date the asylum application was filed, Asylum Offices will adopt that determination without another factual inquiry.Id. at 1-2.  The memo goes on to state that [u)nless there was an affirmative act  by [Health and HUinan Services], ICE or  CBP to terminate the UAC finding before the applicant filed the initial application for asylum, Asylum Offices will adopt the previous  DHS determination that the applicant was a UAC” and‘will take jurisdiction over the case.” Id  at 2 (emphasis supplied). The memo further explains 1hat in such cases, where there is a prior UAC determination which is still in place at the time the asylum application is filed, USCIS will take initial jurisdiction over the caseeven if there appears to be evidence that the applicant may have turned 18 years of age or may have reunited with a parent or legal guardian since the UAC detemtination was made. Id

Neither Immigration Judges nor this Board are bound by the USCIS memo cited above. See, e.g., Matter of C. Valdez, 25 I&N Dec. 824, 826 n.1 (BIA 2012) (noting that a USCIS policy memorandum was persuasive, but not binding). However, as USCJS is the agency vested with initial jurisdiction over UAC asylum applications, we would defer to USCISs determination of whether it retains jurisdiction over the initial adjudication of an unaccompanied minors asylum application.

On the record before us, we conclude that a remand is necessary for a determination whether this is a case in which the USCIS would take initial jurisdiction over this respondent’s application for asylum. In this regard, further fact-finding is needed l) whether the respondent was determined to be a UAC prior to the initial filing of her asylum application; 2) if so, whether that status has been terminated by an “affirmative act” within the contemplation of the USCIS memo; and 3) whether the announced position of the USCIS as set forth in the USCIS memo has been withdrawn or superseded.

If this respondent comes within the scope of the USCIS memo, the respondent shall be provided the opportunity to pursue an application for asylum before ‘the USCIS. If after additional fact-finding, it is determined that the respondent does not fall within the provisions of this policy memo, the Immigration Judge may certify the case back to the Board. 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.7.

Accordingly, the following order will be entered.

ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings not inconsistent with the foregoing opinion.

FOR THE BOARD 2

.,,

U.S. Department of Justice

, Executive Office for Inunigration Review

Decision of the BoBrd oflmmigration Appeals

Falls Church, Virginia 20530

File: (b) (6) – Atlanta, GA Date: In re: (b) (6)

JUN 17 2015

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Julio E. Moreno, Esquire

ON BEHALF OF DHS: Ginger Vaudrey

Assistant Chief Counsel

CHARGE:

Notice:   Sec.    212(a)(6){A)(i), J&N Act [8U.S.C. § 1182(aX6)(A)(i)] –

Present without being admitted or paroled

APPLICATION: Asylum; withholding of removal; Convention Against Torture

The respondent a native and citizen of El Salvador, appeals the Immigration Judge’s October 20. 2014. decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). See sections 208, 241{b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U .S.C. §§ 1 158, 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13, 1208.161208.18. The record wiU be remanded.

We review for clear error the findings of fact, induding the detennination of credibility, made by the Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.I (d)(3)(i). We review de novo all other issues, including whether the parties have met the relevant burden of proof, and issues of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l (d)(3)(ii). The respondent’s application was filed after May 1J. 2005, and therefore is governed by the provisions of the REAL ID Act. Matter of S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 42 (BIA 2006).

The record reflects that the respondent in this case may have been an “unaccompanied alien child(..UAC”). As such, we find that there is a threshold issue to be addressed regarding initial jurisdiction over the respondent’ s application for asylum in light of the provisions of the William Wilbetforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (“TVPRA”), Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, and the procedures set forth by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (”USCIS”) relating to the adjudication of asylum applications filed by UACs.

Section 235(d)(7)(B) of 1VPRA, codified at section 208(b)(3)(C) of the Act, provides that

;’[a]n asylum officer ... shall have initial jurisdiction over any asylum application filed by an unaccompanied  alien child ....1    The term unaccompanied alien child” is defined in the Act by reference tosection 462(g) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. § 279(g}),which in turn defines the term asa child who (A) has no lawful immigration status in the United States (B) has not attained 18 years of age; and (C) with respect to whom (i) there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States; or (ii) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available to provide care and physical custody.

Toe USCIS subsequently issued a memorandum regarding updated procedures for determining initial jurisdiction over asylum applications filed by UACs. Memorandum from Ted Kim, USCIS Acting Chief, Asylum Division (May 28, 2013), Updated Procedures for Determination of Initial Jurisdiction over Asylum Applications Filed by Unaccompanied Alien Children, HQRAIO 120/12a (“USCIS memo). This memorandum states that, effective June 10, 2013, in cases in which the Customs and Border Protection (”CBP”) or Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) has already made a determination that an applicant is a UAC, “and that status determination was still in place on the date the asylum application was filed,

Asylum Offices wil1 adopt that determination without another factual inquiry.” Id. at 1-2. The memo goes on to state that “[u]nless there was an affirmative act by [Health and Human

Services], ICE or CBP to terminate the UAC finding before the applicant filed the initial application for asylwn. Asylum Offices will adopt the previous DHS determination that the applicant was a UAC” and “will take jurisdiction over the case.Id at 2 (emphasis supplied). Toe memo further explains that in such cases, where there is a prior UAC determination which is still in place at the time the asylwn application is filed, USCIS will take initial jurisdiction over the case “even if there appears to be evidence that the applicant may have turned 18 years of age or may have reunited with a parent or legal guardian” since the UAC detennination was made. Id

Neither Immigration Judges nor this Board are bound by the USCIS memo cited above. See, e.g., Matter of C. Valdez, 25 l&N Dec. 824, 826 n.1 (BIA 2012) (noting that a USCIS policy memorandum was persuasive, but not binding). However, as USCIS is the agency vested with initial jurisdiction over UAC asylum applications, we would defer to USCIS’s determination of whether it retains jurisdiction over the initial adjudication of an unaccompanied minor’s asylum application.

On the record before us, we concJude that a remand is necessary for a detennination whether this is a case in which the USCIS wouJd take initial jurisdiction over this respondent’s application for asylum. In this regard, further factfinding is needed 1) whether the respondent was determined to be a UAC prior to the initial filing of her asylum application; 2) if so, whether that status has been terminated by an “affirmative act” within the contemplation of the USCIS memo; and 3) whether the announced position of the USCIS as set forth in the USCIS memo has been withdrawn or superseded .

If this respondent comes within the scope of the USCIS memo, the respondent shall be provided the opportunity to pursue an application for asylum before the USCIS. If after additional fact-finding, it is determined that the respondent does not fall within the provisions of this policy memo, the Immigration Judge may certify the case back to the Board . 8 C.F.R .

§ 1003.7.

Accordingly, the following order will be entered .

2

(b) (6)

ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and entry of a new decision.

;       ·

FOR THE BOARD

3

U.S. Pays over $16 million For ‘Return and Reintegration’ of Deported Central Americans

On August 15, 2016 the United States Agency for International Aid (USAID) made a direct payment for $16,813,000.oo to the International Organization For Migration Aid (IOM) for what is euphemistically referred to as “Return and Reintegration in the Northern Triangle” though the place of performance is El Salvador. 

Return is a euphemism for deportation.

 Reintegration, on the other hand, is not as straightforward a translation. In the context of US goals, reintegration means ensuring that those who are deported from the United States or Mexico do not attempt to come to the United States again. 

For those fleeing fatal violence, reintegration means death. 

Here are the project details: 


This almost $17 million aid payment is by far the largest the USAID agency has made to any of the Northern Triangle countries since the exodus of unaccompanied children and families began in 2014. 
What does it say about the United States’ priorities that its biggest payment in foreign aid has been to keep those it deported from returning to the United States?